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PREFACE
This disssertation is concerned with methodology and progress in international trade 
theory, from 1776 to 1981. It is also concerned with the way in which econom ic 
methodologists have analysed the extent o f progress in econom ics in general. 
‘Mainstream econom ic m ethodology,’ it is argued, has focused on positivist 
philosophy o f  science in the hope o f  divining an objective definition o f  scientific 
progress which could be applied to econom ics. For Blaug, for exam ple, econom ic 
m ethodology can "provide criteria for the acceptance and rejection o f  research 
programs, setting standards that will help us discriminate between wheat and chaff" 
(Blaug 1992:247).
Two positivist philosophies o f  science are considered below - Popper’s falsificationism  
and Lakatos’ methodology o f  scientific research programmes. These philosophies are 
considered in the context o f  rational reconstructions undertaken by economic 
m ethodologists o f  specific events in the history o f  econom ic thought. There are two 
problems with this ‘m ethodology o f  econom ic m ethodology.’ Rosenberg pointed out 
that philosophers o f  science have long since given up the search for a unique, 
objective definition o f  scientific progress. In persisting in this search, Rosenberg 
argued that econom ic m ethodologists "have, as it were, attached them selves to a 
degenerating research program "(Rosenberg 1986:136). Another problem is the use o f  
rational reconstructions. Lakatos’ meta-methodological framework, the m ethodology  
o f  historiographic research programmes(1971a), suggests that philosophers o f  science
should reconstruct the history of a science according to various theories of scientific 
rationality The preferred theory of scientific rationality is that which manages to 
explain most of the choices made by scientists in the development of a particular 
science The underlying assumption of this historiographic method is that scientists 
actually used the criteria advocated by the preferred theory of scientific rationality
Lakatos’ historiographic method has been much criticised by philosophers of science, 
who argue that, even if there were an optimal theory of scientific rationality, the 
methodology of historiographic research programmes would be an inadequate method 
of discovering such an optimal theory Yet, ‘mainstream’ economic methodology has 
been devoted in large part to the rational reconstruction of episodes in the 
development of economic theory Are these economic methodologists using the much 
maligned methodology of historiographic research programmes, and therefore 
subscribing to a degenerating research programme as Rosenberg suggests9 This 
dissertation argues that mainstream economic methodologists are not m fact using the 
method of rational reconstruction in the way proposed by Lakatos Rather, the failure 
to reveal a ‘closeness of fit’ between the actual history of economic thought and 
positivist rational reconstructions has forced mainstream economic methodologists into 
a Kuhman-type analysis of what it is that economists actually do This particular use 
of rational reconstruction by mainstream economic methodology is not, however, a 
full-blown, sociological Kuhnian analysis This is because economic methodologists 
have tended to treat Kuhn’s philosophy of science as if it were another positivist 
philosophy advocating an alternative objective theory of scientific rationality 
Economic methodology, it is argued, has failed to fully take on board, Kuhn’s call for 
a sociological approach to the analysis of scientific progress However, the method of
rational reconstruction m economic methodology is not a degenerating one It has 
yielded many useful insights into the actual practice of economics
Part two of the dissertation considers the use of rational reconstruction as a means of 
revealing the underlying definitions of progress used by mtemational trade theorists 
International trade theory is an interestmg case study in that economists themselves 
have tended to pinpomt mtemational trade theory as a relatively unprogressive branch 
of economics (until recently) Economic methodologists, too, have suggested that 
mtemational trade theory is lacking m progress Blaug, for example, has described 
international trade theory as "a field of economic specialization that seems peculiarly 
prone to the disease of formalism" (Blaug 1992 190) The arguments presented in Part 
Two of this dissertation show that this notion of mtemational trade theory arises out of 
a particularly narrow reconstruction of the history of mtemational trade theory
A modified version of Chapter 6, entitled ‘A Lakatosian Approach to Change in 
International Trade Theory’ will appear in History o f  Political Economy, no 3, 1994
The accompanying bibliography contains all works referenced m the text In addition, 
however, there are also included some works which, while not directly referred to in 
the text, were used as general sources of information
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PART ONE
TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE 
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This part of the dissertation considers the influence of three twentieth century 
philosophies of science - Popper’s methodological falsificatiomsm, Kuhn’s scientific 
revolutions, and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes - on 
economic methodology
Philosophy of science deals with scientific knowledge on three levels Level one is 
concerned with the method of a science, with its "intellectual accountancy"(Toulmin 
1970 553) At this level, philosophers of science debate how  scientists might choose 
between scientific theories At the next level, philosophers of science are concerned 
with why certain criteria for theory-choice might be adopted This epistemological 
analysis considers the underlying rationale to the method adopted by scientists 
Method and epistemology together form methodology On the third level,
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philosophers of science deal with an ontological issue - the relation of scientific 
concepts to reality Philosophers of science have generally confined the bulk of their 
analysis to the first two levels "the central problem of philosophy of science is the 
problem of normative appraisal of scientific theories, and, m particular, the problem 
of stating universal conditions under which a theory is scientific" (Lakatos and Zahar 
1976 335) However, implicit in methodological analysis is some ontological stance
McMullm classified different philosophies of science according to the way m which 
their methodology was established (McMullm 1970) "Externalist philosophy of 
science - PSE" presents an abstract theory of how science progresses (McMullm 
1970 24) This theory of science gives a set of criteria by which scientists may choose 
between theories in order to ensure that science progresses - the method PSE is 
abstract in that "it does not rest upon any analysis of the strategies followed by those 
who would regard themselves as ’scientists’" (McMullm 1970 24) McMullm divided 
PSE into two categories PSM where M = methodological, and PSL where L = 
logic In addition to presenting a method, PSM also presents an underlymg 
justification or rationality for the method it espouses PSL, on the other hand, is 
concerned solely with the construction of scientific theories and their relation to the 
formal rules of logic (McMullm 1970 25)
In opposition to PSE is "internalist philosophy of science - PSI" (McMullm 1970 27) 
PSI is an historic theory of science progresses "The response of these [PSI] writers is
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to say that rationality ought to be defined by what is found in the history and practice 
of science rather than set out formally in advance and imposed upon history" 
(McMullin 1978 239) Thus, PSI "presupposes an already-functioning methodology, 
whose pragmatic success is a sufficient warrant of its adequacy as a heuristic" 
(McMullm 1970 27)
Both PSE and PSI use the history of science The externalist philosopher dips into the 
history of a science, intermittently, looking for examples of actual scientific progress 
that support his particular theory of science The internalist philosopher, on the other 
hand, scans the history of a science m order to identify the method actually used In 
both cases, it is most commonly the history of physics which is the focus of analysis
Of the mam philosophies of science considered here, Popper’s falsificatiomsm is an 
externalist philosophy and more specifically a PSM, Kuhn’s theory of scientific 
revolutions is an internalist philosophy, Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research 
programmes is, like Popper’s, a PSM These three theories of science have had the 
greatest influence on modem economic methodology
Such has been the influence of philosophy of science in general on economic 
methodology that it could be described as a branch of philosophy rather than a branch 
of economics Modem economic methodology has been criticised for not providing 
the practicing economist with a set of methodological criteria to ensure progress in
3
economics But philosophers of science have long since recogmsed that it is "an 
illusion that there can exist in any science methodological rules the mere adoption of 
which will hasten its progress" (Klappholz and Agassi 1959 74) This plurality of 
theories of scientific progress has drawn economic methodologists onto another level 
of philosophical debate Economic methodologists have now been faced with the task 
of establishing criteria to allow them to choose, not between scientific theories, but 
between theories of science or methodologies "[Sjetting standards that will help us 
discriminate between wheat and chaff" (Blaug 1992 247), has involved much more 
debate on philosophical issues than debate on issues pertaining to the actual practice of 
economics
Does this mean that economic methodology has not managed to meet its aims? This 
section is concerned with the following questions i, has economic methodology, m an 
externalist agenda, given methodological prescriptions which practising economists 
have followed with some success, and 11, has it, in an internalist agenda, identified a 
progressive methodology within economics9
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CHAPTER ONE
1 1 AN OUTLINE OF POPPERIAN FA L SIFIC A T IO N S
Popper’s methodological falsificatiomsm is the prime example of an externalist 
philosophy of science Falsificatiomsm sets down a p n o n  a set of criteria or standards 
by which the scientist chooses between scientific theories m such a way as to ensure 
that his science progresses Popper’s falsificatiomsm developed out of a criticism of 
the logical positivist school and then- particular treatment of Hume’s problem of 
induction
Logical positivism dominated the philosophy of science in the early part of this 
century The major players were Schlick, Neurath and Carnap in Austria (known as 
the Vienna Circle), and Ayer m Britain (Hamlyn 1987 306) Logical positivism makes 
a distinction between meaningful and meaningless statements on the basis of their 
relationship to observable phenomena Specifically, scientific statements are 
meaningful because they are verifiable by observation Metaphysical statements, on 
the other hand, are meamngless because they are not verifiable by observation 
Logical positivism is commonly presented as a cohesive, almost dogmatic philosophy 
In fact, there were many debates within the school (Hamlyn 1987 308) What is
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presented here, are the elements of logical positivism which Popper specifically 
objected to Popper’s primary objection to logical positivism was that it ignored 
Hume’s criticism of the inductive method of verification
Hume (1748) argued that a scientific statement cannot be verified as true on the basis 
of compatibility with real phenomena, regardless of the number of times this 
compatibility is observed The acceptance of the inductive method of verification was, 
Popper argued, a major flaw in the logical positivist philosophy Acceptmg Hume’s 
criticism means acceptmg that all statements are equally conjectural m nature, whether 
metaphysical or scientific Neither type of statement can be verified as true simply by 
repeated corroborative observations Popper argued that, given this similarity between 
scientific and metaphysical statements, the only distinction between science and 
metaphysics could be that which is made on the basis of method, not of meaning 
(Popper 1979 1-31) The method Popper proposed was falsificatiomsm He argued 
that, while scientific statements could not be verified by corroborative observations, 
they could be falsified by contradictory observations Since metaphysical statements 
cannot be falsified, this provides a demarcation of method between the two modes of 
thought
It should be pointed out that Popper was opposed to a specific form of induction, 
"mstantiomst induction" (Grunbaum 1976 122) This is the notion that scientific 
hypotheses can be verified solely by repetitions of corroborative observations While
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this form of inductive validation was acceptable to the logical positivists, it was not 
acceptable to all inductive philosophers Francis Bacon was one of the first to dispute 
the validity of mstantiomst induction (Grunbaum 1976 118) He developed tables of 
presence, absence and degrees to develop a notion of relative appraisal of theories He 
conceded that mstantiomst mduction would not verify a theory, but argued that the 
relative verity of two theories could be established (Losee 1980 65) This notion of 
relative appraisal was later adopted by Mill, in his methods of agreement and 
difference (Mill 1843)
The notion that all knowledge is conjectural means that all are equally likely to be true 
(Popper 1972 Appendix 11) Taking this notion that all knowledge is conjecture to its 
extreme results m an instrumentalist methodology Instrumentalism holds that science 
can never explain natural phenomena, but only predict them The incapacity to explain 
arises out of the acceptance of Hume’s argument that scientific theories cannot be 
verified by repeated confirming instances This, coupled with the modus ponens rule 
of logic that truth cannot be passed backwards from the initial premises of a theory to 
its predictions, leads to the conclusion that the only way of choosing between 
scientific theories is on the grounds of their relative success as predictors Science 
should therefore be composed of predictive devices, not of causal theories For 
Popper, instrumentalism places an intolerable limit on the scope of science
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If instrumentalism were true, then all scientific theories would be nothing but 
computation rules Consequently, there could be no fundamental differences 
between the theories of the so-called pure sciences, such as Newton’s 
dynamics, and those technological computation rules which we encounter 
everywhere in the applied sciences and engineering (Popper 1983 113)
Popper described instrumentalist science as "an activity of gadget-making - glorified 
plumbing" (Popper 1983 122) Giedymin took exception to Popper’s interpretation of 
instrumentalism where "instrumentalists deprive theoretical statements of the 
descriptive functions" (Giedymin 1976 201) For Giedymin, instrumentalism as an 
epistemological stance "allows not one but several methodological stances"
(Giedymm, 1976 203) Popper, on the other hand, implied that an extreme fallibilist 
stance could only lead to a instrumentalist methodology Popper, while arguing that 
all knowledge is conjecture, combined his fallibilism with a realist ontology in order 
to avoid this extreme fallibilism Popper believed that theoretical concepts can refer to 
real entities In order to demonstrate this, he had to give a set of criteria by which 
scientists could show one scientific theory to be closer to the truth than others
The Poppenan methodology of science is "a method of trial and the elimination of 
errors, of proposing theories and submitting them to the severest tests we can design" 
(Popper 1979 16) While the scientist can never confirm the truth of his theory, he
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may satisfy himself that it is a good theory if it stands up to his best attempts to falsify 
it Popper’s theory of science is based on the following theory of rationality the 
scientist will not accept confirmations of the predictions of his hypothesis as evidence 
of the hypothesis’ truth-status Rather, he will attempt to falsify his hypothesis by 
subjecting it to severe tests If these tests prove the hypothesis to be false, then the 
scientist will reject it Popper did mention the possibility of immunizing a theory 
against criticism by making ad hoc adjustments to the theory in order that it remain 
unfalsified (Popper 1979 30) Such an action, however, clearly contravenes Popper’s 
theory of rationality, and he excluded it from his model of how science should 
progress
Popper gave three requirements that a new theory must fulfil if it is to be 
characterised as a good theory
The new theory should proceed from some simple, new, and powerful, 
unifying idea about some connection or relation between hitherto 
unconnected things or facts or new "theoretical entities"
we require that the new theory should be independently testable
We require that the theory should pass some new, and severe, tests 
(Popper 1963 241-242)
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The criteria upon which Popper judged scientific theories are, therefore, novelty, 
testability, and success in passing tests All three criteria must be met before the 
theory can be said to constitute an addition to scientific knowledge If all three are 
satisfied they ensure that the newly proposed theory is not ad hoc Popper defined an 
ad  hoc theory as one which seeks to explain a phenomenon by using that phenomenon 
in the construction of the theory as a theory which employs circular reasoning 
Popper argued that the criterion of independent testability prevents the acceptance of 
such ad  hoc theories as valid The criterion of independent testability asserts that a 
theory must be testable in a way that is independent of the phenomenon it is 
attempting to predict The theory must also actually be tested It is the actual 
refutation of a theory which, for Popper, marks scientific progress New theories are 
built upon the refutations of old theories They both encapsulate and contradict the 
old, refuted theories
the new theory, although it has to explain what the old theory explained, 
corrects the old theory, so that it actually contradicts the old theory it 
contains the old theory, but only as an approximation Thus I pomted out that 
Newton’s theory contradicts both Kepler’s and Galileo’s theories - although it 
explains them, owing to the fact that it contains them as approximations 
(Popper 1979 16)
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It is the continual process of conjecture and refutation which gives science its 
dynamic, in Popper’s methodology This process turns on the test to which scientists 
submit their theories But this test, m turn, assumes the prior acceptance, by the 
scientist, of some other scientific knowledge as true Without this prior acceptance, 
the result is an infinite regress Popper conceded this
Every test of a theory, whether resultmg m its corroboration or falsification, 
must stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept If we 
do not come to any decision, and do not accept some basic statement or 
other, then the test will have led nowhere (Popper 1972 104)
For Popper, scientific theories are built upon the foundation of "background 
knowledge" (Popper 1972 102) The background knowledge of the natural scientist is 
comprised of "basic statements" and "universal laws" (Popper 1972 102) Umversal 
laws are those regularities perceived m nature, which, although their future existence 
cannot be guaranteed, are for the most part unquestioned by scientists Basic 
statements are "singular existential statements" which have themselves been severely 
tested and are yet to be falsified (Popper 1972 102) The scientific community takes a 
decision as to which statements are to be mcluded in background knowledge 
Agreement on basic statements is part of the process of testing a theory "Agreement 
upon the acceptance or rejection of basic statements is reached, as a rule, on the
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occasion of applying a theory, the agreement, m fact, is part of an application which 
puts the theory to the test" (Popper 1972 106)
This agreement between scientists to hold some knowledge as foundational smacks of 
conventionalist philosophy of science Conventionalism stresses a number of criteria, 
including simplicity, clarity and mathematical precision, to choose between scientific 
theories These criteria have then- roots in the ontological beliefs of the middle ages, 
such as Occam’s belief that nature always follows the simplest course None of the 
criteria suggested by conventionalism are empirical For this reason, Popper argued 
that the conventionalist will remain undisturbed by falsifications of his theory "he 
will explain away the inconsistencies which may have arisen, or he will eliminate 
them by suggesting ad  hoc the adoption of certain auxiliary hypotheses" (Popper 
1972 80) For Popper, such ad hoc adjustments to a theory were the mark of bad 
science Popper distinguished between falsificatiomsm and conventionalism by arguing 
that, while he instructed the scientist to hold some knowledge as foundational, the 
scientist should never hold this knowledge to be true
Individual basic statements are never elevated to the status of universally true 
statements They remain potentially falsifiable, although their ability to defy severe 
tests makes them candidates for background knowledge Thus, falsificatiomsm is 
distinguished from both conventionalism and positivism
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I differ from the conventionalist in holding that the statements decided by 
agreement are not universal but singular And I differ from the positivist m 
holdmg that basic statements are not justifiable by our immediate 
experiences, but are, from a logical point of view, accepted by an act, by a 
free decision (Popper 1972 109)
The background knowledge should only be accepted tentatively by scientists Popper 
did concede that in practice, "almost all of the vast amount of background knowledge 
which we constantly use in any informal discussion will, for practical reasons, 
necessarily remain unquestioned" (Popper 1963 238) Popper pointed to "something 
like a law of diminishing returns from repeated tests" (Popper 1963 240) By this 
Popper meant that in order to maintain the severity of tests, scientists should review 
background knowledge regularly
Relative appraisal, in Popper’s methodology, is dependent on the relative extent to 
which theories are corroborated Popper defined corroboration in the following way
By the degree of corroboration of a theory I mean a concise report evaluating 
the state (at a certain time t) of the critical discussion of a theory, with 
respect to the way it solves its problems, its degree of testability, the severity
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of tests it has undergone, and the way it has stood up to these tests 
Corroboration is thus an evaluating report of past performance (Popper 
1979 18)
A theory with a high degree of corroboration does not assume truth-status It can, 
however, be said to be a better theory than those which have failed tests The theory is 
better in the sense that it is "a better approximation to the truth" (Popper 1979 47) 
Popper argued that the degree of corroboration of a theory (relative to some other) is 
indicative of that theory’s verisimilitude It is not, he was anxious to point out, a 
measure of versimilitude of a theory (Popper 1979 103) This would have been too 
close to another theory of induction, for Popper’s comfort (Popper 1979 103) But 
what of the common situation where the scientist is confronted with two false 
theories9 In this case, falsificatiomst methodology would appear to have him discard 
both Theories are, of necessity, limited cognitive constructions of real phenomena 
As such, it is likely that all theories will be falsified by at least one piece of empirical 
evidence Where theories are probabilistic rather than deterministic, there may simply 
be too much falsification to allow science to progress by discardmg all falsified 
theories Popper recogmsed this, and used the concept of corroboration to develop a 
means by which scientists might choose between false theories
Popper argued that the concept of corroboration, indicating as it does verisimilitude, 
allows him to "conjecture that Einstein’s theory of gravity is not true, but that it is a
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better approximation to the truth than Newton’s" (Popper 1979 335) Thus, 
verisimilitude is to do with the relative appraisal of fa lse  theories It introduces the 
notion that it is possible to compare in some way the relative degree of falsity within 
two theories Faced with a plethora of false theories, versimilitude can give the 
scientist an indication of which are the best theories to hold on to and which should be 
discarded
Grunbaum showed that the notion that scientists can make a choice between two false 
theories conflicts with Popper’s earlier insistence that two false theories each have a 
truth probability of zero (Grunbaum 1976 127) If Popper retamed the premise that 
the truth probability of all false theories is zero, then his theory of "quantitative 
verisimilitude" cannot logically hold, there can be no empirically based method of 
choosing between two false theories (see also Miller 1985) If scientists deal with 
theories which are probabilistic m nature and therefore likely to fail at least one test, 
then falsificatiomsm cannot provide a methodology which ensures progress 
Verisimilitude is not compatible with falsificatiomsm, and cannot save it
It is difficult to see how the concept of versimilitude can be workable - how scientists 
can choose between two equally false theories - unless some inductive criteria are 
permitted Lakatos added these mductive criteria m his methodology of scientific 
research programmes (Lakatos 1970) This philosophy of science and its impact on 
economic methodology is examined in chapter three
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Popper himself indicated that the theories of the social sciences are false because they 
are over-simplified (Popper 1976 103) Yet, he argued that they can be relatively 
assessed m order to establish which are the best approximations to the truth (Popper 
1976 103) This indicates that verisimilitude is a particularly important concept with 
respect to theory-choice m the social sciences (Hands 1991 69) But it also indicates 
that falsificatiomsm cannot be the optimal methodology for the social sciences 
Section 1 4 considers how a falsification^ agenda in economics, and particularly m 
econometrics, reflects these problems in Popper’s falsificatiomsm Before an 
examination of this issue, however, Poppenan falsificatiomsm is compared to a 
methodology developed by a practising economist - Friedman’s methodology of 
positive economics
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1 2 ON FRIEDMAN’S METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS AND 
F A L SIF IC A T IO N S
The two mam influences on economic methodology have been Popper’s 
falsificatiomsm, and Friedman’s methodology of positive economics Friedman’s 
paper ’The Methodology of Positive Economics’ (1953 hereafter MPE) has been 
described by Caldwell as a "marketing masterpiece" because of the longevity of the 
debate it sparked off (Caldwell 1984 226)
Classifying Friedman’s methodology is problematic This is compounded by the fact 
that Friedman was somewhat schizophrenic with regard to the philosophical influences 
underlying his methodology While Friedman agreed with Boland that his was an 
instrumentalist methodology (Caldwell 1984 226), he intimated to Hirsch that he 
could see no sources of conflict between his methodological framework, and that of 
Popper (Hirsch and de Marchi 1990 6) Frazer and Boland (1983) attempt to 
rationalise Friedman’s position by defining him as a short-run instrumentalist but a 
long-run Popperian Hands argued that, with the failure of the concept of 
verisimilitude, Popper’s methodology deflates to instrumentalism (Hands 1991 75) If 
this is so, then the distinction between Friedman (as instrumentalist) and Popper is 
automatically removed
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Given the extent of the debate over MPE, it is surprisingly non-contentious, which 
perhaps explains the narrowness of the response to it "The philosophical response to 
this article, which is in fact extensive, is also embarrassing for its concentration on 
philosophical minutiae" (Ackermann 1983 390) Stanley argued, not so much that 
Friedman’s paper is non-contentious, but that it is ambiguous in the extreme (Stanley 
1985 307) Stanley criticised Friedman for his failure to state clearly his 
methodological position "a simple reference to the literature or a smgle explicit 
statement could have avoided the decades of confusion and senseless debate this essay 
has generated" (Stanley 1985 307) This section examines the mam aspects of this 
debate, m the light of Stanley’s objections to it, and considers whether any final 
conclusions can be drawn on the relationship between the methodology of positive 
economics and Popper’s falsificatiomsm
The core of MPE is represented in the following quotation
a theory cannot be refuted by comparmg its ’assumptions’ directly with 
’reality’ Indeed, there is no meaningful way m which this can be done 
Complete ’realism’ is clearly unattainable, and the question whether a theory 
is realistic ’enough’ can be settled only by seeing whether it yields 
predictions that are good enough for the purpose m hand or that are better
18
than predictions from alternative theories (Friedman 1984 237)
There are a number of different methodological issues contained m this quotation 
Different economic methodologists have picked up on particular issues in order to 
attempt to classify Friedman’s methodology
Boland argued that at the core of Friedman’s paper is a recogmtion of two basic rules 
of logic (Boland 1979) Modus ponens is the rule of logic which states that truth is 
passed forward m a deductive argument from initial assumptions to conclusions It is 
the corrollary of the modus tollens rule that falsity is passed backwards from the 
conclusion to at least one of the initial assumptions The implication of modus ponens 
is "if your argument is logical, then whenever all of your assumptions (or premises) 
are true all of your conclusions will be true as well" (Boland 1979 504) Accordmg to 
Boland, Friedman was arguing that reverse modus ponens and reverse modus tollens 
are illogical (Boland 1979 512) Accordmg to Boland, Friedman was arguing, i that 
a theory whose predictions are not falsified by observation is not necessarily based on 
true assumptions, and u that a theory whose initial assumptions are false will not 
necessarily produce false predictions
Friedman was particularly concerned with how an economist might choose between 
two equally successful predictors In this case, he argued that the choice cannot be 
made on the basis of reverse modus ponens The economist cannot hold the theory
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with the more realistic assumptions to be the better theory, because truth is not passed 
backwards from conclusions to premises but rather forwards from premises to 
conclusions
The emphasis which Friedman placed on prediction prompted Boland to classify him 
as an instrumentalist (Boland 1979 503) An instrumentalist interpretation of 
Friedman’s MPE was a common one (see, for example, Bear and Orr 1967, 
Coddington, 1972, Wong, 1973)
In traditional, Berkeleyian instrumentalism, theorists are concerned solely with the 
predictive accuracy of their theories Theories are used solely as tools or 
computational techniques for prediction, not as explanatory devices Newtoman 
mechamcs, for example, becomes solely a tool for prediction If these laws of 
mechanics are concerned only with prediction, their initial assumptions need bear no 
resemblance to actual phenomena
In MPE, Friedman did stress the importance of the prediction of, as distinct from the 
explanation for, economic phenomena He argued that "the only relevant test of the 
validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience" (Friedman 
1984 214) There is quite substantial evidence m MPE of instrumentalist prescription 
This interpretation of Friedman as an instrumentalist was first suggested by Samuelson 
(Samuelson 1963 231) Samuelson interpreted Friedman as saymg that "the
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j~ (empirical) unrealism of the theory "itself," or of its "assumptions," is quite irrelevant 
to its validity and worth" (Samuelson 1963 232) He called this, Friedman’s "F-twist" 
(Samuelson 1963 231) Not only did Friedman believe the truth-status of theories to 
be irrelevant, Samuelson suggested that Friedman also believed "it is a positive merit 
of a theory that (some of) its content and assumptions be unrealistic" (Samuelson 
1963 233, italics not in original).
Samuelson’s definition of unrealism differs from Friedman’s, and as a result, 
Samuelson misrepresented Friedmans’ methodological position Samuelson equated 
’unrealistic’ with ’false’ in his discussion of the "F-Twist" Friedman, Samuelson 
argued, "is fundamentally wrong m thinking that unrealism m the sense of factual 
inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of approximation is anything but a demerit for a 
theory or hypothesis" (Samuelson 1963 233) Musgrave pointed out that Friedman’s 
error "stems from unclanty about what is stated by a negligibility assumption" 
(Musgrave 1981 380) Friedman was concerned, not with the "factual inaccuracy" of 
a theory, but rather with its "descriptive inaccuracy" (Fnedmand 1984 218)
Friedman held theories to be descriptively inaccurate, m the sense of being 
descriptively incomplete a theory is "descriptively inaccurate" where "it takes account 
of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, smce its very 
success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained" (Friedman 
1984 218) Thus, for Friedman, theories are necessarily unrealistic and false because
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they are incomplete descriptions This descriptive limitation does not matter, 
according to Friedman, if the theory is an accurate predictor, because predictive 
accuracy shows that the theorist has captured all the necessary independent variables 
m his theory
A meaningful scientific hypothesis or theory typically asserts that certain 
forces are, and other forces are not, important in understanding a particular 
class of phenomena It is frequently convement to present such a hypothesis 
by stating that the phenomena it is desired to predict behave m a world of 
observation as i/they occurred m a hypothetical and highly simplified world 
containing only the forces that the hypothesis asserts to be important 
(Friedman 1984 236)
For Musgrave, the classification of Friedman as an instrumentalist is borne out of 
Friedman’s failure to clarify his particular interpretation of the falsity of a theory 
(Musgrave 1981 380)
Hirsch and de Marchi (1990) argued strongly against Boland’s interpretation of 
Friedman as an instrumentalist, on the grounds that if Friedman were an 
instrumentalist, he would have discarded theory altogether and concentrated solely on 
correlations in his practice of economics Hirsch and de Marchi argued that, while on 
the grounds of MPE alone, Friedman appeared to espouse an instrumentalist
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methodology, m practice he made every attempt to ensure the realism of initial 
assumptions (Hirsch and de Marchi 1990 155) Despite the fact that economists will, 
of necessity, derive unrealistic, "as if" hypotheses, "for Friedman these "as if" 
accounts are not so many hot-air balloons floated freely aloft They are firmly 
anchored by the problems and data one starts with" (Hirsch and de Marchi 1990 155)
There is an important epistemological foundation to instrumentalism In contrast to 
realism, instrumentalism maintains that theories do not pertain to phenomena, they 
have no truth-status It is difficult to conclude that Friedman adopted this stance m the 
light of Hirsch and de Marchi’s elucidation of the methodology inherent in Friedman’s 
practice of economics
It is perhaps in Friedman’s 1944 review of Lange’s ’Price Flexibility and 
Unemployment’ that one finds the clearest description of Friedman’s methodology 
"The theorist starts with some set of observed and related facts" (Friedman 1944 618) 
This presupposes some theory about which facts are related Friedman made this point 
in MPE "A theory is the way we perceive ‘facts,’ and we cannot perceive "facts" 
without a theory" (Friedman 1984 232) The theorist "seeks a generalization that will 
explain these facts" (Friedman 1944 618) In the following elucidation of Friedman’s 
methodology, it appears that explanation has an equally important role to prediction
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[The researcher] tests his theory to make sure that it is logically consistent,
that its elements are susceptible of empirical determination and that it will
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explain adequately the facts he started with He then seeks to deduce from his 
theory facts other than those he used to derive it, and to check these 
deductions against reality Typically some deduced "facts" check, others do 
not, so he revises his theory to take account of the additional facts (Friedman 
1944 618)
Both in this paper, and m MPE, Friedman expressed the belief that theories must be 
constructed in such a way as to make them potentially falsifiable For Friedman, the 
"crucial question" is "[w]hat observed facts would contradict the generalization 
suggested" (Friedman 1944 618) Thus, MPE contains shades of falsificatiomsm 
However, Friedman was not prepared to reject a probability hypothesis on the grounds 
of just a single falsification For Friedman, a successful hypothesis is one which is an 
accurate predictor, most o f the time But if the occasional falsification is allowed, then 
how do economists choose between probability hypotheses9
Popper attempted to resolve this issue using the degree of corroboration as an 
indicator of a theory’s verisimilitude (Popper 1972 335) Friedman, on the other 
hand, adopted conventionalist criteria
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The choice between alternative hypotheses equally consistent with the 
available evidence must to some extent be arbitrary, though there is general 
agreement that relevant considerations are suggested by the criteria 
’simplicity’ and ’fruitfulness,’ themselves notions that defy completely 
objective specification (Friedman 1984 215)
Friedman argued that these conventionalist criteria were employed by econometricians 
in order to solve the identification problem (Friedman 1984 240) Friedman conceded 
that such a process is "entirely arbitrary" but insisted that it was the only way of 
"selecting among the alternative hypotheses equally consistent with the evidence" 
(Friedman 1984 240)
From 1948 until his publication of his re-specification of the Quantity Theory m 1957, 
Friedman compiled monetary statistics Hirsch and de Marchi argued that this 
preliminary empirical investigation showed that Friedman was concerned to make 
"concrete problems and carefully compiled data" the foundation of his analysis 
(Hirsch and de Marchi 1990 155)
This starting pomt of the development of a theory is also described m MPE Friedman 
stressed that "empirical evidence is vital at two different, though closely related,
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stages in constructing hypotheses and m testing their validity" (Friedman 1984 217) 
The development of a theory could only begin with "full and comprehensive evidence 
in the phenomena to be generalized or ’explained’" (Friedman 1984 217) This will 
ensure that the hypothesis is not "contradicted in advance by experience that has 
already been observed" (Friedman 1984 217) The next step was to derive from this 
hypothesis, "new facts capable of being observed but not previously known and 
checking those deduced facts against additional empirical evidence" (Friedman 
1984 217)
This methodology appears to be very similar to Mill’s inductive method However, 
Hirsch and de Marchi argued that Friedman’s methodology owes more to American 
pragmatism, and m particular that of Dewey, than it does to Mill’s empiricism (Hirsch 
and de Marchi 1990 chapter 6)
Friedman’s work on monetarism took the form of a curious loop from observation to 
deduction and back to observation, until the final specification of the theory - the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis - was tested m 1963
Friedman’s 1948 paper provides evidence of his belief m the overriding importance of 
monetary transmission mechamsms in price and income determination, prio r  to his 
collection of monetary statistics Friedman cannot therefore be said to be concerned in 
the first instance with measurement to the exclusion of any notion of an underlying
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theory By 1948, Friedman was able to conduct an mdirect comparison of the 
predictive ability of the Keynesian income/expenditure model and the Quantity 
Theory, of price and mcome changes in three wartime periods This suggests that 
Friedman did have at least an embryonic version of a theory of demand for money 
prior to his restatement of the Quantity Theory m 1957 Durmg the late fifties and 
early sixties, Friedman refined the Quantity Theory and added to it the Permanent 
Income Hypothesis as an alternative to the Keynesian consumption function In 1963, 
Friedman and Meiselman undertook a test of the relative accuracy of the predictions 
of consumption by the income/expenditure model and by the Quantity Theory for the 
period 1897 to 1958 Theorists were not happy to accept Fnedman and Meiselman’s 
conclusion that the Quantity Theory is a more accurate predictor Instead there 
developed an argument over the validity of the methods used to test the theories, and 
the specifications of the models used to represent them That Friedman and 
Meiselman’s conclusions led to debate over the nature of tests and models rather than 
to debate on the relative validity of the theories, is not surprising given the lack of 
consensus m econometrics over which tests are conclusive and which models are 
complete specifications of particular theories
Tests cannot be conclusive if economists do not agree as to which are the crucial tests 
In a reply to Ando and Modigliani, and to DePrano and Mayer, who were the mam 
critics of the Fnedman/Meiselman tests, Friedman and Meiselman remarked "[a]mong 
us, we have produced more measures than there are critics [a]nd all of us harbour
27
serious doubts about the measures we settled on" (Friedman and Meiselman 
1966 754) Friedman’s concern with predictive accuracy forced him to concede that 
he may have chosen a test which was biased against the income/expenditure theory 
and "as a result may have led to too sweeping a conclusion about its lack of 
conformity with experience" (Friedman and Meiselman 1966 784) Friedman was, of 
course, fully aware of the arbitrariness with which different models of a theory are 
adopted "it is an entirely arbitrary subdivision of the process of deciding on a 
particular hypothesis that is on a par with many other subdivisions that may be 
convement for one purpose or another or that may suit the psychological needs of 
particular investigators" (Friedman 1984 240)
This to-mg and fro-ing between hypothesis and observation, before arriving at an 
ultimate hypothesis is described by Hirsch and de Marchi "We have to do here, then 
with a continuous process of inquiry in which observation, the derivation of 
hypotheses, the testing of implications and the use of revised hypotheses in generating 
new, testable implications, succeed each other in a never-endmg round" (Hirsch and 
de Marchi 1990 157) This "continuous process of inquiry" sets Friedman’s 
methodology apart from that of Mill Friedman himself noted this distinction 
(Friedman 1962, quoted in Hirsch and de Marchi 1990 45) In addition, where Mill 
derived laws from introspection, Friedman attempted to derive them from objective 
data
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Positive economics, then, starts from observed correlations These take the place of 
the umversal regularities of the natural sciences Hypotheses are deductively formed to 
attempt to predict these regularities These hypotheses are specified as stochastic 
hypotheses As such, it is accepted that they will be false m general What is hoped 
for, is to find a particular hypothesis which will be a successful predictor most of the 
time To this end, a hypothesis is compared to sample data and adjusted where 
appropriate, to account for any previously omitted variables This process should 
ensure that no theory is accepted unless it has a reasonable level of success as a 
predictor Thus, Friedman does appear to be a short-run instrumentalist, as Frazer and 
Boland argued (Frazer and Boland 1983) However, Friedman cannot be considered a 
long-run Poppenan
The mam methodological problem for the ’positive economist’ is m choosing between 
two equally successful predictors In this case, the economist cannot legitimately 
choose between the theories on the basis of the relative realism of their initial 
assumptions (In any case, the continual appeal to sample data throughout the 
development of the hypothesis is likely to ensure that the initial assumptions do reflect 
real phenomena) The ’positive economist’ must, at this stage, resort to arbitrary 
criteria for theory-choice such as simplicity, clarity, or precision The ’Poppenan 
economist, ’ on the other hand, would attempt to establish the relative degree of
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corroboration of each theory in order to indicate the relative vensmilitude of each 
theory
In practice, however, neither the ’positive economist’ nor the ’Poppenan economist’ 
is likely to reach this stage of evaluation This is because the potential for several 
different models to specify a theory makes it impossible to judge between theories on 
the grounds of how well models predict Thus, Friedman’s methodology of positive 
economics reaches the same impasse as Haavelmo’s probabilistic methodology in 
econometrics Friedman, like Haavelmo, was stuck at a level of theory-development 
prior to the issue of relative theory-choice For philosophy of science, the only way 
out of this impasse was to permit inductive criteria in the evaluation of scientific 
theories (Lakatos 1970) Economic methodologists, however, continued to debate the 
relevance of falsificatiomsm for economics for nearly two decades more (The last 
comprehensive study of the Popperian influence in economics was de Marchi (1988) 
This text had the air of finality about it, notable even in its title, The Poppenan  
Legacy in Economics)
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1 3 DO ECONOMISTS FALSIFY9
The extent to which Poppenan terminology has successfully infiltrated almost all fields 
of economics has been well documented (for example, Blaug 1980, 1992, Caldwell 
1982, 1991, de Marchi 1988) However, the extent to which Poppenan methodology 
has been adopted by practismg economists is less certain It has been argued that 
economists pay only "lip service" to the methodological prescriptions entailed m 
falsificatiomsm (de Marchi 1976 109) The most obvious place to look for evidence of 
falsificatiomsm in economics is the field of econometrics, since it is econometrics 
which seeks to quantify economic theories and compare these theories to observable 
economic phenomena This section considers those economists who directly 
introduced Poppenan methodology mto economics, and considers the role of 
falsificatiomsm in econometrics
Popper came to the London School of Economics m 1946 His appointment to the 
philosophy department was particularly encouraged by the chair of economics at the 
time, Lionel Robbins Popper professed to have gamed a knowledge of the nature of 
economics from Robbins (Popper 1957 143) In the Poverty o f Histoncism  (1957), 
Popper refered the reader to Robbins’ 1935 text, An Essay on the Nature and 
Significance o f  Economic Science Despite this link between Popper and Robbins,
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there is a conflict between Popper’s methodological prescriptions for economics and 
the common interpretation of Robbin’s views on the nature of economics
Popper held that the only difference between economics and the natural sciences is the 
extent to which successful testmg can be carried out
In physics, for example, the parameters of our equations can, m principle, be 
reduced to a small number of constants - a reduction which has been 
successfully earned out m many important cases This is not so in economics, 
here our parameters are themselves in the most important cases quickly 
changing variables This clearly reduces the significance, mterpretability, and 
testability of measurements (Popper 1957 143)
Popper acknowledged the difficulties mvolved in quantify mg economic theories, but 
still maintained that attempts should be made since, for Popper, falsification was the 
optimal form of criticism Robbms, on the other hand, is often depicted as stressmg 
the qualitative nature of economic theory and as denying the possibility of deriving 
quantifiable and testable economic theory (for example, Rosenberg 1983 309, de 
Marchi 1988 144) It is difficult to see how Popper could have claimed his views on 
quantification and falsification in economics to be consistent with Robbin’s views on 
the nature of economics as they are most commonly interpreted
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Robbins, while he did not place much importance on the quantification of economic 
theory, was not anti-quantification (O’Brien 1988, see also the debate between 
Hutchison and de Marchi m de Marchi 1988) There is some evidence m support of 
O’Brien’s interpretation in Robbm’s 1938 paper Here, Robbins argued that "the 
appropriate method of economics is the construction and development of hypotheses 
suggested by the study of reality and the testing of the applicability of the results by 
reference back to reality" (Robbins 1938 346) Indeed, he called for more 
quantification in economics "there is not yet nearly enough quantitative investigation 
of the applicability of the conclusions to which recent theoretical developments have 
given rise" (Robbins 1938 347) For Robbins, therefore, economics was 
fundamentally an empirical science, and a science which could be subjected to 
empirical testing although he did not distinguish between testing for verification or 
falsification However, Robbms did advocate a division of labour in economics While 
he conceded that quantification might be a useful and, indeed, necessary exercise, it 
was one he was not overly anxious to get involved in
Hutchison’s 1938 text marks the introduction of Poppenan falsificatiomsm into 
economics However, Hutchison’s particular brand of falsification differs substantially 
from that of Popper These differences were discussed by Klappholz and Agassi 
(1959) Hutchison identified two types of scientific statement - those which are 
falsifiable by observation, and those which are not According to Hutchison, any
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statement which is not falsifable can only be a tautology (Hutchison 1938 42) For 
Hutchison, any statement which contains a cetens panbus  clause is tautologous This 
is clearly untrue While such a statement may be untestable if the cetens panbus  
clause remains unspecified, it is not necessarily tautologous (Klappholz and Agassi 
1959 63-64) Hutchison contested that, due to the use of cetens panbus clauses, many 
economic hypotheses were unfalsifiable
This is perhaps the reason for his application of falsification, not to the predictions of 
economic hypotheses as m Popperian falsification, but to their initial premises This 
insistence that every part of a theory must be tested, not simply that theory’s 
predictions, led to Hutchison bemg classified as an ultra-empiricist by Machlup 
(Machlup 1978 141) The problem with such ultra-empincism is that it runs the risk 
of ending up as a naive form of falsificatiomsm If every part of knowledge is to be 
tested, then what knowledge is to be used as a test9 Hutchison argued that economic 
hypotheses had to be bolder, to exclude more by eliminating cetens panbus  clauses 
This would certamly be in line with Popper’s recommendations However, rather 
strangely, Hutchison went on to argue that economic hypotheses "need not actually 
be tested or even be practically capable of testing under present or future statistical 
investigation" (Hutchison 1938 10) It was enough for Hutchison that economic 
hypotheses be potentially testable This is clearly not compatible with Popperian 
prescriptions Yet, arguing that theories need only be potentially testable gets neatly
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around the problem, to the ultra-empiricist, of defimng the test
Hutchison’s call for greater quantification in economics was mirrored by similar calls 
in the other social sciences in the 1930s The piecemeal statistical work on economic 
theory and data was, by the 1930s, pulled together to form econometrics
The role of early econometrics was the conversion of economic theory into 
quantifiable laws The aim was the objective measurement of the parameters of 
qualitative economic theory (Morgan 1990 229) There was also a suggestion that 
econometrics could pass an objective critical eye over economic theory There was a 
confidence m this early period, that "future statistical investigations may lead to 
verification, revision, or possibly, entire restatement of some economic laws"
(Persons 1925 195) It was through econometrics that economics could attain the 
status of a quantitative science similar in nature to physics
However, Morgan showed how this early confidence soon diminished in respect of 
demand analysis, when econometricians were faced with the evidence that one of the 
fundamental laws of economics, demand theory, did not correspond to observed data 
(Morgan 1990 146) The initial reaction to these discrepancies was to regard economic 
theory as implicitly correct and to detrend data to bring them closer to the predictions 
of the theory of demand (Morgan 1990 146) This adjustment process "gradually gave 
way to the realisation that economic theory had little to say about dynamic elements
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Isuch as the course of economic change and the timing of economic reactions"
(Morgan 1990 146) Instead of attempting to make data conform to the qualitative law 
of demand, econometricians changed their stance Quantitative models serve as the 
interface between the economic theory and the observed data Where the theory and 
the data failed to correspond, econometricians changed the particular model of the 
theory to make it more fully reflect the data
To a naive falsificatiomst, this would be interpreted as an immunising strategy 
designed to save the theory in the face of conflicting evidence However, these early 
econometricians highlighted a number of problems which prevented the falsification 
and rejection of qualitative theory It was realised that the conversion of qualitative 
theory into quantitative model meant that a number of auxiliary assumptions had to be 
made This raised the question, for every model, as to whether it was a correct 
specification of the underlying theory Depending on the auxiliary assumptions made, 
a qualitative theory could be represented by a number of different models This 
problem of exact specification of the theory was further compounded by the 
identification problem In the 1920s, econometricians recognised the difficulties 
involved in isolating estimates of single parameters the regression of quantity on 
price could be an estimate of demand parameters or supply parameters, or most likely 
of both Econometricians were thus faced with a number of intervening problems 
which prevented them from directly testing qualitative economic theory What might 
seem like an immunising strategy was in fact the struggle to find the correct
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quantitative specification of the law of demand Without some prior agreement as to 
this specification, econometricians could not test the law of demand to either confirm 
or refute it
Implicit m Popper’s falsificatiomsm is the assumption that scientists have agreed, a 
p n o n ,  on which are the severest tests of theory This, in turn, presupposes that 
scientists are agreed on the quantitative form of theory This level of agreement did 
not exist m econometrics The difficulties which econometricians incurred with regard 
to the specification of theory, led them to focus more on statistical relations in sample 
data These investigations were aided by the use of ordinary least squares (OLS)
(OLS, though it was developed in the late nineteenth century, only became extensively 
used by econometricians in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s)
Some econometricians, and most economic theorists, saw a danger in this 
preoccupation with statistical relations m data Koopmans’ (1947) critique of Bums 
and Mitchell’s work on the business cycle is indicative of the divisions which this turn 
in the focus of econometrics created Koopmans, as director of the Cowles 
Commission, criticised Bums and Mitchell’s quantitative analysis of business cycles 
for the NBER in 1946, as containing nothing but statistical correlations The danger 
he saw in analysis of this nature was the replacement of causal laws with purely 
statistical ones That Bums and Mitchell had eschewed the causal laws of economics 
was the core of Koopmans’ attack "the tool-kit of the theoretical economist is
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deliberately spumed Not a single demand or supply schedule or other equation 
expressing the behaviour of men or of the technical laws of production is employed 
explicitly m the book, and the cases of implicit use are few and far between" 
(Koopmans 1947 163) Koopmans argued that theory was "an indispensable element 
m understanding in a quantitative way the formation of economic variables" 
(Koopmans 1947 166) Without an underlymg theory, Koopmans argued that Bums 
and Mitchell were engaged in "methodological quasi-theory", in measurement without 
theory (Koopmans 1947 165) The tables were turned on Koopmans, when Vining in 
his defence of the NBER methodology, argued that the Walrasian assumptions 
underlymg the econometric analysis of the Cowles Commission were too weak to be 
considered a theoretical foundation to such analysis (Morgan 1990 54-55) This 
distinction between what Koopmans considered to be econometrics on the one hand, 
and statistical analysis on the other, persists today m the distinction drawn between 
econometric modelling and autoregressive time-series analysis
Econometricians continued to be frustrated by the seemingly unbridgeable gap 
between economic theories and observed data, and the methodological problems this 
gap caused In 1944, Haavelmo presented an alternative methodology, which 
approached this gap from a new angle (Morgan provides a comprehensive analysis of 
the unpact of Haavelmo’s probabilistic methodology on econometrics in Morgan 
1990 chapter 8)
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Haavelmo believed economic theory to be too inexact ever to correspond in a 
deterministic way with observed data This was something which had been recogmsed 
by econometricians working on dynamic demand theory ten years previously 
Haavelmo’s proposal was that economic theories be rewritten as the "hypothetical 
probability models" they were, and the gap between theory and observation be 
reconsidered m this light (Haavelmo 1944 52) This reconstruction of economic theory 
would, Haavelmo argued, be more on keeping with the probabilistic nature of the 
statistical methods of analysis, and would allow statistical analysis to be used as the 
test of theories (Morgan 1990 243)
With regard to testing, an important feature of Haavelmo’s re-specification of 
economic theories as probability hypotheses is the argument that the sample data, too, 
are subject to error in collection (Haavelmo 1944 18, quoted in Morgan 1990 246) 
Haavelmo’s answer to this probabilistic nature of sample data was to make allowances 
for sample errors within the probability hypothesis itself As Morgan pomted out, 
there is nothing new in this "indeed, it provides a good description of the ad hoc 
statistical practices of the early econometricians" (Morgan 1990 246) What Haavelmo 
suggested was simply an alternative way of re-specifying the model to brmg it closer 
to the observed data, by taking account not only of errors in the specification of the 
relation between the theory and the model, but also of errors between the population 
and the sample data
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The errors in statistical models would be explicitly accounted for by probability laws, 
and the analysis of these probability errors would provide a way (using 
Neyman-Pearson tests) of choosing between models Haavelmo showed that this 
methodology does not in fact solve the problems encountered by the early 
econometricians with regard to model-choice, since "the same observable results may 
be produced under a great variety of different probability schemes" (Haavelmo 
1944 49) A range of different models could be subject to the same probability laws, 
and therefore, could all conform to observed sample data
While Haavelmo’s work may appear to mark "the shift from the traditional role of 
econometrics in measurmg the parameters of a given theory to a concern with testmg 
those theories" (Morgan 1990 257), it is clear from his presidential address to the 
Econometric Society m 1958, that Haavelmo believed no great change m the focus of 
econometric study to have occurred as a result of his work Econometricians still held 
their role to be the carrying out of "general ’repair work’ upon the logical consistency 
of theories", rather than the carrying out of tests on theory (Haavelmo 1958 354)
Apart from the practical problems of any potential falsificatiomsm in econometrics, 
Haavelmo’s re-specification of economic theory as probability hypotheses presents 
another limit to any Popperian stance in econometrics The specification of economic 
theory not as deterministic but as probabilistic hypotheses, involves the acceptance
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that all economic theories are false over some range of observations The focus for 
methodology m this case, then, is the setting of criteria by which economists might 
choose between two false theories Popper recogmsed that physical theories, too, 
might be probabilistic m nature, and introduced the concept of vensimiltude to 
provide a means by which choices could be made between false theories However, 
this concept cannot be reconciled to Popper’s falsificatiomsm (see section 1 1) Thus, 
Haavelmo’s probability method excludes Poppenan falsificatiomsm as a means of 
theory-choice in econometrics Despite the fact that Haavelmo’s methodology 
excluded falsificatiomsm m econometrics, the Poppenan influence in economics 
persisted, reaching its zenith m the 1950s
It was clear, by the 1950s, that econometrics could not be used to test economic 
theories, without some a prion  methodological criterion to confirm a particular model 
as fully representative of a qualitative hypothesis Despite this acknowledged difficulty 
m testing economic theory, Darnell and Evans identified a renewed confidence m the 
scope of econometrics m the 1950s and 1960s (Darnell and Evans 1990 40) They 
relate this new-found optimism to Friedman’s 1953 paper, ’The Methodology of 
Positive Economics,’ and to Lipsey’s 1963 text, An Introduction to Positive 
Economics Friedman’s paper is the subject of the previous section Lipsey’s work is 
considered below
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By the late 1950s, a group of economists at LSE were beginning to become familiar 
with Poppenan falsificatiomsm Their interest in this methodology arose mainly from 
their dissatisfaction with the anti-empirical stance of Robbins The mam protagonists 
of this group were Richard Lipsey and G C Archibald Each was concerned with a 
different aspect of empiricism in economics "If quantification was Lipsey’s mission, 
reconsidering theory with an eye to testing was Archibald’s" (de Marchi 1988 145) 
Lipsey was concerned with the establishment of the umversal laws of economics to 
confirm causal laws with statistical evidence Archibald was concerned more directly 
with the introduction of Poppenan criteria for theory-choice into economics
Archibald (1959) focused on the theory of the firm This turned out to be an 
unfortunate choice He pointed to the methodological schism m this field, between 
those who continued to analyse firm behaviour within idealistic neoclassical models, 
and the industrial economists, like Hall and Hitch, who took a more mductive 
approach Both approaches were, according to Archibald, methodologically unsound 
"[0]n the one hand we had those who paraded their ’realism’ - ’this is how businesses 
actually work’ - and were indifferent to the arguments that their theory was 
indeterminate and therefore irrefutable, on the other hand we had those who stuck to 
’rational’ theory, and appeared more and more indifferent to reality" (Archibald 
1959 61) Archibald set about trying to derive testable predictions from Chamberlain’s 
theory of monopolistic competition What he found was that the theory was
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incomplete the definition of the group, the relation between the firm’s dd curve and 
the industry DD curve, the response of firms to changes in price, were all too loosely 
modelled to form any useful quantifiable predictions The range of auxiliary 
assumptions that would have been necessary to produce a quantifiable form of 
Chamberlain’s theory would have made it impossible to identify the source of any 
refutation (de Marchi 1988 156)
Undetered by these obstacles to falsificatiomsm, Archibald attempted to engage 
Friedman and the rest of the Chicago school m a Poppenan-style critical debate about 
the problem of gleamng testable predictions from monopolistic competition theory (de 
Marchi 1988 154) He highlighted a discrepancy between Friedman’s methodological 
stance (see section 1.3), and Friedman’s treatment of monopolistic competition
We should expect to find the Chicago critics endeavouring to discover what 
predictions monopolistic competition yields, comparing the predictions with 
those of perfect competition and monopoly, and finally addressmg themselves 
to such empirical testing as seemed necessary But we do not find this at all 
Rather we find that much of their argument has the a p n o n  character that we 
would associate with a very different methodological school (Archibald 
1961 3)
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Archibald criticised the Chicago school for criticising the theory of monopolistic 
competition on the grounds that its initial assumptions were too complex and 
unrealistic They should, accordmg to Friedman’s own methodological prescriptions, 
have been focusing instead on the validity of the predictions of the theory If there 
were no testable predictions to be gleaned from the theory, then Friedman’s own 
methodological stance outlined in 1953 would suggest that the theory is worthless
Stigler defended this "internal criticism" of the theory on the grounds that "the 
probability that a theory will yield useful predictions is reduced by logical weaknesses 
in its construction" (Stigler 1963 64) Yet Friedman himself had argued in 1953 that, 
"the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions 
with experience" (Friedman 1984 214) Archibald’s highlighting of this inconsistency 
between Friedman’s methodological stance and his treatment of the theory of 
monopolistic competition provoked very little response from the Chicago school 
Archibald’s attempts to introduce a little Poppenan critical rationalism into economics 
failed (de Marchi 1988 153), so too, for Archibald, had the notion of falsificatiomst 
economics He argued that too much of economic theory was "incurably irrefutable" 
for a falsificatiomst methodology to work (Archibald 1966 279) Archibald reverted to 
Mill’s solution to Hume’s problem of induction, he argued that the only method of 
testing possible m economics was the relative appraisal of theories in the light of
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observable evidence (Archibald 1966 279)
Lipsey’s method was, from the start, much closer m spirit to Mill than to Popper 
Lipsey worked on data to isolate correlations, then developed a theory to provide 
causation, then derived from this theory a set of predictions, and finally tested these 
predictions Lipsey’s work on the Phillips curve broadly followed this pattern (Darnell 
and Evans 1990 44) Lipsey encountered the same problems as Archibald and the 
econometricians had done, and by 1966 had rejected falsificatiomsm as a methodology 
for economics (de Marchi 1988 161)
Darnell and Evans’ description of econometric practice m the 1960s, is similar to that 
outlined by Morgan m respect of econometric practice in the 1930s (Darnell and 
Evans 1990 48) Econometricians placed a great deal of faith m OLS, particularly in 
the investigations of macroeconomic behavioural variables The emphasis was, 
according to Darnell and Evans, on confirmation rather than on falsification (Darnell 
and Evans 1990 47) As in the 1930s, where models performed badly, they were 
adjusted in an ad hoc way, m order to fit the observed data Once agam, the 
distinction between causal and statistical laws was blurred as econometricians 
attempted to establish the umversal laws, the background knowledge, of economics
Economists do falsify, but what they falsify and reject are models of a theory, rather 
than the theory itself The conjecture and refutation that occurs in econometrics is
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limited to particular specifications of a theory However, Darnell and Evans pomted 
out that this is an important prelude to the testmg of theory (Darnell and Evans 
1990 67) The constant revision of models, ideally, should brmg the econometrician 
to a model which is accepted as fully representative of the theory
At this stage, there is some hope of directly testmg the theory The problem, however, 
is that there still exists the possibility of pre-test bias Each rejection of a particular 
model of a theory involves a decision to accept the validity of the data used to test the 
model Implicit in this decision is the assumption that there have been no sample 
errors Ultimately, the accuracy of a model can only be accepted "as a matter of faith" 
(Darnell and Evans 1990 72) Econometricians must be prepared to accept the 
assumption that there are no sample errors, in order that a test of the ultimate model 
be recogmsed as a test of the underlying theory Few econometricians are willing to 
do this Yet, without some form of a p n o n  agreement as to the status of certain tests, 
falsification is impossible Without this agreement, the constant re-specification of 
models appears pointless Hendry’s tongue-in-cheek description of this process of 
model re-specification indicates this "the search correction process is terminated at 
an arbitrary point often incorrectly determined by the insignificance of some test, or 
perhaps more usually by fatigue" (Hendiy 1985 36)
This consensus problem facing econometricians stems from the Duhem/Qume 
argument Qume developed Duhem’s argument that theories are in fact bundles of
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statements, some of which are analytic and some, synthetic (Quine 1953) Since there 
is "no sharp boundary" between these statements, the problem for the falsification^ is 
decidmg which statements must be rejected upon falsification of the theory (Losee 
1980 192) Another problem m testing identified by the Duhem/Qume argument is 
that the testing of a theory involves the use of statistical techniques, themselves 
derived from statistical theories This considerably complicates the process of 
falsificatiomsm, smce there could be a number of different sources from which the 
falsification emanates
Learner suggested adopting Bayesian techniques in econometrics in order to "take the 
con out of econometrics" (Learner 1983) Bayesian analysis would, he argued, provide 
econometricians with an a p n o n  set of criteria with which to judge models and 
ultimately allow for theory-appraisal Adopting Bayesian criteria mvolves a 
fundamental change m the way m which econometricians generally consider 
probability The general definition of probability is the frequency with which an event 
is observed in repeated trials The Bayesian definition of probability, on the other 
hand, is essentially a reflection of the belief of the individual researcher as to the 
likelihood of the event being observed The researcher’s belief is not necessarily 
derived from the evidence of repeated samples While the Bayesian technique offers a 
p n o n  criteria to the econometrician, these criteria are too subjective to be thought of 
as Poppenan Bayesian criteria are conventionalist rather than empirical m nature
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There is a fundamental conflict between Bayesian a prion  criteria and Poppenan a 
p n o n  criteria
Econometrics m the 1980s has had a rather narrower focus than that with which it 
began in the early part of this century The mam focus now is forecasting The 
forecasts of classical linear regression models have been challenged by time-series 
techniques, principally Box-Jenkins analysis Econometric models still contain some 
vestiges of economic theory, although to arrive at a quantifiable model some auxiliary 
assumptions will undoubtedly have had to be made Time-series analysis, on the other 
hand, takes no explicit cogmscence of qualitative economic theory In time-series, the 
forecast of a variable depends solely on past values of that variable "it is m essence 
no more than a sophisticated method of extrapolation" (Kennedy 1985 205) Much of 
current econometrics has been concerned with which of the two is the better predictor 
This emphasis on prediction as opposed to explanation of economic phenomena 
suggests that econometrics might be pursuing an instrumentalist methodology
Gilbert has disputed the claim that "economists never reject theories, or at least not on 
the basis of econometric evidence" (Gilbert 1991 137) While Gilbert conceded that 
economists test models, not theories, he argued that "the outcome of these tests may 
have some bearing on our views about the validity of the underlying theories" (Gilbert 
1991 138) Gilbert argued that "in demand theory we are indeed only testing the 
appropriateness of particular empirical models, while m consumption analysis tests of
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empirical models are genuine tests of the underlying theory" (Gilbert 1991 142) The 
ability to test consumption theory directly is a result of the nature of the modifications 
made to the theory in order to render it empirically testable
Both demand theory and the theory of the consumption function simplify, as 
must any theory, but in demand theory the simplifications are motivated by 
the need to reduce the scale of the modelling enterprise, whereas m 
consumption, they are motivated at least in part by a desire to generate a 
particular set of implications In demand theory, these simplifications are part 
of the empirical model, while in consumption theory they are part of the 
theoretical model It follows that m testing demand theory we are testing for 
the appropriateness of an empirical model, and that our tests have the 
character of specification tests, while m consumption theory tests of the 
empirical model are tests of the theoretical model (Gilbert 1991 161)
Gilbert’s analysis suggests that there might be some possibility of Poppenan-style 
testing of at least some economic theories However, McElroy, in her comment on 
Gilbert’s paper disputed Gilbert’s argument that tests of consumption theories have 
been tests of theories and not of models
the fundamental insight underlying the rational-expectations approach 
(differential responses to anticipated and unanticipated events), much less the
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fundamental insights underlying the PIH (permanent income and permanent 
consumption), are not at all at issue (McElroy 1991 174)
While Gilbert’s analysis might highlight a limited ability to test theories, 
econometricians are far from establishing the sort of consensus necessary in order to 
define a crucial experiment It also appears that the concerns of the majority of 
econometricians have shifted in such a direction as to make it unlikely that this 
consensus will develop m the near future
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1 4 ON SITUATIONAL LOGIC AND THE METHODOLOGY OF 
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
At the end of section 1 1, it was argued that Popper held critical rationalism to be the 
method of progress for both science and metaphysics Of the many forms which 
criticism may take, Popper’s view was that falsificatiomsm is optimal The 
demarcation between metaphysics and science specified by Popper was one of method 
- scientific propositions could be falsified, but metaphysical propositions could not 
But what of the social sciences, and economics m particular9
In the Poverty o f Histoncism, Popper presented the difference between economics and 
the natural sciences as bemg one of degree (Popper 1957 143) He implied that 
falsificatiomsm is the optimal form of criticism m both, although he acknowledged 
that falsificatiomsm might be more difficult m economics due to the changing nature 
of parameters This brief paragraph in the Poverty o f Histoncism has been the warrant 
for economic methodologists stressmg the importance of falsification m economics
Economic methodologists have paid much more attention to Popper’s falsificatiomsm, 
than they have to Popper’s externalist philosophy of the social sciences, his situational 
logic Popper maintained that situational logic is in fact the methodology of 
neoclassical economics (Popper 1976 102) However, economic methodologists
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appear to be unimpressed with Popper’s elucidation of situational logic It has been 
described as "very sloppy" (Blaug 1985b 287), "confused or deliberately elusive" 
(Latsis 1983 133) and "vague and seemingly inconsistent" (Hands 1985 85)
The neglect by economic methodologists of situational logic matters little on a 
practical level if falsificatiomsm and situational logic entail the same methodological 
prescriptions Popper maintained that falsificatiomsm is applicable not just to 
economics, but to all the social sciences "[A] 11 theoretical or generalising sciences 
make use of the same method, whether they are natural sciences or social sciences" 
(Popper 1957 130, see also 1966 222) Interestingly, as a warrant for his unity of 
method argument, Popper cited both Hayek and Menger (Popper 1957 136-137)
(Both Hayek and Popper were anxious to point out that histoncism is an madequate 
method for a science Popper first presented The Poverty o f Histoncism as a paper in a 
seminar series run by Hayek m 1936 m the London School of Economics, and refered 
to Hayek’s earlier arguments in Hayek (1933) Despite the obvious cross-influences of 
Popper and Hayek in respect of scientific methodology, it does not appear that Popper 
was particularly influenced in his perceptions of neoclassical economics by Hayek 
When discussing the methodology of neoclassical economics, Popper cited only 
Robbins (1935))
Caldwell argued that one way in which to make sense of this insistence on a umty of 
method across the sciences, is to interpret Popper as meamng that all theories "share
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the same structure" (Caldwell 1991 14n) Thus, Caldwell held that when Popper 
talked about the unity of method he was referring to the fact that both natural and 
social science should be based on hypothetico-deductive method Yet, Popper clearly 
meant more than this when he proposed a unity of method
The only course open to the social sciences is to forget all about the verbal 
fireworks and to tackle the practical problems of our time with the help of the 
theoretical methods which are fundamentally the same in all sciences I mean 
the methods of trial and error, of inventing hypotheses which can be 
practically tested, and of submitting them to practical tests (Popper 
1966 222)
Is it possible for the unity of method thesis to be a unity of methodology thesis9 
Popper argued that economics can progress using falsification^ rules Yet he also 
said that economics has its own distinct methodological framework - situational logic 
(Popper 1966 97) He further suggested that situational logic be extended to the other 
social sciences (Popper 1976 102) If the unity of method thesis is to be upheld, then 
falsificatiomsm and situational logic must entail the same methodological 
prescriptions Upon investigation, however, it is apparent that these two 
methodologies do not entail the same prescriptions This leads to a paradox This 
section investigates the nature of this paradox If there is no unity of methodology - if 
situational logic makes prescriptions which are different from those made by
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falsification - then this has important implications for those methodologists who stress 
the importance of falsification in economics In addition to the question of the unity of 
methodology, this section assesses the extent to which situational logic is 
representative of the methodology of neoclassical economics
Popper’s methodological rules for both the natural and the social sciences are based on 
the "rules of critical discussion" (Popper 1979 17) These rules form Popper’s critical 
method Falsificatiomsm instructs the natural scientist to hold some of his knowledge - 
background knowledge - as foundational This background knowledge is then 
combined with particular premises to form theory While the background knowledge 
generally goes unquestioned for periods of tune, Popper warned that the natural 
scientist must be aware of the tentative nature of background knowledge and submit it 
to testing in order to ensure its continuing approximation to the truth The analysis of 
the paradox begins with a search for a concept analogous to background knowledge m 
situational logic
According to Popper, situational logic provides the mechamcs of the critical method 
for neoclassical economics In situational logic, Popper mtroduced two concepts - 
situational analysis and the rationality principle The situational analysis is formed 
from "the initial conditions describing personal interests, aims and other situational 
factors, such as the information available to the person concerned" (Popper
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1966 265) This situational analysis is a description of the social situation of the 
individual at the time m which a particular form of behaviour occurred
Of itself, the situational analysis, as described by Popper, says nothing about why a 
certain course of action arises from the situation so described One is left with a gap 
between a description of the range of possible actions inherent in the situational 
analysis, and an explanation as to why one course of action, out of the range of 
possibilities, was chosen Popper claimed that while other methodologies in the social 
sciences appeal to the laws of psychology in order to explain why a particular course 
of action was chosen, that such an appeal should be unnecessary m all the social 
sciences Popper bridged the gap between description and explanation via the 
"rationality principle" (Popper 1966 265)
Popper defined the rationality principle as "the trivial general law that sane persons as 
a rule act more or less rationally” (Popper 1966 265), yet insisted that the rationality 
principle involves no "psychological assumption" of what constitutes rational 
behaviour (Popper 1966 97) Popper maintained that the rationality principle has 
"little or nothing to do with the empirical or psychological assertion that man, always, 
or m the mam, or m most cases, acts rationally" (Popper 1985 359) The rationality 
principle is therefore nothing more than the "principle of acting appropriately to the 
situation" (Popper 1985 359) The rationality principle involves no general definition 
of rational behaviour, and for that reason, "lets through as rational most social,
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economic, political, problem-solving and even neurotic behaviour" (Latsis 1983 132) 
It does not involve the social scientist making an objective, a p n o n  assumption as to 
what constitutes rational behaviour
The rationality principle and situational analysis provide a foundation against which 
the Poppenan social scientist will test his social theories Popper himself however 
gave no example of the mechamcs of situational logic In order to demonstrate the 
kind of methodological direction given to economics by situational logic, Barro’s 
Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (1976) is examined using Koertge’s interpretation 
of the explanation schema under a situational logic framework (Koertge 1979 87)
Situational Analysis
Rationality Principle 
Hypothesis
Explanandum
mcluded m the information which agents hold about 
the economy is the knowledge that sales of 
Government debt have increased
agents act appropriately to their situation as they see 
it
when sales of Government debt increase, agents will 
reduce their expenditure because they believe higher 
bond sales now will result in higher taxes m the 
future
agents reduce their expenditure when the level of 
Government debt increases
In this example, the explanandum is not realised The weight of empirical evidence 
suggests that in fact economic agents do not reduce expenditure when the level of 
Government debt increases In order to find out why Barro’s Ricardian Equivalence
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Hypothesis does not accurately predict the behaviour observed, Popper instructed the 
economist to review either his hypothesis or his situational analysis
However, Popper instructed the social scientist always to retain the rationality 
principle The economist should never conclude that economic agents are, m fact, 
acting inappropriately, given the situation as the economist describes it "My thesis is 
that it is sound methodological policy to decide not to make the rationality principle 
accountable but the rest of the theory that is, the model" (Popper 1985 362)
This methodological rule in situational logic appears to be m direct conflict with the 
instructions Popper gave to natural scientists under falsificatiomsm There is no piece 
of their knowledge that natural scientists may hold to be above falsification Natural 
scientists are instructed to test all of their background knowledge intermittently in 
order to ensure that it remains a good approximation to the truth Yet social scientists 
under situational logic are instructed to retain the rationality principle regardless of its 
approximation to the truth Hence, the background knowledge of the natural scientist, 
and the rationality principle and situational analysis of the social scientist, are not 
analogous
Popper’s demarcation criterion between science and non-science is based on the 
falsifiability of the theory whose scientific status is in question The fact that Popper 
instructed social scientists to hold a part of their theories wnfalsifiable, implies that, by
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his own demarcation criterion, social theories which use situational logic are not 
scientific Yet, it is not at all clear from what Popper said about economics m the 
Poverty o f Histoncism, that this is a conclusion he intended
This analysis suggests that there are methodological differences between Popper’s 
falsificatiomsm and his situational logic It is difficult to see how a unity of method 
argument can be sustained in any way other than by arguing, as Caldwell did, that the 
theories of the social and natural sciences are constructed in the same 
hypothetico-deductive way
Caldwell suggested that an alternative resolution to the paradox might be found m 
Popper’s critical rationalism (Caldwell 1991 25) If, by unity of method, Popper 
meant that some form of critical analysis may be applied m both the natural and social 
sciences, then according to Caldwell, the paradox ceases to exist (Caldwell 1991 25)
Popper described the principle of critical rationalism as the insistence that "our 
adoption and our rejection of scientific theories should depend upon our critical 
reasoning combined with the results of observation and experiment" (Popper 
1983 32) Critical rationalism entails the acceptance of an alternative point of view 
and a willingness to accept criticism of our own point of view A critical rationalist 
pomt of view is not confined to the criticism of scientific theories Popper held critical 
rationalism to be a fruitful method for analysmg all ideas, whether scientific or
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metaphysical, although the optimal form of criticism, falsification, is open only to 
scientific propositions
If the umty of method is taken as meaning that both social and natural scientific 
theories can be assessed using some form of critical analysis which falls short of 
falsificatiomsm, then the paradox ceases to exist Both social and natural scientific 
theories can be critically assessed using the same tools, except for the case of 
falsification which is the preserve only of the natural sciences
What are the tools of critical analysis that are applicable to both sciences9 Accordmg 
to Caldwell, critical analysis at this sub-optimal level, does not lay down any a p n o n  
rules for theory-appraisal "¡T]he level o f criticism will depend on the problem to be 
solved and the nature o f the material under investigation " (Caldwell 1991 25) 
Caldwell acknowledged that "empirical criteria are the strongest and whenever 
possible they should be used" (Caldwell 1991 25) However, he argued that where 
falsification is the optimal criticism m the natural sciences, m the social sciences, 
optimal criticism can be obtained where the rationality principle is left intact and 
either the hypothesis or the situational analysis, or both, is questioned (Caldwell 
1991 25)
Thus, the umty of method thesis, for Caldwell, can only refer to the application of 
critical rationalism in the natural and social sciences and not to the application of
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falsification This solution to the unity of method paradox creates another paradox 
why have economic methodologists spent so much time on applymg falsification to 
economics, when this is not the optimal form of criticism in social science9
The crux of the umty of method paradox as it is described above is that the instruction 
to social scientists not to deny the validity of the rationality principle is not consistent 
with Popper’s instruction to natural scientists to test every part of their scientific 
knowledge This explanation of the paradox assumes that the rationality principle is an 
empirical concept, analogous to the background knowledge of natural science If they 
are not equivalent concepts, then it is not clear that the paradox persists
Popper introduced the rationality principle as the animator of the social scientist’s 
situational analysis But what plays the role of animator in the natural sciences9 
According to Popper, in the natural sciences "if we wish to "animate'' the model, that 
is, if we wish to represent the way m which the various elements of the model act 
upon each other, then we do need umversal laws" (Popper 1985 358) The implication 
is that the rationality principle and the umversal laws have the same function But if 
this is so, why are they subject to different methodological prescriptions9
Popper maintained that the rationality principle is "clearly false" (Popper 1985 360) 
This implies that it takes a form which is empirically testable The fact that it is false 
does not appear to have been, for Popper, a good reason for rejecting the principle It
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may, he argued, still be "a good approximation to the truth" (Popper 1985 362) On 
the other hand, Popper does not advocate testing the rationality principle to ensure 
proximity to the truth Since Popper was prepared to admit that the rationality 
principle is false, he demed any suggestion that he has attempted to make the principle 
a priori valid by preventmg social scientists from testmg it
The only thing which seems clear from Popper’s description of the rationality 
principle is that, while the rationality principle and umversal laws may play the same 
role, it is clear that they are not of the same nature
How exactly does the rationality principle animate the scientist’s situational analysis7 
How does it fill the gap between the situational analysis and the behaviour which 
scientists observe7 It appears to explain everything and nothing On the one hand, the 
notion that the scientist must accept that individuals always act appropriately to their 
situation, is strong methodological advice It constantly throws the burden of proof 
onto the scientist’s hypothesis or onto his situational analysis On the other hand, 
without a definition of what constitutes appropriate behaviour, the rationality principle 
can tell the scientist nothing about how the decision to act, mamfested m the behaviour 
that the scientist observes, arises out o f the situational analysis he describes Indeed, 
Popper described the rationality principle as "almost empty", as "a kind of zero 
principle" (Popper 1985 359)
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This emptiness is precisely why Popper developed the rationality principle To attempt 
to bridge the gap between description and explanation by using an empirical 
rationality principle would involve the adoption of some behavioural rule on the part 
of the social scientist It is this which Popper wanted to avoid
Popper argued that while psychology is a social science, it is not the basis of all social 
sciences (Popper 1966 97) Latsis, in the most comprehensive analysis of situational 
logic by an economic methodologist, concluded that the rationality principle, as 
described by Popper, can only be interpreted as a "bridge between the decision do 
something at t and the actual performance of the behaviour at t" (Latsis 1983 134)
The explanation for the decision to act must already be incorporated m the situational 
analysis, if Popper’s interpretation of the rationality principle is to be maintained 
Latsis concluded that, if all the goals, aims and motives for the decision to act are 
contained in the situational analysis, the rationality principle is not necessary to the 
social scientist (Latsis 1983 135)
The rationality principle appears then to be best described as "a byproduct of a 
methodological postulate" (Popper 1985 360), the ann of which is to avoid 
psychologists explanations of behaviour m social sciences other than psychology It is 
false which implies that it is testable Yet it "does not play the role of an empirical 
explanatory theory" (Popper 1985 360) If the rationality principle is not an
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explanatory theory then it is difficult to see how it bridges the gap between decision 
and action in a way that is useful for the social scientist, hence Latsis’ conclusion 
Latsis argued that the situational analysis could be framed in such a way as to yield an 
explanation for a particular form of behaviour without including a rationality principle 
at all (Latsis 1983 135) This could be done by including some motivational 
assumption in the situational analysis (Latsis 1983 135) Yet, this involves the making 
of behavioural assumptions, which is what Popper was expressly attempting to avoid
Why did Popper employ the rationality principle at all if he held it to be empty9 Latsis 
argued that the rationality principle was consistent "with a certain ontology about the 
relation between mental states and behaviour" which Latsis finds in Popper’s 1967 
paper, ‘Of Clouds and Clocks’ (Latsis 1983 136) The rationality principle was devoid 
of any psychological assumption, and had to remain so in order to be compatible with 
Popper’ views on psychologism
In ‘Of Clouds and Clocks,’ Popper examined the impact of the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum physics on physical determinism (Popper 1979 210) Popper 
distinguished between the different levels of control within physical systems On the 
one hand, there is the cast-iron control represented by the clock, within a "regular, 
orderly, and highly predictable" physical system (Popper 1979 207) On the other 
hand, there is the "highly irregular, disorderly, and more or less unpredictable" 
physical system represented by the cloud (Popper 1979 207) In the latter, the control
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is plastic With plastic control, it is no longer clear which part of the system is 
controlling the other (Popper 1979 249) Popper gave the following example of plastic 
control "The soap bubble consists of two subsystems which are both clouds and 
which control each other without the air, the soapy film would collapse without the 
soapy film, the air would be uncontrolled it would diffuse" (Popper 1979 249)
Popper maintained that despite this two-way control, it would be possible to identify 
the controlled system and the uncontrolled system The air is the controlled system 
"the enclosed air is not only more cloudy than the enclosing film, but it also ceases to 
be a physical (self-interacting) system if the film is removed" (Popper 1979 249)
Latsis pointed to an analogy between Popper’s description of different types of control 
in physical systems and the plastic control which mental states have on behaviour 
(Latsis 1983 140) Latsis believed that the rationality principle "does not have the 
status of a umversal theory because Popper’s ontology does not allow him to represent 
the connection between mental states and behaviour as a causal one" (Latsis 
1983 140) A rationality principle which embodied a behavioural assumption would be 
indicative of "’cast-iron’ control between mental states and behaviour" (Latsis 
1983 140) Yet, without assummg some form of cast-iron control, how can social 
scientists make predictions9
In ’Of Clouds and Clocks,’ Popper argued that no cast-iron controlled physical system 
actually exists "all clocks are clouds, to some considerable degree - even the most
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precise of clocks" (Popper 1979 215) On the other hand, "our clouds are not 
perfectly chance-like, since we can often predict the weather quite successfully, at 
least for short periods" (Popper 1979 229) Implict in this, is the argument that social 
systems and physical systems are both cloudy, although social systems might be 
considerably more cloudy and therefore less predictable than physical ones A study of 
Popper’s ontological argument appears, then, to lead back to the belief that the 
difference between social science and natural science is one of degree It is a small 
jump from this position, backward to the unity of method thesis
What seems necessary is a reformulation of the rationality principle which solves the 
unity of method paradox m a way that is compatible with Popper’s ontological stance 
on plastic control The following is such an attempt
The rationality principle is re-interpreted as a principle with two components - an 
empirical, ammatory component and a methodological component The ammatory 
component instructs the social scientist to make an objective, a pn o n , conjecture 
about what it is that constitutes appropriate behaviour m his model, that is, to form his 
model m terms of cast-iron control
This conjecture forms a link between the situational analysis described by the social 
scientist and the social behaviour he is attempting to predict or explain In other 
words, this conjecture ammates the social scientist’s situational analysis The animator
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enters the explanation schema of the social scientist m the same way that umversal 
laws enter the explanation schema of the natural scientist As with the umversal laws 
of the natural scientist, the social scientist’s animator should be periodically tested for 
its approximation to the truth, if the social scientist is to achieve the optimal level of 
criticism for his hypotheses If the social scientist finds that his animator is no longer 
a good approximation to the truth, then he rejects it and formulates another conjecture 
to animate his situational analysis Because social systems are clouds, not clocks, the 
cast-iron animator is likely to require regular testing It is this commitment to constant 
testing of the empirical animator which allows for the recogmtion of plastic control
The rationality principle, as it is presented here, also contains a methodological 
component This component instructs social scientists always to retain the rationality 
principle, that is, to always construct social laws on the basis that there is consistency 
of behaviour of individuals placed in the same situation This, Popper asserted, allows 
one to conclude, "admittedly I have different aims and I hold different theories (from, 
say, Charlemagne) but had I been placed in his situation thus analysed - where the 
situation includes goals and knowledge - then I, and presumably you too, would have 
acted in a similar way to him" (Popper 1976 103) Note that Popper’s description of 
the rationality principle here implies cast-iron control If we were to be placed in the 
same position as Charlemagne, we would not exhibit any control upon the situation, 
and would respond in the same way as he Popper’s critique of Marxism also suggests 
cast-iron control from the situational analysis to observed behaviour Popper criticised
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Marx’s economism with the notion that once the ruled classes become the ruling 
classes, they will behave in the way of the ruling classes regardless of what they were 
before (Popper 1966 131) This surely implies that the position of ruler exhibits 
cast-iron control on whoever is ruler9
In the interpretation of the rationality principle presented here, Popper’s instruction 
never to reject the rationality principle, is taken to apply to the methodological 
component of the rationality principle, but not to the empirical ammatory component 
Situational logic, under this interpretation, works in the following way The 
rationality principle enters the explanation schema of the social scientist as an 
animator, along with a situational analysis and the social scientist’s particular 
hypothesis On finding that his predictions or explanations are false, the social 
scientist can test the animator, or the situational analysis or the hypothesis, or all 
three The rationality principle qua methodological principle remains A rationality of 
behaviour is always assumed, though the social scientist might not have hit upon the 
accurate one
Given that the methodology of neoclassical economics provided Popper with the 
inspiration for situational logic, the methodology of neoclassical economics should 
provide the best test of the re-interpretation of the rationality principle as a dualistic 
concept
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It is clear that neoclassical economics makes explicit use of a rationality principle 
And this rationality principle does appears to contain two different components In 
neoclassical economics, individuals are assumed to act in a way appropriate to the 
situation But neoclassical economics also incorporates a definition of what it is that 
constitutes rational behaviour, namely utility or profit maximisation This forms the 
animator in the situational logic of neoclassical economics
Koertge’s (1979) explanation schema can be adapted to show how this alternative 
interpretation of the rationality principle corresponds to the kinds of methodological 
questions which arise in economics
Situational analysis
Animator
economic agents are in situation X which has x 
particular characteristics (eg the firm is in a 
perfectly competitive market)
economic agents act appropriately to the 
situation, where appropraite behaviour is 
defined as profit maximisation given 
constraints (eg the firm will always attempt to 
maximize profits)
Scientific hypothesis
Explanandum
given situation X economic agents will do Y to 
maximize profits (eg the firm in a perfectly 
competitive market will set price equal 
marginal cost in order to maximize profits)
economic agents do Y (eg firms set their 
prices equal to marginal cost and maximize 
profit)
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Suppose economic agents do Z (eg the firm sets its price above marginal cost) The 
economist’s prediction is falsified There are three possibilities
1 the economist’s analysis of the economic agents’ situation is inaccurate (he has
wrongly identified the market so that the firm maximizes profit by setting price 
above margmal cost)
2 the economist’s interpretation of appropriate behaviour is inaccurate (firms do
not always attempt to maximize profit)
3 the economist’s hypothesis is wrong (firms do not do Y to maximize profit)
In most cases the economist will, on the falsification of his hypothesis, reassess either 
his hypothesis or his situational analysis This is in accordance with Popper’s 
methodological prescription But is it not possible that the economist has cause to 
question his animator, that is, his definition of the appropriate behaviour for firms9
In respect of the nature of the utility maximisation hypothesis, Koertge asked, "What 
if an agent deliberately set out to minimize expected utility9 Would the resulting 
action count as a rational one9" (Koertge 1979 30) Under the interpretation presented 
here, the answer is yes What is questioned is the economist’s definition of the 
rational behaviour contained in the animator
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If one accepts this interpretation of the rationality principle as the combination of a 
metaphysical component and an empirical, animating component, then the prescriptive 
paradox between situational logic and falsificatiomsm ceases to exist, in principle 
This is done by assuming a minimum psychological assumption, but that assumption 
can be contradicted by observed behaviour, and changed Both natural and social 
scientists search for laws, without having to assume that such laws exist Both 
formulate laws by postulating consistencies in the behaviour they observe, and both 
should, m the Poppenan tradition, attempt to falsify their laws and more frequently, 
the hypotheses derived from these laws The unity of method thesis therefore remains 
mtact This reformulation does nothing, of course, to shelter falsificatiomsm or 
situational logic from the charge that verisimilitude does not stand up as a method 
which is compatible with falsificatiomsm
The reformulation of the rationality principle raises an mteresting question to what 
extent does the maximisation principle constitute an empirical animator for situational 
logic in economics9
There is, now, a considerable amount of agreement among economic methodologists 
as to what the maximisation principle is not It is not testable Agassi applied Popper’s 
demarcation criterion to the maximisation principle, and argued that the principle is 
metaphysical (Agassi 1971 52) Hutchison had previously suggested that if the
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principle were not empirical, then it must be a tautology (Hutchison 1938) Agassi 
pointed out that a non-empirical statement need not necessarily be a tautology "the 
informative content need not be zero - it can be too low for empirical tests but still too 
high for tautology" (Agassi 1971 52) However, Agassi pointed out that the way in 
which the maximisation principle is continually protected by economists, is in danger 
of reducing the maximisation principle to a tautology "It looks as if we always defend 
the theory by qualifying it again and again in the face of counter-evidence" (Agassi 
1971 51) This has converted the maximisation principle into an accounting 
convention "income equals expenditure both m properly balanced books and in 
perfect competition of necessity" (Agassi 1971 51) The danger is that further 
defence of the maximisation principle will reduce it the tautology, "firms do as firms 
do" (Agassi 1971 51)
Boland also held the maximisation principle as a metaphysical principle (Boland 
1981 1035) He also criticised the continual defence of the maximisation principle 
"One would be better off maintaining one’s metaphysics rather than creating 
tautologies to seal their defence" (Boland 1981 1035) Caldwell argued that where 
utility or profit remains undefined, then the maximisation principle is untestable 
(Caldwell 1983 826) He argued that Boland made the principle tautologous by 
defimng it as "all consumers maximise something" (Boland 1981 1034) Caldwell 
went on to assess the attempt by Samuelson to make the maximisation principle 
empirically testable, by defimng utility (Caldwell 1983 824) The problem with the
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revealed preference approach is that it "requires that assumptions be made concerning 
the stability of preferences of the choosing agent, as well as the states of information 
confronting him Since the content of these assumptions are subject to change but 
are not themselves directly testable, test results are not unambiguously interpretable" 
(Caldwell 1983 824-825) The problem of testability which Caldwell highlighted is the 
same as that facing econometricians, namely the identification problem This is a 
problem for the utility maximisation principle, but not for the profit maximisation 
principle The work on industrial orgamsation of the 1950s and 1960s set about 
replacing the profit maximisation principle with a sales maximisation principle 
(Baumol 1959), and later, a growth maximisation principle (Marris 1963,1966)
These alternative models of firm behaviour are based on the assumption of the 
separation of ownership and control in the modem corporation Where the shareholder 
no longer has control over the dividend he is paid, then these models predict that sales 
or growth become the major priority for the corporation The problem with these 
models is that they entail an assumption about utility maximisation on the part of the 
managers of the corporation They simply replace one kind of utility maximisation, 
that of the shareholders, with another kind of utility maximisation, that of the 
managers One still ends up with an untestable utility maximisation principle
The neoclassical maximisation principle is not of the same nature as the animator 
described in the situational logic model above It does provide a bridge between the
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situational analysis, and the observed behaviour, and as such turns the model into one 
of cast-iron control However, it does not allow for the possibility of plastic control, 
since it is not specified as a testable principle The model remains one of cast-iron 
control, which is, accordmg to Latsis, precisely what Popper wanted to avoid (Latsis 
1983 140) It appears then that Popper’s situational logic cannot be the method of 
neoclassical economics, if one accepts Latsis’ interpretation of Popper’s rationality 
principle
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CONCLUSIONS
Falsificatiomsm, although advocated by some prominent economic methodologists 
(eg Hutchison 1938, Blaug 1980, 1992), has been a failure m the practice of 
economics
The principle reason for this failure is that the gap between theory and observation has 
proved too great for falsificatiomsm to be properly applied The attempted 
quantification of economic theory has revealed a number of obstacles to testmg A 
variety of models can purport to be complete representations of a theory A further 
problem is caused by the difficulty m isolating economic parameters Testmg m 
economics has a different focus than m Poppenan methodology Testmg in economics 
tends to be testmg of models, not of theories (Caldwell 1984 493)
Falsificatiomsm provides criteria by which scientists may choose between theories In 
economics, the use of such criteria could only be consequent upon economists havmg 
agreed on which models are the best representations of which theories The level of 
consensus required m order to adopt falsificatiomst criteria has not yet been achieved 
In addition to this, the fundamental premise of economic theory, the maxim isation 
principle, has been made unfalsifiable by successive modifications This metaphysical
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foundation is at odds with Popper’s call for an empirically tested background 
knowledge On the other hand, the maximisation principle says too much to be 
equated with the empty rationality principle
The fact that economists have been unsuccessful m their attempts to falsify economic 
theory should not be taken as a critique of falsificatiomsm To criticise 
falsificatiomsm, one would have to show that falsificatiomst criteria do not enable the 
economist to make choices between economic theories
it is not an effective argument against falsificatiomsm to simply point out that 
it is difficult to get clean tests of hypotheses, that decisive refutations are 
rare That problem always exists The argument must be against Popper’s 
insistence that nevertheless refutations should be taken seriously, and that 
when one occurs, certain theory adjustments are forbidden (Caldwell 
1991 7)
Economic theories are probability hypotheses As such, they are likely not to hold 
outside of a specified range of observations They are, therefore, false m general For 
Popper, the choice between two equally false theories can be made by appraising the 
degree of corroboration of each theory The concept of corroboration gives the 
scientist an mdicator of the verisimilitude, the truth-likeness, of a theory The problem 
is that verisimilitude is not compatible with the essence of falsificatiomsm which is
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that all false theories have a zero truth-probability If the recommendation is that the 
scientist discard all false theories, why should he then be instructed to compare false 
theories9 Popper’s methodology does not allow for a choice to be made between false 
theories unless one accepts the validity of the concept of verisimilitude, accepting 
verisimilitude, in mm, necessitates a rejection of falsificatiomsm This inconsistency 
is a substantial criticism of Popper’s philosophy of science Popper argued that 
falsificatiomsm is equally applicable to the natural and social sciences Situational 
logic, the method of choosing between false theories in the social sciences, also fails 
on the basis of this inconsistency between falsificatiomsm and verisimilitude
Not only can falsificatiomst criteria not be applied in economics, it can also be argued 
that they should not be applied Falsificatiomsm does not allow economists to choose 
between false theories, yet, this is exactly the type of comparison economists will be 
forced to make Friedman, in his methodology of positive economics, argued that 
such decisions between false theories should be made on the basis of conventionalist 
criteria The only alternative to this conventionalist methodology is to embrace 
induction The extent to which economists and economic methodologists have done 
this is exammed in chapter three m the context of Lakatos’ methodology of scientific 
research programmes
Has there, then, been no Poppenan legacy for economic methodology9 Caldwell 
suggested that Popper’s critical rationalism has had a positive influence both on
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economic methodology and on economics m practice (Caldwell 1991 27) Yet, what is 
critical rationalism but the instruction that scientists be more critical of their own work 
and more tolerant of the work of others9 Without the falsifications criteria for 
theory-choice, critical rationalism "becomes an unobjectionable but rather empty set 
of rules which at best excludes dogmatism but says little more that is positive" (Nola 
1987 455) However, in a social science which tends toward dogmatism, the 
importance of this legacy should be underestimated
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THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS IN ECONOMICS
CHAPTER TWO
Faced with the difficulties of implementing falsificatiomsm m economics, economic 
methodologists turned back to the philosophy of science In their preoccupation with 
Popper, economic methodologists failed to notice that the orthodoxy of the philosophy 
of science was under attack The orthodoxy of the philosophy of science was the view 
that criteria for theory-choice could be made without any reference to the theories the 
scientist was choosing between Thus, the attack was an attack against the externalist 
philosophies of science This attack reached its "happy and serendipitous culmination" 
with the publication m 1962 of Kuhn’s The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions 
(Wartofsky 1976 729) Kuhn’s text created "a split between two philosophies of 
science - one of which had become all but canomcal, m its ahistoncal mode, the other 
of which threatened to usurp this hegemony, with a peculiar link to history of science" 
(Wartofsky 1976 722)
Kuhn’s primary concern was with the history of natural science, but not with the mere 
chronicle of historical facts Kuhn set out two tasks for the historian of a science
On the one hand he must determine by what man and at what point in time 
each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory was discovered or 
invented On the other, he must describe and explam the congeries of error,
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myth, and superstition that have inhibited the more rapid accumulation of the 
constituents of the modem scientific text (Kuhn 1970a 2)
For Kuhn, "the process of scientific discovery , or of changing theoretical structures, 
is inherently a part of its broader environment" (Dow 1985 27) It is the conversion of 
a chronicle into a subjective discourse on motive, purpose and event, that characterises 
Kuhn’s analysis as a philosophy rather than as a history of science It is, in 
McMullm’s (1970) classification, an internalist philosophy of science Thus, it 
presupposes the existence of an already functioning methodology within a science and 
attempts to elucidate that methodology The purpose of internalist philosophy of 
science is not to set down, a pn o n , criteria for theory-choice, but rather to elucidate 
the criteria for theory-choice already at work m science
Given the failure of the falsification^ methodology in economics, it might, in 
retrospect, have seemed a sound methodological move for economic methodologists to 
turn to the consideration of what economists actually do, and away from what 
orthodox philosophers claimed they ought to do The extent to which Kuhn’s approach 
has served a useful one for economic methodologists is explored m section 2 2 
Section 2 1 gives a brief outline of Kuhn’s methodology
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Kuhn accepted Popper’s assertion that science progresses in a process of conjecture 
and refutation However, the history of science showed that scientists did not always 
reject refuted theories For Popper, the reluctance of a scientist to reject a theory 
refuted by empirical evidence could only be described as irrational in terms of 
Popper’s particular theory of science Kuhn attempted to explain why scientists might 
not reject refuted theories To do this, he did not posit an alternative externalist 
philosophy of science His aim was, rather, to elucidate the theory of science used by 
scientists
Kuhn explamed the tenacity of refuted theories in a sociological theory of scientific 
development Kuhn saw science as developing through a series of evolutionary cycles, 
with the dynamics of each cycle being of the same nature Each cycle begins with 
what is the most famous (and overused) of Kuhn’s concepts - the paradigm Kuhn 
defined the paradigm in a myriad of different ways Masterson (1970) outlined 
twenty-two definitions m Kuhn (1970a)
The paradigm is a metaphysical heuristic concept giving direction to scientists, it is a 
series of laws and theories which scientists use as the foundation of their knowledge, it 
is a methodological tool-box, it is a set of standards to which scientists must adhere 
Paradigms combine all these functions into an entire scientific tradition Kuhn’s
2 1 AN HISTORICIST EXPLANATION OF SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT
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examples of paradigms include Ptolemaic astronomy, Aristotelian dynamics and 
Newtoman dynamics The word paradigm appears to be too all-encompassing to have 
any real analytical force ’Paradigm’ had been so extensively adopted to describe a 
range of different concepts, that by 1970, Kuhn admitted that he had lost control of 
the word (Kuhn 1970b 272) In the postscript to the second edition of The Structure o f 
Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn attempted to regain control over the concept in order to 
reestablish its methodological significance
Kuhn acknowledged the variety of meamngs delineated by Masterson, but argued that 
many of these are as a result of "stylistic inconsistencies" and can therefore be 
discarded (Kuhn 1970a 181) Kuhn equated the paradigm to a "disciplinary matrix" 
(Kuhn 1970a 182), made up of the following components The paradigm or matrix 
will contain "symbolic generalizations" (Kuhn 1970a 182) These form a frame of 
reference for the development of theory within the paradigm These symbolic 
generalisations take the form of laws, but inherent in them is a particular definition of 
the concepts as used withm the law Kuhn showed this dual function of symbolic 
generalisations by posmg the following question "Did Einstein show that simultaneity 
was relative or did he alter the notion of simultaneity itself9" (Kuhn 1970a 184)
The second component of the paradigm is the existence of shared beliefs or 
commitments to particular problems by those scientists working within the paradigm 
(Kuhn 1970a 184) This suggests a third component - that of a system of "shared
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values" (Kuhn 1970a 185) Finally, the paradigm must contain a set of specified 
exemplars (Kuhn 1970a 187) It is these exemplars which "provide the community 
fme-structure of science" (Kuhn 1970a 187) Kuhn placed a lot of emphasis on the 
importance of common exemplars, it is this which ensures that all the scientists within 
a particular paradigm see things in the same way (Kuhn 1970a 193)
The paradigm, therefore, sets down for the individual scientist, not only the problems 
or puzzles to be solved, but also the method by which these problems or puzzles ought 
to be solved This puzzle-solvmg activity, Kuhn defined as normal science
research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, 
achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a 
tune as supplying the foundation for its further practice (Kuhn 1970a 10)
Normal science is presented as the manifestation of a heuristic given to science by the 
adopted paradigm It involves the creation of theories to solve set problems m the 
form dictated by the accepted set of exemplars, in a way that is consistent with the 
symbolic generalisations of the paradigm, and that does not contradict the shared 
values of the scientific community which espouses the paradigm It involves empirical 
investigation "to articulate the paradigm theory, resolvmg some of its residual 
ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which [the paradigm] had 
previously only drawn attention" (Kuhn 1970a 27)
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In the process of normal science, scientists are concerned with upholding rather than 
with refuting the paradigm They construct their theories and models to fit in with the 
pronouncements of the paradigm - "the aim of normal science is not major substantive 
novelties" (Kuhn 1970a 35) The paradigm provides the scientist with the answer, and 
it is his job to formulate the question If the scientist fails to resolve his theory to the 
paradigm, then "only his ability not the corpus of current science is impugned" (Kuhn 
1970b 4) Normal science, Kuhn asserted, "accounts for the overwhelming majority 
of the work done m basic science" (Kuhn 1970b 4) The majority of scientists, 
according to Kuhn, are not m fact engaged in Poppenan-type quests for falsifications, 
but rather m testmg theories for compatibility with the prevailing paradigm
The scientific revolution of the title of Kuhn’s text, occurs when there is a change m 
the accepted paradigm of the scientific community This change is ultimately wrought 
by the discovery of anomalies in the existing paradigm If this is so, where is the 
difference between Kuhn’s description of progress in science and Popper’s 
prescription for progress m science9
Kuhn argued that single refuting instances will not be enough, by themselves, to 
warrant the overthrow of a paradigm When faced with individual anomalies, Kuhn 
argued that scientists will "devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of 
their theory m order to eliminate any apparent conflict" (Kuhn 1970a 78) In its
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extreme, the constant modification of a paradigm will lead a dogmatic persistence in 
the acceptance of the paradigm whatever the impact of anomalies, an outcome which 
Kuhn called "professionalisation" (Kuhn 1970a 64) Professionalisation leads to "an 
immense restriction of the scientist’s vision and to a considerable resistance to 
paradigm change" (Kuhn 1970a 64) Science falls short of this development when a 
new paradigm rises to challenge the accepted paradigm
It is only when the "anomalies and counter-instances" are worked into an alternative 
paradigm that the established paradigm is overthrown During a period of "crisis", 
some scientists begin to examine the nature of the anomalies to the established 
paradigm (Kuhn 1970a 76) "A failure that had previously been personal may then 
come to seem the failure of a theory under test" (Kuhn 1974 801) It is only during 
this period of crisis that scientists begin to question the adequacy of their theories as 
opposed to the theories of other scientists However, scientists do not, according to 
Kuhn, reject the established paradigm until they have an alternative paradigm of equal 
stature to replace it with
At the start a new candidate for paradigm may have few supporters, and on 
occasions the supporters’ motives may be suspect Nevertheless, if they are 
competent, they will improve it, explore its possibilities, and show what it 
would be like to belong to the community guided by it And as that goes on, 
if the paradigm is one destined to wm its fight, the number and strength of
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the persuasive arguments in its favour will increase More scientists will then 
be converted, and the exploration of the new paradigm will go on at last 
only a few elderly hold-outs remam (Kuhn 1970a 159)
Kuhn argued that the new paradigm will differ from the old one m a very fundamental 
way it will propose new problems to solve and new methods of solving them Given 
these fundamental differences between paradigms, Kuhn spoke of the necessity of a 
gestalt-switch among scientists, a conversion from belief in the primacy of the old 
problems and methods, to the primacy of the new problems and methods (Kuhn 
1970a 103)
Because they deal with different problems in different ways, Kuhn concluded that 
paradigms are incommensurable "The normal scientific tradition that emerges from a 
scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with 
that which has gone before" (Kuhn 1970a 103)
Kuhn gave the following reasons as to why competing paradigms are 
incommensurable "The proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree about 
the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve Their standards or 
definitions of science are not the same" (Kuhn 1970a 148) But this definition of 
incommensurability as a dispute over standards is a narrower one than the definition
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of incommensurability which Kuhn finally proposed
Since new paradigms are born from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate 
much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, 
that the traditional paradigm had previously employed But they seldom 
employ these borrowed elements in quite the traditional way Withm the new 
paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships, 
one with the other The inevitable result is what we must call, though the 
term is not quite right, a misunderstanding between the two competing 
schools (Kuhn 1970a 149)
This "misunderstanding" is the source of the incommensurability of competing 
paradigms The notion that paradigms are incommensurable should not be interpreted 
as meamng that competing paradigms cannot be compared, since "the very rationale 
for introducing the notion of mcommmensurability is to clarify what is involved when 
we do compare alternative and rival paradigms" (Bernstein 1983 82) Thus, "when 
Kuhn claims that ‘mass’ means something different m classical and relativistic 
mechamcs, thus rendering these theories incommensurable, he is not appealing to 
history but to an analytical criterion of difference in meamng" (Giere 1973 291)
—i
Kuhn attempted to clear up the general misunderstanding over the meamng of
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incommensurability by starting with what he felt to be the most common 
misinterpretation of the impact of incommensurability
the proponents of incommensurable theories cannot communicate with each 
other at all as a result, m a debate over theory-choice there can be no 
recourse to good reasons, instead theory must be chosen for reasons that are 
ultimately personal and subjective, some sort of mystical apperception is 
responsible for the decision actually reached (Kuhn 1970a 198-199)
For Kuhn, scientific theories can be compared, but "debates over theory-choice cannot 
be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or mathematical proof" (Kuhn 
1970a 199) On what grounds then can the choice between incommensurable theories 
be made9
For Kuhn, normal science takes up most of the time of the scientist Inherent in the 
activity of normal science is the recogmtion of the "incompleteness and imperfection 
of the existing theory-data fit" (Kuhn 1970a 148) In normal science, there is an 
attempt to establish a closer fit by adjusting theory to fit the data It is this process of 
adjustment which makes falsification an inadequate methodology in practice "if any 
and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be 
rejected at all times" (Kuhn 1970a 145) Popper recogmsed this probabilistic nature of
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scientific theories and proposed verisimilitude as a method of choosing between 
equally false theories (Popper 1972 335)
While Kuhn acknowledged that "it makes a great deal of sense to ask which of the two 
actual and competmg theories fits the facts better", the incommensurability poses a 
barrier to the resolution of this question (Kuhn 1970a 147) For Kuhn, "the 
competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by 
proofs," because "the proponents of competmg paradigms are always at least slightly 
at cross-purposes" (Kuhn 1970a 148) Thus, the debates about the particular merits of 
one paradigm over another are circular since "each group uses its own paradigm to 
argue in that paradigm’s defense" (Kuhn 1970a 94)
Yet, scientists do choose between paradigms, although their conversion might take 
some tune Why conversions occur, Kuhn argued, has "no single or uniform answer" 
(Kuhn 1970a 152) Kuhn considered a range of possible reasons "the sun worship 
that helped make Kepler a Copemican","idiosyncrasies of autobiography and 
personality", "the nationality or prior reputation of the innovator" (Kuhn 
1970a 152-153) In addition, Kuhn argued that the new paradigm is likely to succeed 
if it "displays a quantitative precision strikingly better than its older competitor"
(Kuhn 1970a 154) And novel facts are "particularly persuasive" (Kuhn 1970a 154) It 
appears than anything might determine the conversion from the old paradigm to the 
new, but the relative degree of corroboration of each The working out of the degree
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of corroboration comes after the conversion "it is only much later, after the new 
paradigm has been developed, accepted, and exploited that apparently decisive 
arguments are developed" (Kuhn 1970a 156)
Kuhn placed conventionalist criteria at the centre of the conversion "these are the 
arguments, rarely made entirely explicit, that appeal to the individual’s sense of the 
appropriate or the aesthetic - the new theory is said to be ‘neater,’ ‘more suitable,’ or 
‘simpler’ than the old" (Kuhn 1970a 155) The essence of conventionalism is that the 
definitions of ‘simple,’ ‘neatness,’ ‘fruitfulness,’ and so on, have been established by 
the scientific community, and thus are applied by every scientist m the same way 
Kuhn, on the other hand, argued that "such reasons function as values and they can 
thus be differently applied, individually and collectively, by men who concur in 
honoring them" (Kuhn 1970a 199) Where concepts like ‘simplicity,’ ‘neatness,’ and 
so on, are applied with different meamng within different paradigms, then these 
conventionalist criteria, too, fail to explam why choices between paradigms occur 
For Kuhn, the choice between paradigms comes down to persuasion "the debate is 
about premises, and its recourse is to persuasion as a prelude to the possibility of 
proof" (Kuhn 1970a 199) The persuasion of the holders of the old paradigm that the 
disciplinary matrix of the new paradigm "can solve the problems that have led the old 
one to a crisis" (Kuhn 1970a 153), must occur before this can actually be shown to be 
the case The conversion "must be based less on past achievement than on future
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promise A decision of that kind can only be made on faith" (Kuhn 1970a 157-158)
It is after the persuasive tactics of the holders of the new paradigm have managed to 
ensure conversion from the old paradigm, that the logical relation of the old to the 
new paradigm is explored Kuhn argued that this resulted in a history of science which 
is "linear or cumulative" (Kuhn 1970a 139) The fact that the disciplinary matrix has 
changed when a conversion to a new paradigm occurs, is hidden by this new history 
The source of this new history is to be found in textbooks "From the beginning of the 
scientific enterprise, a textbook presentation implies, scientists have striven for the 
particular objectives that are embodied in today’s paradigms" (Kuhn 1970a 140) 
Scientific revolutions are therefore made invisible by the desire of the scientists 
working within the present paradigm not only to direct the future development of their 
science, but also to represent the past Thus, the history of a science as presented by 
current scientists, will m fact be a reconstruction of that history which seeks to 
identify, in the past, the seeds of the present set of exemplars
Bernstein argued that this tendency to rewrite history of science as a cumulative 
process is propagated by empiricist philosophers (Bernstein 1983 83) His example is 
the common argument that Einstein’s theory of dynamics was a more complete 
version of dynamics than was Newton’s which is contained within Einstein’s theory as 
a special case For example, this is Popper’s argument agamst Kuhn’s description of 
incommensurability
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It would thus be simply false to say that the transition from Newton’s theory 
of gravity to Einstein’s is an irrational leap, and that the two are not 
rationally compatible On the contrary, there are many points of contact and 
pomts of comparison it follows from Einstein’s theory that Newton’s theory 
is an excellent approximation (Popper 1970 57)
Popper’s argument is that the shift from the Newtoman to the Einsteiman system can 
be described in terms of a process of conjecture and refutation, as all good science 
can In other words, Popper reconstructs this history of physics m terms of his own 
particular theory of scientific rationality In Poppenan terms, the Einsteiman system is 
preferable to the Newtoman because it solves anomalies that the Newtoman system 
cannot solve and incorporates the Newtoman system as a special case
This argument does not hold in Kuhn’s analytical framework Where paradigms are 
incommensurable, one cannot be held as a special case of the other In the Kuhnian 
framework, the differences between paradigms m their understanding of particular 
concepts suggests that the decision to shift from one paradigm to another cannot be 
made on the basis of objective criteria such as those suggested by Popper
Kuhn’s philosophy of science met with a substantial amount of criticism from 
positivist philosophers of science whose mam argument was that there is a
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(discoverable) underlying rationale to the scientific process The main aspects of this 
criticism are to be found in the collection of papers presented at the International 
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, published m Lakatos and Musgrave (1970)
Kuhn’s argument that science did not progress according to a single, universally held, 
set of objective criteria was interpreted as an argument that that science grows on the 
basis of irrational decision-making by scientists Their decision-making can only be 
irrational m the light of the argument that paradigms are incommensurable In the 
light of Popper’s arguments against histoncism and psychologism (Popper 1966), it is 
not surprising that he argued strenuously against Kuhn’s assertion that scientific 
growth is borne out of decisions which are based on the relative abilities of 
revolutionary scientists to persuade their ‘normal’ colleagues (Popper 1970 57-58) 
Lakatos, too, demed that ‘mob psychology’ played a role m "the world of articulated 
knowledge" (Lakatos 1970 180) Kuhn demed this charge of irrationalism in his reply 
to these papers "I do not for a moment believe that science is an intrinsically 
irrational enterprise" (Kuhn 1970b 143) What Kuhn was arguing was that the 
commumty-wide concepts used to judge between paradigms are understood in 
different ways by different members of that community Thus, the decision to change 
from one paradigm to another is essentially a personal one (see Kuhn 1970a 199, 
quoted above) For Kuhn, this explains why the conversion of an entire scientific 
community to a new paradigm can take a long time
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If scientific rationality is a personal, as opposed to a community-wide, concept, then 
the next step is to mvestigate the extent to which the concept of rationality differs 
between scientists, to investígate the criteria which scientists themselves use when 
choosing between theories This leads into the sort of sociological investigation of 
scientific growth which Popper argued so strenuously against "The suggestion that we 
can find anything [m psychology or sociology] like ‘objective, pure description’ is 
clearly mistaken" (Popper 1970 58)
The notion of the incommensurability of paradigms is closely connected to the notion 
that scientific decisions are based on irrational premises If paradigms are 
fundamentally incomparable, as Kuhn was interpreted as having said, then the choice 
between them can only be irrational Watkms doubted that incommensurability would 
describe the relation between two paradigms within the same science He argued that 
incommensurable paradigms are not necessarily incompatible, they do not necessarily 
lead to scientific revolution "Biblical myths and scientific theories are 
incommensurable [but] they are compatible and can peacefully co-exist just because 
they are incommensurable" (Watkms 1970 36) On the other hand, Watkms argued 
that
if the Ptolemaic system is logically incompatible with the Copemican
system peaceful co-existence is not possible they are rival alternatives, and
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it was possible to make a rational choice between them partly because it was 
possible to devise crucial experiments between them (Watkins 1970 36)
Thus, for Watkins, two paradigms that are incompatible cannot also be 
incommensurable Toulmm, too, criticised Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability, it 
had "an element of rhetorical exaggeration" (Toulmm 1970 43) Kuhn, argued 
Toulmm, "went too far by implying the existence of discontinuities in scientific theory 
far more profound and far less explicable than any which ever m fact occur" (Toulmm 
1970 41) Toulmm pointed to the fact that many scientists were able to give reasons as 
to why they changed paradigms, and few cited the persuasive abilities of their 
colleagues (Toulmm 1970 44) Kuhn appears to have taken at least some of this 
criticism on board, for in The Essential Tension (1977), he had adopted a softer 
definition of incommensurability, which allowed a scientific revolution to have 
elements of continuity as well as disjomtedness This revision to the concept of 
incommensurability, and therefore to the nature of scientific revolutions, has 
particular significance in respect of Kuhnian analyses of the growth of economic 
knowledge
It has been argued that "these concessions considerably dilute the apparently dramatic 
import of Kuhn’s original message" (Blaug 1992 30) However, the notion that there 
are elements of continuity and disjomtedness as a science shifts from one paradigm to 
another is only interpreted as a weakening of Kuhn’s argument if one considers
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Kuhn’s argument m an objectivist light In other words, the fact that there can exist a 
great deal of commensurability between competing paradigms, is only troubling if 
Kuhn were attempting to put forward an objective theory of science based on the 
notion of incommensurability between paradigms The Kuhnian framework has m fact 
been interpreted in this narrow sense by positivist philosophy of science It was not, 
however, Kuhn’s aim to find an alternative theory of scientific rationality Rather, he 
argued that searching for an objective rationality of science was a wasted exercise
To suppose that we possess criteria of rationality which are independent of 
our understanding of the essentials of the scientific process is to open the 
door to cloud-cuckoo land (Kuhn 1970b 264)
The whole point of a sociological reconstruction of the history of science, is that the 
historian should have no preconceived notions about how science should progress, or 
indeed, whether it does progress Kuhn argued that "the philosopher’s reconstruction 
is generally unrecognizable as science to either historians of science or to scientists 
themselves" (Kuhn 1977 15) This is because the philosopher’s preoccupation with a 
particular theory of scientific rationality distorts his portrayal of scientific 
development
Both historians and scientists can claim to discard as much detail as the 
philosopher, to be as concerned with essentials, to be engaged in rational
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reconstruction Instead the difficulty is the identification of essentials To the 
philosophically minded historian, the philosopher of science often seems to 
have mistaken a few selected elements for the whole and then forced them to 
serve functions for which they may be unsuited in principle and which they 
surely do not perform in practice, however abstractly that practice be 
described (Kuhn 1977 15)
The description, by Kuhn, of his history of science as a rational reconstruction seems 
to be something of a paradox, given his argument that an objective theory of science 
cannot exist However, a Kuhnian rational reconstruction is a history of a science 
which seeks to identify the definitions of rationality employed by scientists 
themselves This is distinct from the positivist notion of a rational reconstruction as an 
interpretation of the history of science from the point of view of a particular, objective 
theory of scientific rationality
Since the definitions of rationality which scientists employ are, according to Kuhn, 
likely to change over tune, the history of science is more likely to display a pattern of 
disjointedness rather than the pattern of continuity which is suggested by positivist 
rational reconstructions
There are three types of rational reconstruction of the history of a science The first is 
a positivist rational reconstruction, which superimposes upon the history of a science a
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particular objective theory of scientific rationality The second is the Kuhnian 
sociological rational reconstruction which attempts to discover the definitions of 
rationality expounded by scientists themselves within a particular science The third 
rational reconstruction is also identified by Kuhn It is the reconstruction of a science 
presented by scientists themselves in their attempt to show continuity over the 
lifecycle of their science (Kuhn 1970a 138) The concept of rational reconstruction is 
raised agam m chapter 3 2 m the context of Lakatos’ methodology of historiographic 
research programmes The following section is concerned with the way in which 
Kuhnian concepts have been imported into economics
97
'l
2 2 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS IN ECONOMICS
Kuhn said relatively little about the social sciences m general, and nothing at all about 
economics His few comments on the social sciences suggest that he did not believe 
them to have developed sufficient consensus to be described as paradigmatic "it 
remains an open question what parts of social science have yet acquired such 
paradigms at all History suggests that the road to a firm research consensus is 
extraordinarily arduous" (Kuhn 1970a 15) However, he strongly objected to the 
notion that social scientists should set about establishing paradigms "If, as 
Feyerabend suggests, some social scientists take from me the view that they can 
improve the status of their field by first legislating agreement on fundamentals and 
then turning to puzzle solving, they are badly misconstruing my point" (Kuhn 
1970b 245) Kuhn’s aim was not to elucidate some objective methodology whereby 
sciences might progress, but rather to argue that such an objective methodology does 
not in fact exist However, economic methodologists have tended to apply Kuhn’s 
philosophy of science m the same way that they applied Popper’s Instead of engaging 
m sociological rational reconstructions of the
history of economic thought, economic methodology has, m the mam, attempted to 
superimpose Kuhnian concepts upon the history of economic thought in the form of a 
postivist rational reconstruction The mam concern has been with identifying
98
paradigms and revolutions in the history of economic thought
As was the case with Popper, economists and economic methodologists eagerly 
adopted Kuhnian terminology "appeal to paradigmatic reasomng has quickly become 
a regular feature of controversies in economics and ‘paradigm’ is now the by-word of 
every historian of economic thought" (Blaug 1976 149) A common view is that 
economics, alone of the social sciences, has the appearance of a Kuhnian science (for 
example, Kunin and Weaver 1971 391) This assertion is normally based on the 
existence of the neoclassical tradition, which bears considerable resemblance to the 
Kuhnian concept of paradigm It contains symbolic generalisations - the laws of 
demand and supply, the law of diminishing returns It also involves shared beliefs and 
values - for example, the maximisation principle, the belief m the efficiency of the 
market, and m the ability of the general equilibrium framework to elucidate this 
efficiency Finally, it has a set of exemplars - the predictions which have been gleaned 
from general equilibrium models in the past
It would seem that something bearing a strong resemblance to a paradigm exists 
within economics But the growth of knowledge occurs, according to Kuhn, when 
there is revolution, when one paradigm is supplanted by another The identification of 
a paradigm alone is not enough for economic methodologists whose concern is with 
whether the development of economic thought can be described m Kuhnian terms
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Bronfenbrenner outlined three possible contenders for Kuhnian revolutionary status m 
economics "the laissez-faire revolution, the utility revolution and the macroeconomics 
revolution" (Bronfenbrenner 1971 150) Bronfenbrenner conceded that, while "none 
of these three revolutions would rank - for a noneconomist, at least - with the 
Copemican, Newtonian, and Darwinian Revolutions m astronomy, physics and 
biology they are the best economics has to offer" (Bronfenbrenner 1971 138-139)
The laissez-faire revolution is an obvious contender for revolution Smith, with The 
Wealth o f Nations, provided a disciplinary matrix that was lacking m the mercantilist 
agenda (Katouzian 1980 12) Yet, the very admission that a disciplinary matrix did 
not exist prior to Smith, shows that the laissez-faire revolution cannot have been a 
revolution in the Kuhnian sense For Kuhn, a scientific revolution is borne out of 
battle between two paradigms, if the mercantilist doctrine was not a paradigm, then 
the victory of the laissez-faire paradigm cannot be the result of a Kuhnian scientific 
revolution There is also the fact that much of Smith’s work involved a synthesis of 
the disparate theories of previous writers In this sense, Smith’s work cannot be held 
as incommensurable with what preceded it
The utility or the margmalist revolution is also commonly given as an example of 
revolution m economics Bicchieri pointed to the fact that continuity was as much a
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feature of the shift from classical political economy to neoclassical economics as was 
disjointedness
Marginalism is more general than classical economics, and it succeeds m 
solvmg some of its predecessors anomalies Other anomalies, on the 
contrary, are of no interest to the margmalists as there occurred a shift of 
emphasis and certain phenomena which were important to the classics ceased 
to be regarded as relevant (Bicchieri 1989 238)
The fact that marginalism answers some of the anomalies of the previous paradigm 
suggests that the shift in paradigms can be explamed in rational terms by the 
philosophies of Popper or Lakatos However, there are also elements of disjointedness 
between the two paradigms which resulted, principally, in the Kuhnian loss of growth 
theory Thus, Bicchieri concluded "There is a measure of continuity and progress, 
since more problems are raised and solved by the new theory of value, while most old 
problems are retained and new solutions are offered to them, but there is neither 
cumulative growth nor complete preservation of content" (Bicchieri 1989 238) The 
marginalist revolution therefore does not correspond completely to Kuhn’s original 
description The two paradigms m question cannot be said to be incommensurable
The macroeconomics revolution was also borne out of an attempt to explain the 
unresolved questions of the accepted paradigm Thus there is, m this revolution too,
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an element of continuity Blaug argued that Keynesian theory made too much use of 
the methods of classical macroeconomics to be considered an alternative Kuhnian 
paradigm (Blaug 1976 161) Moreover, Blaug argued that "the tendency of economists 
to join the ranks of the Keynesians m mcreasmg numbers after 1936 was perfectly 
rational" (Blaug 1976 163) It was made, according to Blaug, on the basis of its 
ability to resolve the problem of persistent unemployment and as such, the revolution 
can be explained wholly m Lakatosian terms (Blaug 1976 163) (The various 
Lakatosian analyses of the Keynesian revolution are considered in chapter 3 2)
Bronfenbrenner, too, argued that in spite of the methodological cases which each of 
these three events in the history of economics brought about, they cannot be described 
as revolutions in the sense that Kuhn meant He pointed out that, while crises did 
occur within particular schools of thought and antitheses have been proposed, "what 
has developed out of the conflict between thesis and antithesis is, m most cases, some 
sort of synthesis which comprises the normal science, the orthodoxy, the paradigm, or 
the Schule of the next generation or two" (Bronfenbrenner 1971 141) The argument 
appears to be that in a Kuhnian revolution, such a synthesis would be impossible, due 
to the incommensurability of competmg paradigms Bronfenbrenner admitted that his 
three examples can only be described as revolutions, if one is prepared to depart from 
the Kuhnian [1970a] meamng of the concept of revolution Coats, too, argued that the 
nature of revolutions m economics differs from that described by Kuhn in respect of 
the natural sciences (Coats 1969 293)
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Bronfenbrenner analysed paradigm-change in terms of a Hegelian dialectic as a 
process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis He argued that, whereas crisis in Kuhnian 
analysis leads to competition between two incommensurable paradigms and the 
eventual succession of one over the other, in Bronfenbrenner’s dialectic crisis leads to 
the eventual synthesis of two opposing points of view (Bronfenbrenner 1971 150) He 
outlined two principle differences between his dialectic and Kuhnian analysis "Our 
dialectic allows ‘outmoded’ ideas longer lives in economics than Kuhn grants them 
in the natural sciences" (Bronfenbrenner 1971 150) The dialectic approach also 
allows for recogmtion of the fact that, in economics, "important advances tend to be 
major accretions without any corresponding rejections of existing paradigms" 
(Bronfenbrenner 1971 150)
The most obvious example of synthesis in respect of the three revolutions chosen by 
Bronfenbrenner, is the neoclassical synthesis of Keynesian and classical 
macroeconomics Bronfenbrenner argued that the fact that such a synthesis could take 
place, suggests that the two paradigms are not incommensurable However, in 
Leijonhufvud’s view, this synthesis is synthetic
The ‘neoclassical synthesis’ proposed a reconciliation of ‘Keynesianism’ and 
‘orthodoxy’ on a purely formalistic plane Substantively, each of the two 
world-views that were thus wrenched into the logical appearance of
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consistency was basically uncompromised by the adopted formula Behind the 
formal screen, they stood poles apart (Leijonhufvud 1976 98)
In Leijonhufvud’s view, the work done to establish the microfoundations of Keynesian 
macroeconomics is simply an attempt to formalise the synthesis, it establishes no 
foundational common ground between the two paradigms (Leijonhufvud 1976 98) 
Thus, for Leijonhufvud, there is much less consistency between the two paradigms 
than Bronfenbrenner’s analysis suggests This, however, does not mean that the switch 
from one to the other can be described as a Kuhnian revolution, quite the contrary If 
the two paradigms do conflict, then there exists the possibility of deciding on rational 
grounds which is preferable The two paradigms are therefore incompatible rather 
than incomparable or incommensurable
Loasby explored the development of the non-neoclassical theory of the firm, usmg a 
Kuhnian analysis (Loasby 1971) Loasby traced the development of the 
non-neoclassical theory of the firm, from Sraffa (1926), to Chamberlain’s theory of 
monopolistic competition, and the development of the managerial and behavioural 
theories of the firm Despite the existence of two alternative paradigms on the firm, 
Loasby pointed out that no revolution had occurred (Loasby 1971 882) Loasby 
implied the following explanation for the absence of a revolution "It [the 
non-neoclassical theory] has no answer to the questions of efficiency or stability as 
those questions are traditionally posed" (Loasby 1971 882) This suggests that the two
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paradigms are incommensurable However, in the Kuhnian framework, the 
incommensurability of paradigms is no obstacle to scientific revolution per se If the 
paradigms are incommensurable and no revolution has taken place, this would imply 
that the proponents of the non-neoclassical theory have so far failed to persuade the 
economics community that the particular questions they have posed are worth more 
time and effort than the questions posed by the neoclassical theory
These studies point to an absence of Kuhnian revolutions m economics, on the 
grounds that there is a degree of commensurability between different schools in 
economics The suggestion among these studies is that Kuhn’s structure of scientific 
revolution fails to describe the development of economic thought
Economic methodologists have been able to identify normal science m economics 
Normal science anses because of the incongruities between theory and data Kuhn 
outlined a range of activities each forming part of the process of normal science The 
paradigm prompts scientists to examine more closely the phenomena which the 
paradigm "has shown to be particularly revealing of the nature of things" (Kuhn 
1970a 25) Examples from astronomy include the "stellar positions and magnitude, the 
periods of eclipsing binaries and of planets" (Kuhn 1970a 25) Another normal science 
activity is the development of "special apparatus to bring nature and theory into 
closer and closer agreement" (Kuhn 1970a 27) An example, again from astronomy, is 
the development of telescopic equipment to "demonstrate the Copemican prediction of
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annual parallax" (Kuhn 1970a 26) The final strand to normal science is the "empirical 
work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory, resolvmg some of its residual 
ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only 
drawn attention" (Kuhn 1970a 27) In addition to empirical work, this third strand 
also includes "theoretical problems of paradigm articulation" (Kuhn 1970a 33) Kuhn 
held that "during periods when scientific development is predominantly qualitative, 
these problems dominate" (Kuhn 1970a 33)
Popper regarded normal science as "a danger to science" (Popper 1970 52) For 
Popper, the normal scientist is "a victim of dogmatisation" who fails to see the scope 
of his science (Popper 1970 53) For Kuhn, on the other hand, normal science is the 
creative task of paradigm-articulation which precisely involves the discovery of the 
scope of a particular paradigm Argyrous explored the work undertaken on the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) and the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) in the 
context of Kuhn’s definition of normal science (Argyrous 1992) Argyrous examined 
the attempts to empirically test the PIH by Houthakker and Eisner m the 1950s 
(Argyrous 1992 239-241) Houthakker’s results did not corroborate the PIH Yet, this 
did not lead to a rejection of the PIH, but rather provided the stimulus for further 
research mto the nature of consumption function Eisner’s work provided more 
favourable results for the PIH, and subsequent studies have been concerned with the 
further articulation of Friedman’s original argument This work on the consumption 
function closely resembles the empirical work which Kuhn identified as bemg a part
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of the process of normal science In chapter 1 3 above, it was argued that instead of 
rejecting theories on the grounds of incompatibility between an empirical model of a 
theory and observed data, econometricians are much more likely to reexamine the 
links between the theory and possible representative
models Friedman’s work on monetarism was described m chapter 1 2 as a curious 
loop from observation to deduction and back to observation This process is in fact 
part of what Kuhn called normal science, it is the empirical articulation of an 
underlying paradigm
Bronfenbrenner argued that the revolutions he identified in economics were not 
Kuhnian revolutions, because of the element of synthesis which occurred between two 
competing paradigms This synthesis suggests that the two paradigms are not 
incommensurable Bronfenbrenner found it more appropriate to analyse revolutions m 
economics using a Hegelian dialectical approach which allowed for this tendency to 
render compatible two competing paradigms This dialectic approach is, however, 
compatible with Kuhn’s softened version of incommensurability which appears m The 
Essential Tension (1977) Here, Kuhn allowed for the fact that the new paradigm may 
address at least some of the issues dealt with by the precedmg paradigm This 
softening of the concept of incommensurability implies an acceptance that the history 
of science displays both disjointedness and continuity Thus, the revolutions depicted 
above may well constitute Kuhnian revolutions under this reformulation However, in 
searching for Kuhnian concepts like paradigm, revolution and normal science,
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economic methodology seems to have missed the mam pomt of Kuhn’s argument 
Kuhn was not concerned with supplying an alternative theory of scientific 
development in order to provide a rational reconstruction of the history of science 
Rather, he argued that the history of science should be a sociological reconstruction, a 
reconstruction which considers the definitions of progress adopted by scientists 
themselves, however irrational these definitions might appear to the positivist 
Somewhat ironically, it is the failure of positivist philosophies of science to provide 
adequate rational reconstructions of the development of economic thought, rather than 
a desire to undertake Kuhman-type analyses of the development of economic thought, 
which has forced economists to consider the definitions of rationality actually 
employed by economists themselves This point is considered further in chapter 4 
below
Kuhn’s work placed the philosophy of science at a crossroads There existed the 
possibility of reverting to the orthodox philosophy, the externalist philosophy 
Alternatively, there existed the possibility of exploring further the idea of a sociology 
or psychology of science Dow has suggested that "the reactions of economists to 
Kuhn’s approach is determmed to a considerable extent by their prior methodological 
stance" (Dow 1985 33) That economic methodologists, in the mam, followed the 
former route, is not therefore surprising, given the general methodological stance that 
economics was a positive science, more like the natural than the social sciences The 
influence of positivist philosophy on economic methodology led methodologists to
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consider the postivist response to Kuhn’s attack, namely Lakatos’ Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP) (Lakatos 1970) The influence of MSRP on 
economic methodology is the subject of the following chapter
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE METHODOLOGIES OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES 
AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY
3 1 THE LAKATOSIAN APPROACH TO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
The methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) can be interpreted as a 
response of the orthodoxy to Kuhn’s thesis that there can be no objective, 
commumty-wide criteria for theory-choice Lakatos attempted to reinstate the notion 
of objective criteria, while at the same time acknowledging the validity of Kuhn’s 
argument that scientists do not reject all falsified theories Suppe depicted Lakatos as 
attempting to "steer a middle course between two extremes" (Suppe 1977 704) On 
the one hand, there was the orthodox, positivist view of science as "a rational 
enterprise concerned with obtaining objective knowledge" (Suppe 1977 705) On the 
other hand, there were the "young Turks including Hanson, Feyerabend and Kuhn" 
with their view of science as "a social phenomenon in which science became a 
subjective and, to varying degrees, an irrational enterprise" (Suppe 1977 704-705)
Both Popper and Kuhn noted that, in order to make scientific theories testable, they 
have to be combined with auxiliary assumptions, and that this makes scientific theories
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probabilistic in nature This leads to a particular problem with the falsificatiomst 
thesis if the theory is found to be incompatible with observed facts, exactly what 
should be rejected, theory or auxiliary assumptions9 This problem, which is 
commonplace m econometrics, is known as the Duhem-Quine thesis (Qume 1953)
The Duhem-Quine thesis also involves a recogmtion that immunising strategies can be 
made within any axiomatic system, to make that system compatible with the facts 
Given this, the choice between scientific theories on the basis of their relative 
corroboration by observed facts, becomes a "‘tackers’ race’" (Worrall 1978b 331) the 
preferred theory is the one which is adjusted to take account of observed facts first
The methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) focuses on the nature of 
the modifications which scientists make to their axiomatic systems when faced with 
refutations It classifies modifications in such a way as to distinguish between those 
modifications which are progressive, and those which are not In this way, MSRP 
provides an alternative, objective, criterion for choice between false theories a 
criterion which is based on the way m which scientists choose to modify then: 
axiomatic systems m the light of conflicting empirical evidence
Lakatos acknowledged that, in order to apply falsificatiomst principles without an 
infinite regress, it would be necessary for the scientist to take some a pn on  
methodological decisions He listed the extent of decision-making that the Poppenan 
scientist would have to engage in, prior to testmg his theories (Lakatos
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1970 106-112) Firstly, the scientist must decide that some knowledge constitutes 
unproblematic background knowledge The scientist "makes unfalsifiable by fia t some 
(spatio-temporally) singular statements" (Lakatos 1970 106) These statements are 
‘basic’ or ‘observational’ statements, "but only m inverted commas," to acknowledge 
the fact that they remam potentially falsifiable by some future test "This decision is 
then followed by a second kind of decision concerning the separation of the set of 
accepted basic statements from the rest" (Lakatos 1970 106) This foundation gives 
the scientist some knowledge against which to test his theory The theory is rejected if 
it conflicts with the ‘observational’ statements held unfalsifiable by the scientific 
community The third decision mvolves "specifying certain rejection rules which may 
render statistically interpreted evidence ‘inconsistent’ with the probabilistic theory" 
(Lakatos 1970 109) Fourthly, the scientist must make a decision with regard to 
cetens panbus clauses The factors m the cetens panbus clause must be specified and 
tested, and a decision must be taken as to whether the clause should become part of 
the unproblematic background knowledge of the scientist This, for Lakatos, is the 
most ‘dramatic’ of the decisions to be taken by the scientist "he has to promote one 
of the hundreds of ‘anomalous phenomena’ into a ‘crucial experiment’, and decide 
that m such a case the experiment was ‘controlled’" (Lakatos 1970 111)
Lakatos held these decisions to be too risky they are "toofirm" and "too arbitrary" 
(Lakatos 1970 114) In MSRP, Lakatos presented a methodology which reduced the 
extent of a p n o n  decision-making for the scientist "it places no restrictions on the
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way a theory may be modified m the event of a clash between theory and evidence, 
however, once the modified theory has been produced, MSRP’s rules will tell whether 
or not the new theory constitutes progress over the old" (Worrall 1978b 333) This 
retrospective characterisation of MSRP suggests that it is an internalist philosophy of 
science, a philosophy which describes rather than prescribes, the criteria for scientific 
progress In fact, it contains both prescriptive and descriptive elements
For both Popper and Lakatos, scientific progress is denoted by the elucidation of 
novel facts For Popper, the elucidation of empirically corroborated novel facts by a 
theory is an indicator of its versimilitude "an accidentally very improbable agreement 
between a theory and a fact can be interpreted as an indicator that the theory has a 
high verisimilitude" (Popper 1979 103) For Lakatos, it is the elucidation of 
empirically corroborated novel facts which creates the demarcation between science 
and non-science "a theory is ‘acceptable’ or ‘scientific’ only if it has corroborated 
excess empirical content over its predecessor (or rival), that is, only if it leads to the 
discovery of novel facts" (Lakatos 1970 116) Lakatos argued that verisimilitude had 
to be provided with an inductive foundation
Only such an ‘inductive principle’ can turn science from a mere game mto an 
epistemological rational exercise, from a set of lighthearted sceptical gambits 
pursued for intellectual fun mto a - more serious - fallibilist venture of
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approximating the Truth about the Umverse (Lakatos 1971a 101)
Lakatos used the notion of corroborating instances to construct an "index of 
verisimilitude" (Zahar 1982 37) For Lakatos, presumably, the probabilities of all 
false theories are not zero, as Popper assumed them to be If the probabilities of false 
theories can be ranked, then some criterion can be adopted which enables a choice to 
be made between theories
Lakatos accepted the Kuhn/Duhem argument, that theories are developed withm 
networks rather than as singular entities "series of theories are usually connected by a 
remarkable continuity which welds them into research programmes" (Lakatos 
1970 132) A research programme is "a series of theories where each subsequent 
theory results from addmg auxiliary clauses to the previous theory m order to 
accommodate some anomaly, each theory having at least as much content as the 
unrefuted content of its predecessor" (Lakatos 1970 118)
The concept of a research programme is more structured than Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’, in 
that Lakatos outlined more clearly how theories, auxiliary clauses, and methodological 
rules interact to form the disciplinary matrix Lakatos also outlined how a research 
programme might develop through time A research programme is held to be 
"theoretically progressive if each new theory predicts some novel, hitherto 
unexpected fact" (Lakatos 1970 118) If these novel facts are also empirically
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corroborated, then the research programme is also "empirically progressive" (Lakatos 
1970 118) In contrast to falsificatiomsm, MSRP only requires that a research 
programme "display an intermittently progressive empirical shift" (Lakatos 1970 134) 
In other words, the scientist need not be continually concerned with the empirical 
corroboration of his novel facts This suggests that there are periods of research within 
a particular research programme which focus on the elucidation of theoretical novel 
facts alone
In accepting verisimilitude as a method of theory-evaluation, Lakatos necessarily 
reduced the importance of falsification Koertge argued that "Lakatos’ position is m 
fact an inversion of Popper’s basic views" (Koertge 1978 269) The Lakatosian 
scientist is certainly less concerned with the falsification of the novel predictions of his 
theory, and more with the extent to which they are confirmed by empirical evidence 
While not denying that refutations are a part of the scientific process, Lakatos did 
believe that they are largely "irrelevant" (Lakatos 1970 136) Rather, "it is the 
‘verifications’ which keep the programme going, recalcitrant instances 
notwithstanding" (Lakatos 1970 137) To discard the first specifications of a theory on 
the assumption that the refutation is not caused by faults m the background knowledge 
or the data, is, for Lakatos, too risky Lakatos argued that, far from ensuring 
progress, refutations can actually be detrimental to a developing research programme 
"To give a stem "refutable interpretation" to a fledgling version of a programme is 
dangerous methodological cruelty" (Lakatos 1970 151) Lakatos continued, "it may
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take decades of theoretical work to arrive at the first novel facts and still more time to 
arrive at interestingly testable versions of the research programmes" (Lakatos 
1970 151) By refuting theories at the first opportunity, falsificatiomsm could result m 
the rejection of potentially progressive theories MSRP would allow the scientist to 
make a choice between two theories even where neither had been falsified The only 
requirement for establishing progress is that a theory, T2, account for the successes of 
its rival, Tj, and predict more novel facts than Tj
A research programme is degenerative, not because of anomalous observations per se, 
but rather when it fails to deal with these anomalies by the generation of further novel 
facts (Lakatos 1970 118) In this way, a research programme may retain a theory 
which has been refuted, and still be classified as progressive Lakatos argued that "it 
may be rational to put the inconsistency into some temporary, ad hoc quarantine, and 
carry on" (Lakatos 1970 143) This course of action is rational if  the programme 
continues to generate novel facts This distinction between degenerating and 
progressive research programmes highlights the demarcation criterion used by 
Lakatos "a theory is ‘acceptable’ or ‘scientific’ only if it has excess content over its 
predecessor (or rival), that is, only if it leads to the discovery of novel facts" (Lakatos 
1970 116)
Since ultimately a research programme is deemed progressive when it generates 
empirically corroborated novel facts, it must contain some form of background
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knowledge against which to empirically corroborate these facts This knowledge forms 
what Lakatos called the "hard core" of the research programme Lakatos outlmed the 
hard core of Newton’s research programme as bemg Newton’s three laws of dynamics 
and the law of gravitation (Lakatos 1970 133) The hard core appears to be analogous 
to the background knowledge of the Poppenan scientist However, Lakatosian 
scientists take a methodological decision not to test the propositions of the hard core 
of their research programmes, while the Poppenan scientist is instructed to only 
tentatively accept the validity of his background knowledge MSRP is, therefore, 
much more overtly conventionalist than Popper’s falsificatiomsm
From conventionalism, this methodology [MSRP] borrows the licence 
rationally to accept by convention not only spatio-temporally singular ‘factual 
statements’ but also spatio-temporally umversal theories (Lakatos 1971a 101)
In order to prevent the testing of the hard core, each programme comes equipped with 
a "negative heuristic" (Lakatos 1970 133) The negative heuristic does not "allow 
‘refutations’ to transmit falsity to the hard core as long as the corroborated empirical 
content of the protecting belt of auxiliary hypotheses increases" (Lakatos 1970 134)
As long as the research programme continues to predict novel facts, the hard core 
remains immune from criticism
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The hard core becomes hardened over time, as scientists sift through theores m order 
to decide which are foundational The propositions of the hard core, once hardened or 
finalised by the scientists working within the programme, would appear to be 
permanent The negative heuristic would appear to provide an impregnable defence 
against refutation Worrall argued against this interpretation of a permanent hard core 
"MSRP would be mad to give this advice, since if it were consistently followed it 
would endow the first research programme m any field with an eternal monopoly" 
(Worrall 1978b 333) This would be too much of a concession to conventionalism 
However, while it is possible to abandon the hard core, Worrall argued that this is "an 
enormous undertaking which may mvolve, amongst other thmgs, the development of 
entirely new mathematical techniques" (Worrall 1978b 334) It is analogous to the 
abandoning of a Kuhnian paradigm The abandonment of the existing programme, for 
this is what an abandonment of the hard core essentially entails, creates "a theoretical 
void" (Worrall 1978b 334)
For the most part, Lakatosian scientists are concerned with the derivation of auxiliary 
hypotheses withm the framework of the programme Yet, this does not make them 
Kuhnian scientists engaged in the process of normal science By Kuhn’s definition, 
normal science does not entail the prediction of novel facts
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In addition to the negative heuristic which protects the hard core, the research 
programme will also contain a set of positive heuristics which instruct the scientist on 
the kinds of problems it is his function to solve while working within that programme 
"The positive heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hmts on 
how to change, develop the ’refutable variants of the research-programme, how to 
modify, sophisticate, the ’refutable’ protective belt" (Lakatos 1970 135) Any 
auxiliary hypotheses incorporated into the programme must be consistent with the 
methodological instructions laid down by the positive heuristic, for the programme to 
remam progressive This adherence to the positive heuristics is what gives a 
programme its internal cohesion The "heuristic power" of the research programme is 
defined as the ability of the programme to generate novel facts by following the 
directives of its positive heuristics (Lakatos 1970 155)
Lakatos outlined three types of ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis, the incorporation of 
which, would render a research programme degenerative Ad hocl hypotheses are 
"those which have no excess empirical content over their predecessor" (Lakatos 
1971a 125) This is equivalent to Popper’s definition of an ad hoc hypothesis as one 
which provides no mdependently testable novel facts Ad hoc2 hypotheses are "those 
which do have such excess content but none of it is corroborated" (Lakatos 
1971a 125) In other words, these hypotheses do generate novel facts but they are 
refuted by empirical evidence Finally, ad hoc3 hypotheses are "those which are not
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ad hoc in these two senses but do not form an mtegral part of the positive heuristic" 
These last are hypotheses which do predict empirically corroborated novel facts, but 
whose methodology is not compatible with that of the positive heuristics of the 
research programme
Scientific progress, according to MSRP, rests upon the empirical corroboration of 
novel facts which are derived in a way which is compatible with the positive heuristics 
of the research programme The definition of what is considered to be a novel fact 
under MSRP has been modified somewhat since Lakatos’ original definition, and no 
clearcut definition exists Carrier provided an outline of the debate over the nature of 
scientific novelty (Carrier 1988)
Lakatos’ original definition of a novel fact was one which was "inconsistent with 
previous expectations, unchallenged background knowledge and, was forbidden by 
the rival programme" (Lakatos and Zahar 1976 375) Zahar pointed out the problem 
which arises if only previously unknown facts count as novel facts "We should, for 
example, have to give Einstein no credit for explaining the anomalous precession of 
Mercury’s perihelion, because it had been recorded long before General Relativity was 
proposed" (Zahar 1973 101) Zahar argued that it should be permissable to include 
known facts as novel facts, provided those facts "did not belong to the 
problem-situation which governed the construction of the hypothesis" (Zahar 
1973 101) In other words, the same fact cannot be used as an initial assumption of a
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hypothesis, and at the same time used as corroborative support for that hypothesis 
Zahar’s modification of the definition of novelty provided by Lakatos was criticised 
on the grounds that it personalised the process of scientific discovery (Carrier 
1988 208) In other words, novelty was defined in terms of the knowledge held by the 
individual scientist at the time he made a particular discovery Worrall argued that 
novelty should not be assessed m personal terms, but rather on the basis of the 
relationship between the purported novel prediction, the theory from which it is 
derived, and the heuristics of the programme within which the theory is developed 
(Worrall 1978 326)
There are, then, two types of novel predictions those which predict previously 
unknown facts, and those which provide novel explanations of known facts In order 
to render a programme progressive, both types must be empirically corroborated and 
be derived in a way that is consistent with the positive heuristics of the programme
The Lakatosian scientist makes two types of decisions - decisions between theories 
within a research programme, and decisions between research programmes
Under MSRP, the choice between two theories, Tj and T , depends on the extent to 
which there is empirical support for the novel facts put forward by each If the novel 
facts of Tj are corroborated by empirical facts, e, which in turn contradict the novel 
facts of T2, then the scientist will choose T (This is similar to Mill’s method of
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agreement and difference) The Duhem-Qume thesis argued, however, that "it is 
always possible to produce a T’2, sufficiently similar to T2 to be essentially the "same" 
theory, which does entail e" (Worrall 1978b 322) To what extent, then, can MSRP 
offer a criterion for theory-choice which allows progress to be determined in the face 
of the Duhem-Qume thesis9
It was John Worrall who developed MSRP, after Lakatos’ death He agreed with 
Feyerabend’s criticism that verismilitude (as adapted under MSRP) fails to provide 
"an objective epistemological rationale" for theory-choice where scientists can make 
these kinds of adjustments
If MSRP is to be more than a simple descriptive generalisation of scientists’ 
past preferences, it must give its methodological rules an at least tentative and 
conjectural underpinning of a general epistemological kind (Worrall 
1978b 326)
Worrall held that MSRP does, m fact, provide such an epistemological rationale, in its 
argument that theory-choice is ultimately a "Ziewrzsnc-relative affair" (Worrall 
1978a 51) Koertge (1971) had argued that MSRP was a sociological analysis of 
history of science, an alternative to Kuhn Worrall demed this "No psyches or social 
structures need be inspected one needs to look only at theories, facts, and 
heuristics" (Worrall 1978b 326)
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When faced with two equally empirically corroborated theories, Worrall argued that 
the Lakatosian scientist will judge between theories on the basis of their relative 
consistency with the heuristics of the programme He will "distinguish between
t
genume and ad hoc explanations" (Worrall 1978b 323), and choose those theories 
which comply with the methodological regulations laid down by the heuristics of the 
programme
The choice between research programmes is dependent on the same criteria that is, on 
the relative extent of empirical corroboration, and the internal consistency of 
programmes vis a vis their positive heuristics
As a research programme develops, it may produce novel facts which contradict those 
predicted by another research programme "As the rival research programmes expand, 
they gradually encroach on each other’s territory and the n-th version of the first will 
be blatantly, dramatically inconsistent with the m-th version of the second" (Lakatos 
1970 158)
Where there are two competing research programmes, Rj and R2, R^  will be the 
preferred programme if it "explains the previous success of its rival and supersedes it 
by a further display of heunstic power" (Lakatos 1970 155) By heuristic power 
Lakatos meant "the power of a research programme to anticipate theoretically novel
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facts m its growth" (Lakatos 1970 155n) Rj is, then, less potentially fruitful in terms 
of novel facts and is therefore less progressive than R2, even though R; may itself be 
deriving novel facts
Despite the preference for progressive over degenerative research programmes, MSRP 
states that scientists should hesitate before rejecting a degenerating research 
programme It is always possible that a degenerating programme will self-rejuvenate 
and start to predict novel facts once again Such a rejuvenation mvolves an internal 
revolution, a revolution within the research programme "When a research programme 
gets into a degenerating phase, a little revolution or a creative shift in its positive 
heuristic may push it forward again" (Lakatos 1970 137) This "creative shift" 
mvolves the introduction of hypotheses which modify the positive heuristics so that 
the programme can begin to predict novel facts once again
However, these hypotheses are obviously inconsistent with the positive heuristics of 
the degenerating programme, smce they cause the positive heuristics to be modified 
As such, they are defined by Lakatos as ad hoc3 It would appear then that, while 
some ad hoc5 hypotheses render a programme degenerative, others shift the 
programme out of its degenerative state back into a state of progress Lakatos 
acknowledged this possibility with ad hoc3 hypotheses "I now see that any "creative 
shift" is ad hoc in my sense" (Lakatos 1971b 176) It would clarify the issue to add to 
Lakatos’ list of ad hoc with the following definition An ad hoc3 hypothesis which is
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applied to a degenerating programme, and initiates a modification of that programme’s 
heuristics in such a way that it provides a necessary creative shift, is an ad hocA 
hypothesis It would seem reasonable to assume that ad hocl and ad hoc2 hypotheses 
cannot produce creative shifts in degenerating programmes, because they do not entail 
empirically corroborated novel facts It is only, therefore, a hypothesis which predicts 
a novel fact, albeit m a way inconsistent with the degeneratmg programme’s 
heuristics, that can possibly produce a creative shift in that programme Thus, 
scientists can be justified m contmuing to work within Rj, m spite of the fact that it is 
less progressive than R^ in the hope of a creative shift in Rj
How can the Lakatosian scientist choose between "empirically equivalent" research 
programmes9 Clearly, where the novel facts of two research programmes are 
empirically corroborated "then neither programme has ‘superseded’ the other"
(Worrall 1978a 63) As m the choice between empirically equivalent theories, Worrall 
held that it is possible to choose between empirically equivalent research programmes 
on the basis of internal consistency of each programme with its heuristics Both R} and 
1*2 may have empirically corroborated novel facts, but where the novels facts of Rj are 
ad hocv  then Rj is the more progressive programme
Worrall pomted to another type of decision - the assessment of two research 
programmes, where each has some empirically corroborated content which the other 
does not have Clearly, the choice of one over the other will entail a loss of content
125
(Kuhnian loss) In this case, Worrall argued that a consideration of the relative 
internal consistency of each research programme with respect to its heuristics 
"provides a clear rationale for the preference of one programme over the next even if 
a loss of explanatory content is involved" (Worrall 1978a 63) Worrall argued that, 
where the extent of empirical corroboration cannot distinguish between theories, the 
relative heuristic power of research programes is an equally objective criterion upon 
which to base theory or programme preference Moreover, the "heuristic power" of a 
programme can be taken as an indicator of that programme’s potential for novel fact 
prediction Thus, Worrall’s heuristic criterion is an objective alternative to Kuhn’s act 
of faith, in the decision to work within a particular research programme/paradigm
MSRP, with Worrall’s additions, seems to defend the orthodox position in the 
philosophy of science from the Kuhnian attack It provides an answer to the Popperian 
dilemma that scientists do m fact retain false theories However, it stops short of a 
psychological or sociological explanation for the retention of false theories, by 
allowing for the reintroduction of mductive criteria for theory-choice The notion that 
the more progressive programme is the one with the greater empirical content allows 
for a rationalist position that there is continuity in the history of science In the case 
where two programmes are empirically corroborated to the same extent, heuristic 
criteria provide the basis for a choice between them Finally, it is rational for the 
scientist to continue to work within a degenerating research programme in the hope of
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a future creative shift
In addition to providing criteria by which scientists could choose between competing 
scientific theories, Lakatos also provided criteria by which philosophers of science 
could choose between competing theories of scientific rationality or methodologies In 
Lakatos’ methodology of historiographic research programmes (MHRP), the actual 
history of a science is used to test the competing methodologies through the method of 
rational reconstruction
In Lakatosian terms, a rational reconstruction describes only the interpretation of the 
history of a science according to a particular theory of scientific rationality This is a 
narrower definition than thatemployed by Kuhn, who argued that all history, whether 
told by philosophers, historians, or scientists themselves, will be a reconstruction of 
historical events (see chapter 2 1)
Lakatos conceded that certain historical events will always remain incapable of 
explanation by any theory of scientific rationality "no rationality theory will ever 
solve problems like why Mendelam genetics disappeared in Soviet Russia m the 
1950s" (Lakatos 1971a 102) Despite this, Lakatos argued that his methodology of 
historiographic research programmes provided criteria which would enable the 
methodologist to have an objective choice between theories of scientific rationality 
(1971a 102)
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The methodology of historiographic research programmes (MHRP) works in the 
following way While the rational reconstruction contains all the historical events that 
the particular theory of scientific rationality can explain, the historian should "indicate 
in the footnotes how actual history ‘misbehaved’ in the light of its rational 
reconstruction" (Lakatos 1971a 105) The preferred theory of scientific rationality is 
that which explains most of the historical events in the development of a science In 
assessing a particular theory of scientific rationality, the methodologist is therefore 
using a "resemblance criterion" (Bunan 1977 31) He is comparmg the rational 
reconstruction of the history of a science with the actual history of a science The 
closer the correspondence between the two, the better the theory of scientific 
rationality MHRP, therefore, mvolves the quasi-empmcal use of the actual history of 
a science as an arbiter between the rational reconstructions of different theories of 
scientific rationality (Zahar pointed out that Popper had proposed a 
meta-methodological framework similar to MHRP m D ie Beiden Grundesprobleme, 
which he wrote in 1930-31 (Zahar 1982))
Lakatos, using MHRP, concluded that Popper’s falsificatiomsm represents progress on 
previous theories of scientific rationality because it "enabled the historian to interpret 
more of the actual basic value judgements m the history of science as rational" 
(Lakatos 1971a 117) Popper’s theory internalised more of the history of science, and
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in addition, "predicts (or, if you wish, ‘postdicts’) novel historical facts, unexpected 
in the light of extant (internal and external) historiographies" (Lakatos 1971a 118)
There are a number of underlying assumptions of MHRP which call into question the 
resemblance criterion as a means of choosing between theories of scientific rationality 
MHRP assumes that "all methodologies function as historiographical theories and 
can be criticised by criticising the rational historical reconstructions to which they 
lead" (Lakatos 1971a 105) However, it is not the aim of all theories of scientific 
rationality to describe the actual historical events of science If the goal of the 
externalist philosopher of science is to provide a description of how science ought to 
be done, then where is the onus on him to ensure that his theory of scientific 
rationality provides a close account of the actual historical events of science9 If the 
resemblance between his rational reconstruction and the actual history of science is 
weak, then he need only retort that "the ‘science’ under discussion falls short of what 
‘science’ ought to be" (McMullin 1970 24) However, McMullm argued that "a 
practitioner of PSE cannot be wholly unconcerned about serious divergences 
between his own account of the nature of science and the course science has actually 
followed" (McMullm 1970 28) In practice, externalist philosophers of science have 
looked to the history of science for examples of scientific progress which support their 
particular theories of scientific rationality There is a "burden of proof on the 
philosopher to show that his ‘rational reconstructions’ of the epistemological problems
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What exactly does the corroboration of a rational reconstruction by the history of a 
science say about the theory of scientific rationality underlying that reconstruction9 
MHRP assumes that a high degree of resemblance between a rational reconstruction 
and actual history means that the criteria suggested by the theory of scientific 
rationality are in fact the criteria adopted by scientists themselves Radmtzky disputed 
the validity of this assumption
The situation appears to be analogous to the justification of a technology 
which is based merely on observed correlaions for which no causal 
explanation has been given, and with reference to which it is thus not known 
whether or not the variables are causally related (Radmtzky 1976 517)
Radmtzky argued that an historical appraisal of a theory of scientific rationality must 
be accompamed by some discussion as to why the rational reconstruction is compatible 
with the history of a science "to justify M [a particular methodology], to give good 
reasons why M leads to success, the methodologist has to embark on ‘praxio-logical’ 
argumentation" (Radmtzky 1976 517-518) In other words, it must be proven that 
scientists actually adopted the criteria advocated by the theory of scientific rationality
faced by scientists are relevant and applicable to real theories" (Bunan 1977 8)
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In using history of a science m the quasi-empincal way suggested by MHRP, there 
arises the problem of whose interpretation of science to employ as arbiter Lakatos 
held that the value judgements of the scientific elite comprise the history which should 
be used to test rational reconstructions (Lakatos 1971a 117) But m a science made up 
of competing research programmes, which scientific elite’s value judgements should 
be used to formulate the history of the science9 What of Kuhn’s argument that the 
history told by scientists themselves will also be a rational reconstruction (Kuhn 
1977 15)9 Kuhn hightlighted the tendency of the scientific elite to rewrite the history 
of their science m order to stress the compatibility between the present paradigm and 
those which dominated in the past (Kuhn 1970a 140) If this is the case, then how can 
the comparison of the philosopher’s rational reconstruction with that of the scientist 
say anything about the worth of the theory of scientific rationality underlying the 
philosopher’s rational reconstruction9
Shearmur has argued against the comparison of rational reconstructions to the "moves 
made by a ‘scientific elite”' on the grounds that
this has the consequence of taking us away from Popper’s Weberian 
pluralism to something closer to Hegel’s momsm m historiography, m which 
there is just one story to be told (Shearmur 1991 44)
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In other words, inherent in MHRP is the notion that there is a single rational way of 
practising science It is at this meta-methodological level that the distinctions between 
Kuhn and Lakatos are at their most obvious Lakatos is often portrayed as a 
compromise between Popper and Kuhn In fact, MHRP perpetuates the positivist myth 
that there is a single, optimal methodology for the natural sciences, a myth which both 
Popper and Kuhn were anxious to dispel
Hall agreed with Lakatos that, "we would generally be inclined to accept scientists’ 
own basic value judgements about what is good science and what isn’t" (Hall 
1978 157) But how is a list of ‘good science’ to be drawn up9 Nola highlighted two 
problems (Nola 1987 473) Firstly, "criteria are needed for individuating members of 
the scientific elite whose judegements are then used to generate the basic list" (Nola 
1987 473) Secondly, "we must ensure that their answer is not tainted by an appeal to 
any methodology to ascertain whether or not some theory is a piece of great science" 
(Nola 1987 473)
Hall did concede that "nobody would want to say that all of scientists’ judgements 
about science are correct" (Hall 1978 157) Yet, assessing rational reconstructions on 
the grounds of their compatibility with the value judgements of the scientific elite does 
involve "the a priori assumption that the best example of present (and past) scientific
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method cannot be unproved upon" (Koertge 1976 366) If this is the case, what is the 
need for the philosophy of science9
Lakatos’ methodology of historiographic research programmes has received a 
substantial amount of criticism If the actual history of a science is taken to be the 
rational reconstruction of that science by scientists themselves, then it is unclear what 
the comparison of the scientist’s rational reconstruction with that of the philosopher’s 
reconstruction says about the philosopher’s rational reconstruction It is also unclear 
how the relative compatibility or resemblance of different philosophers’ 
reconstructions can constitute a criterion by which to judge theories of scientific 
rationality
This conclusion poses a particular problem for economic methodology The past ten 
years have seen a plethora of Lakatosian analyses of the history of almost all branches 
of economics These analyses have mainly consisted of Lakatosian reconstructions of 
the history of economic thought The suggestion, generally implicit, is that because 
MSRP comes closer to the actual history of economics, it is a better methodology for 
economics than Poppenan falsificatiomsm This is a meta-methodological conclusion 
based on Lakatos’ MHRP Yet, if one takes into consideration the arguments against 
MHRP, this conclusion is somewhat tenuous The following section considers some of 
the difficulties and confusions which have arisen in the application of Lakatosian
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analysis to economics Specifically, it considers the debate as to the nature of the 
novelty inherent in Keynesian economics
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3 2 NOVEL FACTS IN ECONOMICS
The falsificatiomst ‘experiment’ m economic methodology was not a success m that it 
failed to provide a feasible set of objective criteria for theory-choice in economics 
However, the preoccupation with falsificatiomsm had embedded twentieth century 
economic methodology m externalist philosophy of science
After the failure of Popper’s verisimilitude, "Lakatos has to choose between 
epistemological anarchism and mductivism" (Andersson 1986 241) The choice was 
the same for economic methodologists Judging by the amount of Lakatosian studies 
on economics, the majority of economic methodologists followed m the tradition set 
by the London School of Economics, and adopted MSRP (Schabas wrote "Neil de 
Marchi informs me that there are some seventy articles by economists addressmg the 
Lakatosian model alone "(Schabas 1992 196n) This gives an idea of the amount of 
resources devoted to Lakatosian analyses of economics) This adoption of MSRP m 
the late 1970s, is indicative of a lag between economic methodology and the 
philosophy of science (Rosenberg 1986 129) By this time, philosophers of science 
had given up attempting to define concepts like excess content and novel fact, and had 
begun to look beyond objectivism (Rosenberg 1986 135) It is not perhaps surprising 
that economic methodology, m the mam, failed to follow this shift in the philosophy 
of science There was the fact that MSRP was m the LSE tradition as mentioned
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above, but there was also the fact that there are distinct parallels between MSRP and 
Friedman’s methodology of positive economics MSRP provided a "less-bizarre 
soundmg replacement for Friedman’s unrealism-of-assumptions methodology (de 
Marchi 1991 6) It provided epistemological justification for the retention of false and 
unfalsifiable assumptions, it described the to-ing and fro-mg between theory, model 
and data as legitimate work withm the protective belt, it suggested that the acceptance 
of those theories that predict well most of the time, might be more than 
instrumentalism As with Popper and Kuhn, practising economists adopted Lakatosian 
terminology, and economics is now replete with research programmes, as it once was 
with paradigms Nearly every possible research programme in the history of 
economics has been investigated for Lakatosian novel facts
Despite this, Rosenberg has argued that in adopting MSRP, economic methodologists 
"have, as it were, attached themselves to a degenerating research program"
(Rosenberg 1986 136) Has the time mvested m applying MSRP to the history of 
economics been wasted time9 This section considers the difficulties in applymg 
Lakatosian concepts m economics, as they arose m the debate about the nature of 
Keynesian economics, principally between Blaug (1976,1990,1991a) and Hands 
(1985b,1990)
Blaug (1976) was principally concerned with the extent of Kuhnian revolution in 
economics He held that the level of continuity (lack of incommensurability) between
136
Keynesian macroeconomics and classical macroeconomics marked the Keynesian 
revolution, not as a revolution in the Kuhnian sense, but rather as a move from a 
degeneratmg to a progressive research programme (Blaug 1976 162) For Blaug, the 
Keynesian method was still closely tied to that of the preceding neoclassical 
programme
Keynes leaned heavily on the concepts of general equilibrium, perfect 
competition, and comparative statics, making an exception only for the 
labour market, which he seems to have regarded as being inherently 
imperfect and hence always in a state, not so much of disequilibrium as of 
equilibrium of a special kind (Blaug 1976 161)
Blaug identified the hard core of the Keynesian programme as highlighting the 
possibility of "pervasive uncertainty and the possibility of destabilizing expectations", 
the auxiliary hypotheses are "the consumption function, the multiplier, the concept of 
autonomous expenditures, and speculative demand for money, contributing to 
stickmess m long term interest rates", the heuristic is embodied in "national income 
accountmg and statistical estimation of both the consumption function and the 
penod-multiplier" (Blaug 1976 162)
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Blaug identified "novel aspects of Keynes", these were "the tendency to work with 
aggregates to concentrate on the short period and, thirdly, to throw the entire 
weight of adjustments to changing economic conditions on output rather than prices" 
(Blaug 1976.162) These are, however, changes in heuristics governing 
macroeconomics, as distinct from the novel facts of the Keynesian programme In 
addition, the Keynesian programme, for Blaug, fulfilled the requirement that it predict 
novel facts (Blaug 1976 162) MSRP gives two definitions of a novel fact The first 
was the original Lakatosian definition, that a novel fact is simply a fact hitherto 
unknown A later modification by Zahar led to the acceptance as a novel fact, that 
which explained a known phenomenon in a novel way This latter is accepted as a 
novel fact, provided that the known phenomenon is not used in the construction of the 
explanation
For Blaug, the Keynesian theory provided the first non-ad hoc explanation for 
persistent unemployment "Its principal novel prediction was the chronic tendency of 
competitive market economies to generate unemployment" (Blaug 1976 162) For 
Hands, reviewing Blaug’s paper among other Lakatosian analyses in 1985, the 
explanation for persistent unemployment could not be interpreted as a Lakatosian 
novel fact "Is it true that the concept of unemployment was not used in the 
construction of the theory7 No, Keynes fails here also Blaug makes it quite clear that 
The general theory was written precisely to explain unemployment" (Hands
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1985b 8-9)
Hands’ argument was that since Keynes’ theory was developed to explain persistent
s
unemployment, it used unemployment as an initial assumption and therefore could not 
also explam the phenomenon in a novel way For Hands, the theory m question had to 
explam the known phenomenon as a by-product This fits in with Zahar’s explanation 
of why he modified Lakatos’ earlier definition (Zahar 1973 101) Zahar argued that 
even though General Relativity explains Mercury’s perihelion, Einstein could be given 
no credit for this explanation under Lakatos’ ongmal definition, since Mercury’s 
perihelion had already been documented (Zahar 1973 101) The difference between 
Einstein’s explanation for Mercury’s perihelion, and Keynes’ explanation for 
persistent unemployment, is that General Relativity did not set out to explam 
Mercury’s perihelion, rather the explanation is a by-product On the other hand, 
Keynes’ theory set out explicitly to explam persistent unemployment, The 
phenomenon of persistent unemployment per se cannot, therefore, be considered a 
novelty Lakatos conceded that "a new research programme which has just entered the 
competition may start by explaining ‘old facts’ m a novel way," but argued that it 
must eventually produce "‘genuinely novel’ facts" (Lakatos 1970 156) His example 
was that of Bohr’s theory of wave mechamcs, whrch explained the already-observed 
Balmer formula
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Balmer merely ‘observed’ Bt that hydrogen lines obey the Balmer formula 
Bohr predicted B2 that the differences in the energy levels in different orbits 
o f the hydrogen electron obey the Balmer formula (Lakatos 1970 156)
Thus, to be ‘Lakatosian novel,’ Keynes would have had to do more than provide a 
new interpretation of an old fact Hands argued that there are no other components of 
The General Theory which can be considered as independently novel The margmal 
propensity to consume, liquidity preference, and the marginal efficiency of capital 
cannot be considered as novel, because they are "used explicitly in the construction of 
the theory" (Hands 1985b 9) For Hands, there is only one possible source of 
Lakatosian novelty in Keynesian theory "it could be argued that the Phillips curve 
and the ensuing related literature represented a novel, and temporarily corroborated 
fact for The general theory" (Hands 1985b 9) Hands argued that a Lakatosian rational 
reconstruction cannot explain economists’ enthusiasm for Keynesian theory He 
therefore concluded his argument to be "a negative appraisal" of MSRP (Hands 
1985b 13)
Ahonen (1989, 1990) attempted to defend Keynes, Blaug, and MSRP against Hands’ 
arguments He used Lakatos’ argument, which came in mm from Popper, that the 
preferred theory is the more ‘general’ one (Lakatos 1970 124)
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Einstein’s theory is better than Newton’s theory because it explained 
everything that Newton’s theory had successfully explained, and it explained 
also to some extent some known anomalies and, in addition, forbade 
events about which Newton’s theory had said nothing, moreover, at least 
some of the unexpected excess Emsteiman content was in fact corroborated 
(Lakatos 1970 124)
In parallel, Ahonen argued that Keynes’ theory was more general than its classical 
predecessor, on the grounds that, "it explained everything that classical theory had 
explained, plus phenomena which had become anomalous in classical theory (such as 
involuntary unemployment and the coexistence of unemployment and equilibrium) It 
also forbade the neutrality-hypothesis of money, which classical theory had taken for 
granted" (Ahonen 1989 259) For Ahonen, the novelty of Keynesian theory lies m 
liquidity preference (Ahonen 1989 262) Hands had argued that liquidity preference 
could not be a novel fact, since it was used in the construction of the Keynesian 
theory Ahonen criticised this definition of novelty which Hands had used
What does Hands mean by say mg that a fact is used when ‘constructing’ a 
theory9 Obviously he cannot mean its use as both explanans and 
explanandum, because that would imply circle reasomng It appears that the
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awareness of an empirical fact is equivalent to using it in the construction of 
a theory (Ahonen 1989 263)
Hands’ rejoinder to Ahonen was to agree that the definitions of novelty he had used 
were bad, but he held "the problem is, these are the Lakatosian definitions of novelty" 
(Hands 1990 73) Hands correctly interpreted Lakatosian novel explanation as commg 
from an unexpected explanation for a well-known phenomenon Ahonen was mistaken 
in his argument that Hands had made awareness of a fact equivalent to the use of that 
fact in the construction of a theory Hands demed that Keynesian theory is more 
general than classical theory and therefore the more preferable
Keynesian theory does not apply to a broader class of phenomena than 
classical theory, both Keynesian and classical theory are ‘about’ developed 
capitalist economies The difference is not in what the theories are about, the 
difference is in how the two theories characterize equilibrium, classical 
theory requires full employment for equilibrium, Keynesian theory does not 
(Hands 1990 74)
In Lakatosian terms, the issue of which theory is more general is a moot one, if 
neither theory predicts novel facts The universality of a theory is not the thing which 
makes it progressive Given the dearth of novel facts in Keynesian theory, any
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generality it may possess over the classical theory, is necessarily ad hoc
Blaug conceded that "the concept of ‘novel facts’ is not unproblematic" (Blaug 
1991a. 172) He went on to define novelty m a stronger way than either Hands or 
Lakatos had done "it does not mclude facts which are known before a research 
program is launched, particularly if these facts are deliberately used m the 
construction of the program" (Blaug 1991a 172) Zahar’s modification only required 
that well-known facts not be used in the construction of the theory which explains 
them, Blaug’s definition holds all well-known facts to be excluded from novelty 
Blaug acknowledged the mistake he made in putting forward persistent unemployment 
as a novel explanation by the Keynesian theory "this may have been a Kuhnian 
‘anomaly,’ but it is not a ‘novel fact’ m the sense of Lakatos" (Blaug 1991a 172n)
Blaug, however, insisted that there is Lakatosian novelty in Keynesian theory
The principal novel prediction of Keynesian economics is that the value of the 
instantaneous multiplier is greater than unity and that the more than 
proportionate impact of an increase m investment on income applies just as 
much to public as to private investment, and mdeed just as much to 
consumption as to investment spending (Blaug 1991a 182)
The multiplier, Blaug argued, was "an unexpected implication" of Keynes’ particular
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formulation of the consumption function The consumption function itself, along with 
liquidity preference and the investment function, Blaug conceded, could not be 
interpreted as novel facts since they had been used m the construction of the theory 
(Blaug 1991a 187) However, he argued that
Nevertheless, interpreted in a particular way thay can be employed to predict 
novel facts, such as that a cut m money wages cannot have a significant effect 
on aggregate demand, that an mcrease m government expenditure will have a 
large, or at least a more than proportionate, effect on aggregate demand, and 
that a given mcrease in government expenditure financed by an equal increase 
in tax receipts will raise national mcome by the same amount as that given 
mcrease - the balanced budget multiplier is unity (Blaug 1991 187)
By elucidating the novel facts of Keynesian economics, Blaug defended Lakatosian 
appraisal, at least m this particular instance MSRP can, for Blaug, explam the shift 
from classical macroeconomics: "it was therefore perfectly ‘rational’ m the strict sense 
of Lakatos for economists in the 1930s to have adopted Keynesian economics" (Blaug 
1991a 188)
Hands, in his comments on Blaug’s paper (which originally appeared in Italian m 
1987), conceded that the government expenditure multiplier is mdeed a Lakatosian 
novel fact (Hands 1990 76) Having granted this much, Hands went on to raise a
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meta-methodological question "Why would we want to accept the position that the 
sole necessary condition for scientific progress is predicting novel facts not used m the 
construction of the theory9" (Hands 1991a 78)
Blaug attributed Hands’, by this stage ambiguous, position as bemg due to a failure to 
separate MSRP from Lakatos’ meta-methodological framework, MHRP (Blaug 
1990 103) MHRP judges methodologies by their ability to ‘internalise’ the history of 
a science, that is, by their relative ability to show the development of a science to be 
consistent with their particular theory of rationality
In his first paper, Hands had argued that since there were no Lakatosian novel facts to 
be found in Keynesian economics (commonly held as an example of progress by 
economists), MSRP was not appropriate to the analysis of the history of economics 
"it will be demonstrated that the MSRP’s strictly empirical criteria of ‘progress’ 
makes a Lakatosian rational reconstruction of the most successful episodes m the 
history of economic thought virtually impossible" (Hands 1985b 2) If there are no 
Lakatosian novel facts tobe found in Keynesian economics, then according to MHRP, 
MSRP fails to show this particular development m economics to be consistent with the
theory of rationality underlying MSRP
\
Five years later, Hands conceded that there are indeed Lakatosian novel facts m 
Keynesian economics But he argued that these novel facts alone do not explain the
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success of the Keynesian theory "I still do not accept this novelty as the general 
reason fo r the progress of the Keynesian revolution, nor do I believe that it is 
appropriate to argue that such novelty ‘accounts for the rapid approval’ of the 
profession" (Hands 1990 77) Hands did not say exactly what factors he believed to be 
instrumental m explaining the Keynesian revolution, but he did discuss, m general 
terms, the criteria economists (along with all other scientists) use to choose between 
theories
We m economics and those m every other branch of science choose theories 
because they are deeper, simpler, more general, more operational, explain 
known facts better, are more corroborated, are more consistent with what we 
consider to be deeper theories and for many other reasons (Hands 1990 78)
In 1990, Hands’ argument shifts from being an argument agamst MSRP to being an 
argument agamst MHRP His argument is now that the validity, or otherwise, of a 
methodology cannot be established on how well the theory of rationality underlying 
that methodology corresponds to the actual history of economics The discovery of 
novel facts in Keynesian economics is not, for Hands, enough to recommend MSRP 
as a method of appraisal m economics The existence of novel facts in Keynesian 
economics says nothing about the value of MSRP as a method of appraisal in the 
history of economics The ability of MSRP to internalise events in the history of 
economics is a correlation, it does not necessarily imply any causal relationship
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Hands made the same argument in respect of MHRP as Radmtzky had done 
(Radmtzky 1976) But this is a criticism of that meta-methodology which Hands first 
used to criticise MSRP
Blaug’s answer to Hands’ question, why economic methodologists should use MSRP, 
betrays the influence of the orthodox philosophy of science on economic 
methodology
In terms of MSRP, the answer is because ‘scientific progress’ is progress in 
achieving ‘objective knowledge’ and the only way we can be sure that we 
have acheived objective knowledge is to commit ourselves to the prediction 
of novel facts (Blaug 1990 103)
Implicit m Blaug’s argument is that economic methodology requires such an objective 
criterion However, in his earlier paper, Blaug too had raised the question as to 
whether the criterion supplied by MSRP was indeed appropriate for defining progress 
m economics
MSRP may not fit the history of economics economists may clmg to 
‘degenerating’ research programmes in the presence of rival ‘progressive’ 
research programmes while denying that the ‘degenerating’ programme is in
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need of resuscitation because they are suspicious of hard data, inclined to 
assign low priority to the discovery of novel facts (Blaug 1976 176)
If there is not a good fit between MSRP and the history of economics, and if novel 
facts alone cannot explain progress in economics, why, one might ask, has so much 
time and effort been spent by economic methodologists on appraising different 
economics research programmes9 There is a general belief that these appraisals have 
been useful, even in Hands (1990) "despite the fact that novel predictions have been 
few and far between, hard cores, and heuristics abound, and Lakatos’ general link 
between empirical prediction and theoretical progress has helped initiate a serious 
historical examination of the role of econometrics and testing in economic theory" 
(Hands 1990 79) Blaug implied that it was useful to analyse the history of economics 
in terms of MSRP, precisely to find out why MSRP does not describe progress m 
economics (Blaug 1976 176)
In his comprehensive review of the Lakatosian analyses of the history of economics to 
date, de Marchi, m contrast to Blaug and Hands, argued that there is a "very 
considerable overlap in perspective between Lakatos’ methodology and the ‘official’ 
methodology of mainstream economics" (de Marchi 1991 2) Moreover, this overlap 
represents "something like a natural fit and signals a deeper underlying agreement 
about the nature and ideal practice of science" (de Marchi 1991 3) De Marchi argued
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that the link between the history of economics, and MSRP, is more than a series of 
coincidental correlations
Economists’ scepticism about data mimng, their sensitivity to the problems of 
specification and their discomfort with black-box ‘testing’, which looks at 
predictions but leaves the structure and explanatory power of the rival 
theories obscure, suggest that they share much the same view of the good 
scientist (de Marchi 1991 4)
De Marchi argued that the Lakatosian rational reconstructions of the history of 
economics provide a causal link between MSRP and actual progress m economics 
These analyses provide the sort of "‘praxio-logical’ argumentation" which Radmtzky 
held to be necessary m order to validate MHRP as a meta-methodology (Radmtzky 
1976 518) Thus, de Marchi used MHRP to argue that MSRP is a good methodology 
for economics, despite the numerous arguments put forward by philosophers against 
this type of meta-methodological conclusion (see chapter 3 1)
According to de Marchi, economists explicitly set about trying to discover Lakatosian 
novel facts Their discovery is not a by-product of the application of some alternative 
criteria for progress, as is suggested by Hands (Hands 1990 77) Implicit m de 
Marchi’s argument is an acceptance that MHRP is a valid method of appraising
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methodologies, and that the rational reconstruction provided by MSRP comes closest 
to describing the actual underlymg rationality in economics
De Marchi reviewed Lakatosian analyses of the history of economic thought, outlining 
the particular points of emphasis m these analyses "theoretical progress" as distmct 
from empirical progress in the history of economics, "how RPs interact", "defining 
and identifying novel facts" (de Marchi 1991 12-14) De Marchi conceded the 
difficulty that Blaug and Hands had m identifying Lakatosian novel facts m Keynesian 
economics, but he argued
the final gloss by Lakatos, incorporating as novel also the first precise 
explanations of known facts, has been ignored in the discussions to date, even 
though, as I suspect, this may be the most obviously relevant to modem 
economics (de Marchi 1991 14)
‘The fmal gloss’ to which de Marchi referred, is Lakatos’ recogmtion that new 
research programmes may begm "by explaining ‘old facts’ m a novel way" (Lakatos 
1970 156) But this explanation alone is not progress for the research programme the 
new programme must go on to produce "‘genuinely novel’" facts (Lakatos 1970 156) 
Lakatos’ example of the development of Bohr’s theory of wavelengths clearly shows 
that "mere theoretical reinterpretation" of old facts is not enough (Lakatos 1970 156)
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This ‘final gloss’ simply leads back to the old problem of identify mg genuinely novel 
facts m economic research programmes
De Marchi pointed out what he sees as failings m the Lakatosian analyses to date For 
example, he noticed a "reticence about spelling out the hard core and heuristics" of 
economic research programmes (de Marchi 1991 16) Without this clarification, much 
of this Lakatosian analysis "looks like an exercise in renaming" (de Marchi 1991 17) 
There is also the failure to specify exactly what constitutes a research programme in 
the history of economics De Marchi argued that these incomplete analyses "cannot be 
seen as tests of the appropriateness for economics of MSRP" (de Marchi 1991 17) De 
Marchi pointed out that Lakatosian analyses have shown theoretical progress to be of 
more importance in economics than empirical progress, that economists are more 
concerned with the generation of theoretical novel facts, and less with their empirical 
corroboration De Marchi suggested that "if testmg is not as important as economists’ 
claims would imply, then perhaps it is also the case that there is (epistemic) value 
elsewhere than in deduced test implications alone" (de Marchi 1991 16) De Marchi 
linked this notion that the source of novelty in economic research programmes may lie 
somewhere other than in the generation of empirically corroborated novel facts, to 
Lakatos’ "late amendment to the notion of novelty," which de Marchi interpreted as 
permitting theoretical remterpretations as novelty (de Marchi 1991 16) This 
amendment has been shown above to be nothing more than an affirmation of Lakatos’ 
original definition of novelty Novelty may lie somewhere other than in novel facts in
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economic research programmes, but this novelty cannot be classified as Lakatosian 
novelty
In one of the first applications of MSRP to economics, Leijonhufvud argued that, in 
economics, "genuinely novel predictions are relatively rarely made, what the 
‘progressive’ economist is usually engaged in is trying to incorporate more ‘things that 
have been well-known for a long time’ into a logically consistent structure" 
(Leijonhufvud 1976 78) This suggests that neoclassical economists might defme 
progress as the ability to incorporate more observed facts mto the general equilibrium 
framework of analysis, and that this definition of progress has much more significance 
for neoclassical economists than any of the objective definitions of scientific progress 
put forward by positivist philosophy of science
The Lakatosian analyses to date have revealed that "novel facts may provide a 
‘clincher’ every now and then, like Hailey’s comet, but they are nowhere near the 
whole story" (Hands 1990 79) A Lakatosian analysis is, therefore, a useful starting 
point in the process of discovering what constitutes novelty and progress in 
economics Lakatosian rational reconstructions should be valued as much for the 
discrepancies they reveal between Lakatosian concepts and the practice of economics, 
as for the points of correspondence The danger is in distorting the history of 
economics to try to derive a closeness of fit between MSRP rational reconstructions 
and the history of economic thought "bringing Lakatos to economics promises to
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yield new insights, bringing economics to Lakatos promises little more than a series of 
artificially generated congruencies" (de Marchi 1991 18)
Much of work done by economic methodologists m applying Lakatosian concepts to 
economics is confused and mcomplete Confusions arise because of a failure to 
distinguish between Lakatos’ methodological framework, his MSRP, and his 
meta-methodological framework, MHRP Incompleteness arises from a failure to 
articulate clearly the research programmes and the novel facts in economic thought
What did the work on Lakatosian concepts in economics hope to achieve9 Much of the 
work reviewed by de Marchi takes the form of Lakatosian rational reconstructions of 
the history of economic thought Implicit m these analyses is the assumption that a 
closeness of fit between the history and its rational reconstruction says something good 
about the compatibility of the methodology of economics and the theory of scientific 
rationality underlying Lakatos’ MSRP In other words, economic methodologists 
appear to have been using MHRP to validate both the methodology of economics and 
MSRP However, not all economic methodologists agree that there is a goodness of fit 
between Lakatosian rational reconstructions and the history of economic thought (eg 
Blaug 1976, Hands 1990) Yet, this type of research is still encouraged The 
suggestion from these economic methodologists is that an analysis of the 
mcongruencies between Lakatosian (and other positivist) rational reconstructions and 
the history of economic thought constitutes an analysis of what it is that economists
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actually do Thus, the failure to find a closeness of fit between positivist rational 
reconstructions and the history of economic thought has forced economic 
methodologists mto a search for the definitions of scientific rationality and progress 
employed by economists themselves In other words, they have been forced mto a 
Kuhman-type analysis
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS
Economic methodology has been principally concerned with the method of rational 
reconstruction, and m particular with the reconstruction of episodes in the 
development of economic thought, usmg positivist philosophies of science as the 
underlying theories of scientific rationality
Poppenan rational reconstructions of the history of economics have shown that 
economists do not use falsification^ criteria when choosing between theories The 
conversion of qualitative economic theory mto testable theory requires the adoption of 
additional assumptions in order to derive quantifiable models A single theory may be 
represented by a number of differently specified models Testmg is confined to these 
models While models may be refuted and rejected, the underlying qualitative theories 
rarely are Economic theories are probability hypotheses, and as such may be false 
over some range of data, while still being good predictors in the range to which they 
relate For this reason, econometricians are reluctant to reject a theory on the grounds
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of falsification per se
The background knowledge of economists does not provide an objective test of 
economic theory Observable data are subject to sample-error, and therefore are not 
accepted by economists as objective tests of theories In addition, the umversal laws of 
the economics background knowledge are metaphysical in nature They have been 
systematically protected from any empirical testing, rather than explicitly subjected to 
testing as Popper instructed Section 1 2 shows that the methodological consensus 
necessary to implement Poppenan falsificatiomst criteria does not exist m 
econometrics The methodology of econometrics appears to be much closer to 
instrumentalism than to falsificatiomsm
Falsificatiomsm instructs the scientist to reject all falsified theories But where theories 
are probability theories, then falsification does not necessarily warrant rejection 
Scientists, m this case, are likely to have to make decisions between false theories 
Falsificatiomsm fails to provide objective criteria for choice between two equally 
corroborated, but false, theories Verisimilitude, Popper’s attempt to remedy this 
deficiency, can only work if an mductivist method of verification is permitted If such 
a method of verification is permitted, than falsificatiomst criteria become superfluous 
Lakatos showed this m his methodology of scientific research programmes These 
internal deficiencies suggest that falsificatiomst criteria would not lead to progress in 
economics
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Popper claimed that his situational logic was in fact the methodology of neoclassical 
economics However, neoclassical economics uses a minimum behavioural 
assumption, the profit maximisation hypothesis, in order to establish cast-iron control 
of a situational analysis on behaviour Popper demed that his situational logic involved 
such a behavioural assumption The rationality principle m neoclassical economics is 
not empty, as Popper insisted it should be Popper also implied that situational logic 
entailed the use of falsification^ criteria If this is accepted, then the same problems 
identified above m respect of falsificatiomsm apply to situational logic
Usmg MHRP (albeit implicitly), economic methodologists have concludedthat 
Popperian falsificatiomsm is not an appropriate methodology for economics 
Popperian rational reconstructions fail to correspond to what the elite of economics 
put forward as examples of progress in economic thought However, this position 
would seem to be tenuous in the light of arguments criticising MHRP as a 
meta-methodology If one accepts these arguments, then Popperian falsificatiomsm 
could still be a valid methodology depsite its failure to describe progress in 
economics This would seem to be Blaug’s position However, there is a more serious 
criticism to be levelled against Popperian falsificatiomsm It is that without a method 
of choosing between two false theories, falsificatiomsm is a deficient methodology for 
any science
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Economic methodologists have tended to adopt a positivist attitude to Kuhnian 
philosophy of science In other words, they have attempted to identify Kuhnian 
concepts - normal science, scientific revolution, paradigms, and so on - in the history 
of economics They have treated Kuhnian philosophy of science as though it were an 
alternative theory of scientific rationality The failure to identify scientific revolutions 
in economics has led to the suggestion that Kuhnian philosophy of science is 
inappropriate for descnbmg progress m economics Again, this is a conclusion which 
seems to be based on MHRP Mainstream economic methodology has remamed 
focused on this positivist approach to scientific development There has been 
significantly less of the sociological analysis suggested by Kuhn than of the positivist 
analysis provided by Lakatos, in economic methodology
Lakatos’ MSRP was a positivist answer to Kuhn’s suggestion that the search for 
objective methodological criteria was a waste of tune MSRP offers a solution to the 
Duhem-Quine thesis, it allows for the metaphysical foundations of a science, and 
justifies the retention of false theories It offers criteria for theory-choice, on empirical 
grounds m the discovery of novel facts, and on heuristic grounds It is an externalist 
philosophy, but one which takes account of the actual methodological difficulties 
which scientists face
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De Marchi held that there is a good fit between Lakatosian rational reconstructions 
and the history of economics (de Marchi 1991 2) Not all economic methodologists 
would agree (for example, Blaug 1976, Leyonhufvud 1976, Rosenberg 1986, Hands 
1990) Section 3 2 shows that, while Lakatosian rational reconstructions correspond 
more closely to the history of economics than Poppenan and Kuhnian rational 
reconstructions, there is still a problem m reconciling Lakatosian novelty with what is 
commonly regarded by the economics community as novel This difficulty suggests 
that Lakatosian rational reconstructions are failing to internalise certain theories which 
economists themselves consider to be novel
The irony is that the failure to find a resemblance between the actual history of 
economics and Lakatosian rational reconstructions has forced economists into an 
examination of how economists themselves define novelty Economic methodologists, 
like Blaug (1976) and Hands (1990), have argued that in spite of the failure to find 
Lakatosian novel facts, Lakatosian rational reconstruction of the history of economics 
is nevertheless useful for this reason Thus, the failure on the meta-methodological 
level to find the optimal theory of scientific rationality has forced economic 
methodologists to undertake a Kuhman-type analysis on the methodological level 
While these analyses are not full-blown sociological analyses in the format suggested 
by Kuhn, they nevertheless do provide useful insights mto the actual practice of
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economics and the underlying criteria of progress which economists use
Part two of this dissertation is concerned with the development of international trade 
theory It compares different philosophical rational reconstructions and their 
conclusions about the nature of progress m international trade theory (Kuhnian 
concepts m international trade theory are identified, but this is not to suggest that 
Kuhn’s philosophy of science provided an alternative theory of scientific rationality to 
Popper’s or Lakatos’) These rational reconstructions are also compared to the rational 
reconstruction of the history of international trade theory written by international trade 
theorists themselves
International trade theory is an interesting choice for this type of study, because it is 
not one of the primary examples of progress put forward by the elite of economics 
Historians of economic thought, too, have tended to assume that progress in 
mtemational trade theory, at least until the early 1980s, has been limited Blaug, for 
example, has descnbed international trade theory as being "peculiarly prone to the 
disease of formalism" (Blaug 1992-190)
The pure theory of international trade is to found in all international trade textbooks 
Its principle characteristic is that of a two country/two good/two factor, general 
equilibrium model of trade It is argued in the following chapters that the development 
of international trade theory has been reconstructed by mainstream international trade
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theorists to emphasise the development of this model Because this rational 
reconstruction stresses the neoclassical elements of the history of international trade 
theory, I have called et the neoclassical rational reconstruction This should not be 
interpreted as a suggestion that neoclassicism provides an objective theory of scientific 
rationality m the same way that falsificatiomsm or the methodology of scientific 
research prgorammes do (Popper, m his situational logic, did argue that neoclassical 
economics used a methodology which was applicable to all the social sciences The 
problems inherent in situational logic are discussed in chapter 1 4) The definition of 
rational reconstruction employed here is not the narrow, Lakatosian one, but rather 
the broader, Kuhnian one Kuhn held that every interpretation of history is a rational 
reconstruction, be it a philosopher’s, an historian’s or a scientist’s interpretation 
(Kuhn 1977 15) Rational reconstruction, in the Kuhnian sense, is not therefore a 
reconstruction which always suggests some objective theory of scientific rationality
The neoclassical rational reconstruction of international trade theory emphasises the 
development of the general equilibrium model of international trade The history of 
international trade theory that is presented is therefore continuous rather than 
disjointed This rational reconstruction omits a substantial amount of work which was 
not in the neoclassical tradition, but which is now being held as significant by 
international trade theorists
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The aim of the analysis m part two of this dissertation, is not, as would be the case m 
MHRP, to find a closeness of fit between any particular philosophical rational 
reconstruction and the rational reconstruction of the elite of international trade theory 
The purpose of the analysis is not to arrive at any conclusion as to which might be the 
preferred theory of scientific rationality out of a particular selection Rather, the 
analysis is more a Kuhnian one Kuhn argued that the philosopher’s rational 
reconstruction will differ from that of the scientific community, because of an 
"identification of [different] essentials" (Kuhn 1977 15) It is hoped that an analysis of 
the distinctions between the philosophers’ rational reconstruction and the neoclassical 
rational reconstruction of international trade theory will produce a greater 
understanding of the nature of progress in international trade theory It is the existence 
of gaps between philosophical rational reconstructions and the neoclassical rational 
reconstruction which forces an exammation of what it is that trade theorists actually 
do
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PART TWO
I
A METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY
CHAPTER FIVE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 
IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD
Schmitt gave the standard textbook definition of the distinction between classical, 
neoclassical and Keynesian economics
Economics can be said to have evolved m three stages In the first, political 
economy considered that production was prior to exchange and not 
determined in exchange In the second stage, economics is founded on the 
general equilibrium of supply and demand, exchange thus encompasses 
production In the third stage, production is again pre-eminent all exchange 
pertains to production (Schmitt 1986 105)
Implicit in this definition is the notion of a methodological distinction between 
classical political economy on the one hand, and neoclassical economics on the other 
neoclassical economics operates within a static general equilibrium framework which
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is in some way different from the framework adopted by classical political economy 
This distinction is not one accepted by all historians of economic thought The 
argument that there is a continuity of method from the classical to the neoclassical 
penod was forcefully put by Hollander in respect of Ricardo (Hollander 1987)
Ricardo, Hollander argued, "frequently dealt with disturbances (demand changes, 
innovation, taxation) within a static framework Conversely, Walras extended his 
own static analysis in the Elements to deal with growth" (Hollander 1987 433) Blaug 
argued that, in the 1930s, "Ricardo was regarded as the virtual inventor of the method 
of comparative statics and a prime example of the tendency of orthodox economists to 
emphasize long-run equilibrium values at the expense of any consideration of 
short-run, disequilibrium adjustments" (Blaug 1985 4) Consider, however, these 
reconstructions of Ricardo’s methodological aims, in the light of Kuhn’s argument that 
the history of a science will tend to be reconstructed m terms of the exemplars of the 
latest paradigm
Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the sceintists of earlier ages are 
implicitly represented as havmg worked upon the same set of fixed problems 
and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent 
revolution m scientific theory and method has made seem scientific (Kuhn 
1970a 138)
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There have also been attempts to show continuity from classical political economy to 
neoclassical economics by using a Lakatosian analysis Baranzim and Scazzien argued 
that classical political economy and neoclassical economics constituted two distinct 
research programmes, but with considerable overlap between them (Baranzim and 
Scazzien 1986 5) This suggests that there was an overthrowing of classical political 
economy in favour of the different hard core propositions of neoclassical economics 
Blaug, on the other hand, argued that there was no such change "it is evident that the 
margmalists adopted the ‘hard core’ of classical political economy but they altered its 
‘positive heuristic’ and provided it with a different ‘protective belt’" (Blaug 
1976 161) This suggests that the shift from classical political economy to neoclassical 
economics was only a creative shift within a smgle research programme, as opposed 
to a shift from one programme to another This creative shift resulted m a 
methodological change, but not in a change in the basic laws which underlie economic 
theory Under this interpretation, the marginalist revolution becomes a revolution m 
method only The argument that economists tend to view heuristic changes, as 
opposed to any other changes, as signs of progress, is repeatedly made below, in 
respect of the development of international trade theory
The Pure Theory of International Trade as it is presented in international trade 
textbooks implies a continuity of methodological purpose in trade theory from the 
classical era into the twentieth century The Pure Theory presents a static, general
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equilibrium model of international trade, the origins of which are traced back to 
Ricardo It is the development of this static theory which a neoclassical rational 
reconstruction of the development of international trade theory would stress 
However, in addition to this static theory, a dynamic theory of international trade also 
developed, the origins of which can be found m Smith and also in Ricardo This 
chapter explores the development of the static and the dynamic theories of 
international trade through the classical era It considers the extent to which the 
twentieth century, neoclassical reconstruction of the development of international trade 
theory ignores the dynamic theory of international trade, and because of this, 
misrepresents the history of international trade theory m the classical era Another 
issue is the extent to which positivist reconstructions can explain the persistence of the 
dynamic theory as the dominant explanation for patterns of international trade until the 
1930s
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THE ORIGINS OF THE STATIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Until recently, the standard interpretation of the development of international trade 
theory m the classical period, was a strictly neoclassical one A prime example of 
neoclassical rational reconstruction in relation to the development of international 
trade theory can be found m Chipman (1965) Chipman began his historiographic 
analysis with the law of comparative advantage, first proposed by Torrens m 1809, 
and developed by Ricardo in 1817 (Chipman 1965 479-481) One could be forgiven 
for assuming that Smith had no role to play m the development of international trade 
theory at all From a neoclassical perspective, Smith’s model was not important The 
principle reason for this is that Smith did not make the assumption that factors of 
production are immobile It is this which gives raison d ’etre to the development of a 
separate theory of international trade
Chipman presented Ricardo’s theory of international trade as a two country/two 
good/one factor model, a precursor to the Heckscher/Ohlin two country/two good/two 
factor model of the 20th century (Chipman 1965 479) Accordmg to Chipman, 
Ricardo made the necessary assumptions to fully delineate a neoclassical model of 
trade "Ricardo rather glossed over the question of the interdependence of industries, 
treating them as integrated, producmg one output and usmg one primary input 
(labour)" (Chipman 1965 479) For Chipman, the mam issue is the failure of Ricardo
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to give the conditions under which the international terms of trade are established, and 
he turned almost immediately to Mill (1848) and his elucidation of the law of 
reciprocal demand, which, not surprisingly given his neoclassical interpretation, 
Chipman considered to be "one of the greatest achievements of the human intellect" 
(Chipman 1965 486)
This interpretation of Ricardo’s contribution to the development of international trade 
theory suggests that the hypothesis that Ricardo was in fact more of a neoclassical 
economist than a classical economist is an accurate one In chapter 7 of his Principles 
o f Political Economy (1817), Ricardo outlmed his supposedly neoclassical theory of 
international trade But how much of the modem neoclassical Ricardian model of 
international trade is in fact a 20th century invention9
Ricardo began his discussion of international trade by pointing out that the gams from 
trade are the gams to consumers
No extension of foreign trade will immediately increase the amount of value 
in a country, although it will very powerfully contribute to increase the mass 
of commodities, and therefore the sum of enjoyments (Ricardo 1965 128)
The argument that such gams exist, independently of any changes which trade may 
induce in production, is at the core of the static theory of trade Thus, the static theory
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of international trade does indeed appear to have originated with Ricardo’s novel fact 
But how much of the modem neoclassical analysis did Ricardo employ, m order to 
derive this novel fact9
Ricardo did not fully agree with Smith that the main benefit of international trade is 
capital accumulation An increase in profits was not a foregone conclusion of 
international trade
If, instead of growing our own com, or manufacturing the clothing and other 
necessaries of the labourer, we discover a new market from which we can 
supply ourselves with these commodities at a cheaper price, wages will fall 
and profits rise, but if the commodities obtained at a cheaper rate, by the 
extension of foreign commerce, or by the improvement of machinery, be 
exclusively the commodities consumed by the rich, no alteration will take 
place m the rate of profits (Ricardo 1965 132)
It would appear, then, that Ricardo played down the dynamic effects of trade, 
highlighted by Smith (Smith’s dynamic theory of international trade is examined in 
the following section) Contrary to Smith, Ricardo argued that "the rate of profits is 
never mcreased by a better distribution of labour" (Ricardo 1965 133) In order to 
validate a separate theory of mtemational exchange, an assumption of international 
immobility of factors of production is required
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If the profits of capital employed in Yorkshire, should exceed those of capital 
employed in London, capital would speedily move from London to 
Yorkshire, and an equality of profits woould be effected, but if in 
consequence of the diminished rate of production m the lands of England, 
from the increase of capital and population, wages should rise, and profits 
fall, it would not follow that capital and population would necessarily move 
from England to Holland, or Spam, or Russia, where profits might be higher 
(Ricardo 1965 134)
Directly following this argument, Ricardo put forward the law of comparative 
advantage, in terms of the well-known example of trade in cloth and wine between 
England and Portugal (Ricardo 1965 134-136) Ricardo showed that where Portugal 
had an absolute advantage m the production of both cloth and wine, she could still 
gam from trade "This exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the 
commodity imported by Portugal could be produced there with less labour than m 
England" (Ricardo 1965 135) The standard neoclassical interpretation of Ricardo’s 
model depicts the gam for Portugal in terms of the labour savings made However, 
Ricardo was not thinking in terms of a single factor model
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Though she [Portugal] could make the cloth with the labour of 90 men, she 
would import it from a country where it required the labour of 100 men to 
produce it, because it would be advantageous to her rather to employ her 
capital m the production of wme, for which she would obtain more cloth 
from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital 
from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth (Ricardo 1965 135)
The fact that Ricardo did not himself employ a single factor model has been pointed 
out by several writers (Fmdlay, 1984, Gomes 1987, Maneschi 1992) Another 
distinction between the neoclassical 2x2x1 model, and Ricardo’s arguments in his 
chapter 7, is the issue of specialisation m production The neoclassical model predicts 
complete specialisation by both countries in one of the traded commodities The 
argument as to whether Ricardo implied complete specialisation focuses on the 
following footnote
It will appear then, that a country possessing very considerable advantages m 
machinery and skill, and which may therefore be enabled to manufacture 
commodities with much less labour than her neighbours, may, m return for 
such commodities, import a portion of the com required for its consumption, 
even if its land were more fertile, and com could be grown with less labour
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than m the country from which it was imported (Ricardo 1965 136)
From this, it would appear that Ricardo did not predict complete specialisation as an 
outcome of trade It also adds credence to the argument that Ricardo’s theory of trade 
was a multi-factor one (Maneschi 1992 428) However, Ricardo continued
Two men can both make shoes and hats, and one is superior to the other in 
both employments, but in making hats, he can only exceed his competitor by 
one-fifth or 20 per cent , and in makmg shoes he can excel him by one-third 
or 33 per cent , - will it not be for the interest of both, that the superior man 
should employ himself exclusively in makmg shoes, and the inferior man in 
makmg hats9 (Ricardo 1965 136)
Vmer argued that, in the second part of the footnote, Ricardo is referring to trade 
between individuals as distmct from trade between two countries, and thus, it cannot 
be inferred that Ricardo predicted complete specialisation between countries as an 
outcome of trade (Vmer 1955 452, quoted in Maneschi 1992 428) This issue of 
whether Ricardo predicted complete specialisation cannot be resolved on the basis of 
this footnote alone But there is evidence elsewhere m Ricardo’s writings on 
international trade to suggest that Ricardo was in fact thinking in terms of incomplete 
specialisation as an outcome of international trade On the evidence of chapter 7
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outlined above, Maneschi made the following argument
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Ricardian trade model is a 
multi-factor one, with circulating capital an mdispensible concomitant of the 
employment of labour, and the production of agricultural goods involving 
land and hence being subject to diminishing returns to labour (Maneschi 
1992 428)
A prior argument has been made that Ricardo put forward two models of trade, the 
static neoclassical one represented in most trade textbooks, and a dynamic theory of 
trade based on his theory of growth (for example, Findlay 1984, Mumy 1991) The 
most concise version of Ricardo’s dynamic theory of trade is to be found in his 1822 
pamphlet, On Protection in Agriculture
The crux of Ricardo’s dynamic theory of international trade is the law of diminishing 
returns to the production of com as production is expanded
It appears then, that m the progress of society, when no importation takes 
place, we are obliged constantly to have recourse to worse soils to feed an 
augmenting population, and with every step of our progress the pnce of com 
must rise, and with such rise, the rent of the better land which had been 
previously cultivated, will be increased (Ricardo 1965 212)
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I
Ricardo pointed out that international trade would prevent the price of com from 
rising
it [higher price of com] would not have existed if the same return had been 
obtained with less labour, - it would not have existed if, by the application of 
labour to manufactures, we had indirectly obtained the com by the 
exportation of those manufactures m exchange for com (Ricardo 1965 212)
Ricardo made two arguments against the assertions of those in favour of the com laws 
on the grounds that the English farmer paid higher wages than those on the Continent 
(Ricardo 1965 213) He argued that if a rise in English wages compared to those on 
the Continent were to produce a rise in prices, it would produce a rise m the prices of 
all goods, including com (Ricardo 1965 213) Smce relative prices would remam 
unchanged in this case, Ricardo argued that the farmer would be just as well off under 
trade as without it, if  the effect of higher wages was to increase prices
If a quarter of com be raised from 60s to 75s , or 25 per cent by a rise in 
wages, and a certain quantity of hats or cloth be raised in the same proportion 
by the same cause, the importer of com into England would lose just as much 
by the commodity which he exports, as he would gain by the com which he 
imports (Ricardo 1965 214-215)
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Of course, the fundamental premise of Ricardo’s law of profits is that an increase m 
wages will not increase price, but rather will reduce profit, and cause a decline in the 
accumulation of capital Ricardo’s conclusions as to the validity of the arguments put 
forward in favour of the com laws were the following
No one class of producers, then, is entitled to protection on account of a rise 
of wages, because a rise of wages equally affects all producers, it does not 
raise the price of commodities because it diminishes profits, and, if it did 
raise the price of commodities, it would raise them all m the same 
proportion, and would not therefore alter their exchangeable value (Ricardo 
1965 215)
Ricardo argued that wages were being kept high m England, because the price of com 
was high due to diminishing returns to its production, com being one of the 
"necessaries of the labourer" (Ricardo 1965 237) High wages would result, according 
to Ricardo’s law of profits, m low profits
In this view of the law of profits, it will at once be seen how important it is 
that so essential a necessary as com, which so powerfully affects wages, 
should be at a low price, and how injurious it must be to the community 
generally, that, by prohibitions against importation, we should be driven to
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the cultivation of our poorer lands to feed our augmenting population 
(Ricardo 1965 237)
For Ricardo, protection had resulted m consumer losses, "diminishing the sum of our 
enjoyments" (Ricardo 1965 237) There was also the possibility of a flight of capital 
"we offer an irresistible temptation to capitalists to quit this country, that they may 
take their capitals to places where wages are low and profits high" (Ricardo 
1965 237) On the other hand, there was the argument of those m favour of the com 
laws, that the free importation of com would rum English farmers Ricardo did not 
accept that the importation of com would result in complete specialisation
From all the evidence given to the Agricultural Committee, it appears that no 
very great quantity could be obtained from abroad, without causing a 
considerable increase in the remunerating price of com in foreign 
countries To raise a larger supply, too, those countries would be obliged to 
have recourse to an inferior quality of land, and as it is the cost of raismg 
com on the worst soils in cultivation requiring the heaviest charges, which 
regulates the price of all the com of a country, there could not be a great 
additional quantity produced without a rise in the pnce necessary to 
remunerate the foreign grower (Ricardo 1965 265)
Ricardo’s dynamic theory of international trade differs from the model of trade he
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presented in chapter 7 of Principles In his arguments on protection m agriculture, 
Ricardo made use of the earlier concept of absolute advantage, rather than his own 
principle of comparative advantage The static Ricardian model of trade m its modem 
formulation incorporates an assumption of constant returns to scale, whereas Ricardo’s 
dynamic theory deals with the impact of diminishing returns to scale m the production 
of com Mumy has criticised Ricardo for failing to establish a link between his 
dynamic and his static theory of mtemational trade
But what about a country that trades with England because it has a 
comparative advantage m agricultural production9 Wouldn’t the argument 
applied to England work in reverse because the agricultural margin is 
extended, thus lowermg the profit rate and increasmg landlord incomes7 
(Mumy 1991 92)
But this effect of diminishing returns to agricultural production was not somethmg 
which Ricardo failed to identify (Ricardo 1965 265, see quote above) Incomplete 
specialisation was the outcome in Ricardo’s dynamic theory of international trade m 
goods subject to diminishing returns This, coupled with the footnote to chapter 7 
(Ricardo 1965 136), casts doubt on the modem assumption that the most accurate 
interpretation of Ricardo’s model of international trade is one based on a straight-line 
production function It would have been impossible for Ricardo to show that there 
would be mutual gams from trade in a two country/two good model, if one of the
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goods was produced under diminishing returns and if complete specialisation was to 
be the outcome (Steedman and Metcalfe 1979 99-100) If  Ricardo had insisted on the 
preservation of a prediction that complete specialisation would be the outcome of 
mtemational trade m all cases, then Mumy would be correct to argue that "the 
generality of Ricardo’s claim that foreign trade is highly beneficial to a country is 
seriously undermined" (Mumy 1991 88-89) However, it is not at all clear that 
complete specialisation was an outcome of international trade that Ricardo held to be 
valid m the face of diminishing returns to agricultural goods
In conclusion, it seems that the standard, one factor model of trade attributed to 
Ricardo, is not an adequate representation of Ricardo’s discussion of mtemational 
trade "The Ricardo of pure trade theory is a pale shadow of the real one" (Fmdlay 
1984 186) Meneschi has argued that a multi-factor model would be a more accurate 
representation (Maneschi 1992 428) In addition, it is argued above that Ricardo did 
not assume complete specialisation in the case of diminishing returns to factors in the 
production of a traded good If this interpretation of Ricardo’s arguments m chapter 7, 
and m the pamphlet, is accepted, then the straight line production function is a 
misrepresentation of Ricardo’s argument
Why is the 20th century, static Ricardian model of mtemational trade at variance with 
Ricardo’s theory of mtemational trade9 Fmdlay suggested conventionalist reasons for 
this divergence "The very neatness and elegant simplicity of the chapter 7 analysis
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seems to have diverted attention from the more complex, but also in my opinion very 
rich and deep ideas contained in the Essay" (Findlay 1984 186) (The Essay to which 
Findlay refers, is Ricardo’s An Essay in the Influence o f  a Low Pnce o f  Com  on the 
Profits o f  Stock, 1815) Blaug made the following comment in his discussion of 
neoclassical interpretations of Ricardo’s work "we have travelled a long way from 
what Ricardo actually said to what Ricardo must have meant if he cared as much as 
modem economists do about the internal consistency of economic models" (Blaug 
1985c 9) This comment is particularly appropriate to the way in which the history of 
international trade theory is written in international trade textbooks This history is 
written as though Ricardo had a fully developed notion of neoclassical objectives In 
fact, while there may be hints of the neoclassical objectives which were later to be 
found in Ricardo’s chapter 7, these hints were not woven together in any cohesive 
fashion
The richness of Ricardo’s theory of international trade can be compared to the 
narrowness of the neoclassical interpretation of his theory, usmg Lakatosian analysis 
From a Lakatosian perspective, there is little novelty m the neoclassical, Ricardian 
model The principle of comparative advantage had already been stated by Torrens in 
1815 The static model predicts that complete specialisation would be the outcome of 
international trade, and that there would be mutual gams from international trade 
where specialisation based on comparative advantage occurred Ricardo himse lf  
showed that incomplete specialisation was the outcome of international trade where
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goods are subject to diminishing returns (Ricardo 1965 265), thus showing complete 
specialisation to be a special case That the principle of comparative advantage is a 
major source of progress in the development of international trade theory, has been 
questioned on occasion "the sole addition of consequence which the doctrine of 
comparative cost made [was the fact that] imports could be profitable even though the 
commodity imported could be produced at less cost at home than abroad" (Vmer 
1955 441)
Ricardo’s dynamic theory, on the other hand, put forward a number of novel 
predictions At the core of Ricardo’s dynamic theory of international trade were the 
law of diminishing returns to agricultural production and Ricardo’s law of profits 
From these propositions, Ricardo made the following predictions m respect of the 
effect of international free trade Without the free importation of com from France, 
the level of money wages m England would remam high, and profits low This would 
induce capital outflows Free trade m com would reduce the money wage, since com 
was the principle commodity purchased by the labourmg classes This free trade 
would not result in the complete specialisation of English agriculture out of com, due 
to the diminishing returns to agricultural production Blaug has shown that several of 
these predictions were in fact falsified by empirical evidence throughout the first half 
of the 19th century (Blaug 1986 94) Ricardo’s dynamic theory failed to explam how 
economic growth persisted throughout the 1830s and 1840s despite the contmuation of 
the com laws (Blaug 1986 94) The com laws failed to produce a rise in the price of
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com (Blaug 1986 105) However, Blaug conceded that in the years following the 
repeal of the com laws, several of Ricardo’s predictions were empirically 
corroborated
A larger quantity of gram was imported m the decade after 1846 than m all 
the thirty-one years between Waterloo and repeal, yet there was no ruinous 
drop m wheat prices or m acreage under cultivation In fact, the period 
between repeal and the 1870s was the golden age of British farming (Blaug 
1986 105)
Ricardo’s dynamic theory contains more novel predictions than the 20th century 
neoclassical representation of Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage Some of 
these novel predictions of the dynamic theory were, in addition, empirically 
corroborated Thus, m Lakatosian terms, it is Ricardo’s dynamic theory which is the 
more progressive of the two, and should have been the one to survive mto the 20th 
century However, Ricardo’s dynamic theory was not compatible with neoclassical 
concerns about exchange It was not so easily adapted to suit the neoclassical mode of 
analysis Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage survived, not because it was 
novel, but because it could be made heunstically compatible with the neoclassical 
mode of analysis This neoclassical modification of Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage mto a two country/two good/one factor model of international trade 
significantly narrows the potential scope of Ricardo’s original theory It suggests that
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there was a continuity m the development of international trade theory, which in fact 
did not exist except m the most implicit and disjointed of forms
The neoclassical rational reconstruction gives an erroneous portrayal of continuity m 
international trade theory Mirowski criticised the notion of rationally reconstructing 
history for justifying the persistence of such erroneous histories
The Lakatosian method of ‘rational reconstruction’ is in fact a thinly 
disguised blueprmt for the justification of the status quo in any intellectual 
discipline, because it freely advises the historian to ignore any contradictory 
evidence which might call into question a presumption of pure and 
unhindered progress in a science (Mirowski 1987 296)
Clearly, in international trade textbooks, the criterion of progress is the ability to 
explain the development of mtemational trade theory m terms of neoclassical 
methodology, regardless of any empirical considerations Thus, there developed in the 
early 20th century a static theory of international trade which purported to have its 
roots in Ricardo’s theory of mtemational trade This static theory was a neoclassical 
alternative to the dynamic theory of International trade which was the mam mode of 
analysing international trade issues until the 1930s The roots of this dynamic theory 
of international trade can be traced back to Adam Smith, whose theory is the subject 
of the following section
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5 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE DYNAMIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE
A neoclassical interpretation of Adam Smith’s theory of international trade represents 
the principle of absolute advantage in a two country/two good/one factor model The 
level of technical advancement differs across the two countries, and this determines 
the relative cost of production in labour umts of each good m each country In 
equilibrium, there is complete specialisation The principle of absolute advantage is an 
almost intuitive argument m support of free trade
Whether the advantages which one country has over another, be natural or 
acquired, is m this respect of no consequence As long as the one country has 
those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more 
advantageous for the latter, rather than to buy of the former than to make 
(Smith 1976, Vol 1 480)
This is not as bold a prediction as that derived from the ‘Ricardian,’ neoclassical 
model of international trade. With the principle of comparative advantage, Ricardo 
produced the unlikely prediction that there can still be mutual gams from trade, even 
where one country has an absolute cost advantage in respect of both goods m the
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2x2x1 model In Poppenan terms, comparative advantage is the bolder, riskier, and 
therefore the preferable prediction
As was noted above in respect of Ricardo, this interpretation of Smith’s theory of 
international trade, common to most textbooks, is a 20th century construct The 
superiority of the principle of comparative advantage means that only a few 
paragraphs are devoted to Smith (for example, Sodersten 1980), or else Smith’s 
theory of trade is omitted altogether (for example, Chipman 1965) Smith, it seems, is 
chastised for failing to discover comparative advantage (Bloomfield 1975, Mymt
1983) This neoclassical interpretation fails to internalise all of Smith’s theory of 
international trade It cannot explain the development of Smith’s dynamic theory of 
trade, just as it cannot explain or rationalise R icardo’s  dynamic theory of trade West 
argued that "after Smith, foreign trade and domestic economy were subsumed as 
branches of the static general equilibrium analysis" (West 1990 27) In respect of 
international trade theory, this is not accurate Smith’s dynamic theory of mtemational 
trade persisted as the primary mode of analysis during the 19th century, and arguably, 
into the 20th century with Ohlin (1933) An alternative rational reconstruction of the 
impact of Smith’s dynamic theory of international trade is therefore necessary
Hollander conceded that there was a dynamic theory of mtemational trade to be found 
in Wealth o f  Nations, but focused on the extent to which Smith’s theory can be made 
compatible with its 20th century, neoclassical interpretation (Hollander
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1973 275-283) The essence of Hollander’s rational reconstruction of Smith is to show 
that Smith was m fact a general equilibrium theorist In respect of international trade 
theory, Hollander pointed to the similarities between Smith’s theory and the 20th 
century factor proportions explanation for patterns of international trade
Smith took it for granted that in a new country the peculiar advantage would 
lie m the production of farm produce, because of the large supply of cheap 
land available And that the advantage of Europe lay in manufactured 
produce, because of the relative cheapness of labour and high cost of land 
(Hollander 1973 283)
Myint, though he disputed Hollander’s interpretation of Smith’s theory of trade on 
several counts, agreed that "Smith was able to conduct his trade analysis on the basis 
of all three factors - land, labour, and capital - and this enabled him to anticipate the 
modem Heckscher-Ohlin approach to international trade" (Mymt 1983 511, see also 
Bloomfield 1975 459) Of course, if Smith’s theory of trade involves the use of more 
than one factor, then the standard 2x2x1 interpretation is a misrepresentation But was 
Smith thinking in terms of a multi-factor model of trade where trade patterns are 
determined solely by factor quantities across countries7 O’Donnell pointed out that 
Smith did not focus solely on quantitative differences of factors across countries, but 
also on qualitative differences (O’Donnell 1990 194) Moreover, O’Donnell argued 
that Smith explicitly "played down" the quantitative differences in factors across
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countries (O’Donnell 1990 194), m his introduction to Wealth o f  Nations (Smith 
1976 1-2) Here, Smith argued that, whatever the factor endowment of a country, its 
rate of capital accumulation would depend on "the skill, dexterity, and judgement with 
which its labour is generally applied" and "upon the number of those who are annually 
employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed" (Smith 
1976 1-2)
Mymt pomted out that "Smith identified China’s potential advantage m trade as 
consisting in the export of manufactures" and that "this conclusion accords well 
enough with the modern factor proportions theory" (Mymt 1983 516) This suggests 
that the reasoning behind Smith’s conclusion that China’s advantage is in 
manufactures, was an assumption that China was relatively abundant m capital as 
opposed to labour However, Smith’s ‘strategic trade policy recommendations’ for 
China come, not from an assumption about factor proportions, but rather from an 
argument based on technology transfer
A more extensive foreign trade could scarce fail to increase very much the 
manufactures of China, and to improve very much the productive powers of 
its manufacturing industry By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese 
would naturally learn the art of using and constructing themselves all the 
different machines made use of in other countries, as well as the other 
improvements of art and industry which are practised in all the different parts
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of the world Upon their present plan they have little opportunity of 
improving themselves by the example of any other nation, except that of the 
Japanese (Smith 1976, Vol II 202)
As O’Donnell has argued, the outcome might be similar to that under the factor 
proportions theory, but the "logic of neoclassical theory" is missing (O’Donnell 
1990 194)
Mymt, m his defence of Smith against the charge of failing to have discovered the 
principle of comparative advantage, argued that Smith provided "a richer and more 
realistic model of the domestic economy than would have been possible within the 
restrictive framework of a comparative cost theory" (Mymt 1983 525) Rather than 
being modified so as to fit a static, neoclassical view of international trade, Mymt 
argued that Smith’s theory "should be considered as an attempt to study the longer-run 
mutual interaction between foreign trade and domestic economic development, 
essentially involving an increase in the total volume of the resources and a rise m their 
productivity" (Mymt 1983 510) The extent to which Smith’s theory of international 
trade spreads over the whole of Wealth o f  Nations is, for Mymt, indicative of the 
importance of international trade in Smith’s theory of economic development (Myint 
1983 513)
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Myint identified two dynamic theories of mtemational trade m Wealth o f  Nations, the 
‘vent-for-surplus’ theory and the ‘productivity’ theory (Myint 1958,1983) The 
productivity theory is Smith’s argument about the impact of international trade on the 
level of output and the productivity of labour
By means of it [foreign trade], the narrowness of the home market does not 
hinder the division of labour m any particular branch of art or manufacture 
from being carried to the highest perfection By opemng a more extensive 
market for whatever of the produce of their labour may exceed the home 
consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to 
augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to mcrease the real 
revenue and wealth of the society (Smith 1976 Vol I 469)
This impact of international trade on the productivity of labour amounts to a pushing 
out of the production possibilities frontier of neoclassical theory (Mymt 1958 318) 
Smith was, therefore, making the point that the domestic reallocation of resources 
which international trade would prompt, would generate not only static, consumer 
gams, but also dynamic, productivity gams He conceded that the reallocation of 
resources prompted by the introduction of foreign trade might negatively affect certain 
sectors of the domestic economy
188
If the free importation of foreign manufactures were permitted, several of the 
home manufactures would probably suffer, and some of them, perhaps, go to 
rum altogether, and a considerable part of the stock and industry at present m 
them, would be forced to find out some other employment (Smith 1976,
Vol II 481)
However, Smith argued that "there are other collateral manufactures of so similar a 
nature, that a workman can easily transfer his industry from one of them to another" 
(Smith 1976, Vol II 493) In order to facilitate the swift adjustment of industry to the 
removal of protection, Smith held that the regulations which impinge on the free 
movement of labour should be abolished, "so that a poor workman, when thrown out 
of employment either in one trade or in one place, may seek for it m another trade or 
in another place, without the fear either of a prosecution or of a removal" (Smith 
1976, Vol II 493)
The neoclassical model of absolute advantage would predict that the domestic 
economy would tend towards specialisation of one good as it realised more economies 
of scale through the greater division of labour In equilibrium, both countries would 
be completely specialised in one good There is some evidence that Smith believed 
underdeveloped countries should specialise completely in agriculture
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It has been the principal cause of the rapid progress of our American colomes 
towards wealth and greatness, that almost their whole capitals have hitherto 
been employed in agriculture Were the Americans, either by combination of 
by any other sort of violence, to stop the importation of European 
manufactures, and, by thus givmg a monopoly to such of their own 
countrymen as could manufacture the like goods, divert any considerable part 
of their capital mto this employment, they would retard instead of 
acceleratmg the further increase in the value of their annual produce, and 
would destruct instead of promoting the progress of their country towards 
real wealth and greatness (Smith 1976, Vol I 388)
An underdeveloped country would, according to Smith, specialise in agricultural 
production because the returns to agriculture m terms of the labour employed is 
greatest "After agriculture, the capital employed in manufactures puts mto motion the 
greatest quantity of productive labour, and adds the greatest value to the annual 
produce" (Smith 1976, Vol I 387, this point is made m Mymt 1983 520) Smith did 
concede that there would be diminishing returns to agriculture, but argued that the 
extent of surplus generated would create enough wealth to counteract these 
diminishing returns (Mymt 1983 516)
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In respect of the developed countries of Europe, however, the implication is that they 
would continue to produce and to expand their agricultural production, while 
exporting manufactures
The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbours in 
agriculture as well as in manufactures, but they are commonly more 
distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former (Smith 1976,
Vol I 10)
This failure to specialise on the part of developed countries suggests that they were not 
fully utilising all their resources prior to the opemng up of international trade That 
international trade allows for the expansion of production so as to utilise previously 
unused factors is the essence of Smith’s vent-for-surplus theory of international trade 
The assumption that a country’s resources are not fully utilised prior to international 
trade introduces a methodological conflict between Smith’s theory of international 
trade and the Ricardian, neoclassical model In respect of Smith’s vent-for surplus 
theory
Introducing foreign trade will not, therefore, require any transfer of resources 
away from domestic production there is a net gain In sharp contrast in this 
regard is Ricardian trade theory according to which resources are initially m
;
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full employment so that the introduction of trade involves a reallocation of 
activity (Hollander 1973 269)
This is a contradiction which Ricardo noted (Hollander 1973 274) If unemployed 
resources existed, Ricardo asked
"Could not this portion of the productive labour of Great Britain be employed 
in preparing some other sort of goods, with which something more in demand 
at home might be purchased7 And if it could not, might we not employ this 
productive labour, though with less advantage, m making those goods in 
demand at home, or at least some substitute for them7 (Ricardo 
1965 294-295)
This point was reiterated by Mill, in his criticism of Smith’s vent-for surplus theory 
(Mill 1892 393)
The implication of the vent-for surplus theory that resources are not fully utilised prior 
to trade, also conflicts with the productivity theory which suggests that it is the 
reallocation of fully utilised resources facilitated by international trade which 
generates further division of labour m those for which the country has an absolute 
advantage Mymt attempted to reconcile these two theories of international trade 
(Myint 1983) He conceded that the formal model of absolute advantage had to
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assume the constant full employment of factors, "otherwise there would be no point m 
insisting on the efficient allocation of the available resources" (Mymt 1983 521)
Mymt argued that Smith, on the other hand, "required a conceptually ‘open-ended’ 
model of the domestic economic system in which the incomplete development of the 
internal economic orgamzation would leave room for its long-run productive 
potentialities to be brought out more fully by the forces introduced by foreign trade" 
(Mymt 1983 522)
Smith considered the argument that "landed nations" of Europe - England and France 
- would gam from restricting their imports from the "mercantile states" - Holland and 
Hamburg (Smith 1976, Vol I 190) Smith argued that free trade would lead to the 
"improvement and cultivation" of the landed nations, and would encourage the 
production of a surplus in agriculture (Smith 1976, vol I 191) Accordmg to the 
neoclassical theory of absolute advantage, the landed nations would develop an 
absolute advantage in agriculture and specialise completely As Mymt pointed out, 
"this is not how Smith would see the situation" (Mymt 1983 524) For Smith, the 
generation of a surplus in agricultural output would have the following beneficial 
effects
The continual increase of the surplus produce of their land, would, in due 
tune, create a greater capital than what could be employed with the ordinary 
rate of profit in the improvement and cultivation of land, and the surplus part
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of it would naturally turn itself to the employment of artificers and 
manufacturers at home (Smith 1976, vol I 191)
This ‘natural’ development of the industry of the landed nations would, Smith argued, 
eventually lead to an absolute advantage in manufactures "The artificers and 
manufacturers of such mercantile states, therefore, would immediately be rivalled in 
the market of those landed nations and soon after undersold and justled out of it 
altogether" (Smith 1976, vol I 191) But would not protection lead to the same 
development of manufactures m the landed nations7 Smith did not agree
By raising up too hastily a species of industry which only replaces the stock 
which employs it, together with the ordinary profit, it would depress a 
species of industry which, over and above replacmg that stock with its profit 
affords likewise a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord It would depress 
productive labour, by encouragmg too hastily that labour which is altogether 
barren and unproductive (Smith 1976, vol I 193)
Myint focused on the Smithian distinction between productive and unproductive 
labour in order to attempt to clarify what Smith meant by full employment
But Smith’s notion of ‘full employment’ of labour would allow for the 
possibility of increasing output, even m the short run, by recruiting the extra
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labour for productive uses from the existing pool of ‘unproductive’ labour 
He then assumed that there was a considerable amount of unused or 
underutilized land to produce the extra agricultural output not only m the 
colomes but also m the developed ‘landed nations’ of western Europe (with 
the exception of the highly advanced ‘mercantile states’ such as Holland or 
Hamburg) (Myint 1983 525)
Thus, Myint reconciled the productivity and the vent-for-surplus theory by arguing 
that neither involved an assumption of the full utilisation of resources in the common 
meamng of the term In essence, international trade gives rise to increased division of 
labour, which in turn mcreases the level of domestic resources, this increase in 
domestic resources generates surplus production which is in turn disposed of through 
international trade It has been argued that m neoclassical terms, the productivity 
theory is concerned with the shifting outward of a country’s production possibilities 
frontier (Myint 1958 318), while the vent-for-surplus theory suggests that a country is 
operating below its production possibilities frontier (Evans 1989 2) Myint’s 
interpretation of Smith’s dynamic theory of international trade suggests a production 
possibilités frontier which can be continually shifted outwards, if a country engages m 
international trade Only at a very advanced stage of development, would a country’s 
actual and potential resources be fully utilised, resulting in complete specialisation
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(As with Ricardo, Smith’s theory of mtemational trade is closely tied to his theory of 
economic growth Also as with Ricardo, Smith’s theory of mtemational trade differs 
markedly from the neoclassical reconstruction of it Smith did not assume one factor 
of production Nor did he argue that complete specialisation would be the outcome of 
free trade There is no equilibrium in Smith’s theory of trade - factors of production 
are endlessly accumulated A neoclassical rational reconstruction omits most of 
Smith’s theory of international trade It creates a historical picture of continuity in 
international trade theory which does not exist As with Ricardo’s principle of 
comparative advantage, Smith’s principle of absolute advantage is retained because it 
can be made compatible with the heuristics governing the static neoclassical theory of 
mtemational trade Yet, Smith’s dynamic theory was not discarded as soon as the 
principle of comparative advantage was elucidated Indeed, it remained the primary 
mode of analysing patterns of international trade until the 1930s (O’Brien 1975 54) 
Where then are the novel predictions of Smith’s dynamic theory of international trade 
which would justify its persistence7
A lot of Smith’s theory of mtemational trade is inductive in nature, deriving its 
predictions from empirical observation (Smith did not, however, use empirical 
observations to verify his predictions) An example would be Smith’s prediction that 
international trade would not result in complete specialisation in the landed nations 
This is deduced, not from a set of basic premisses, but rather from observations as to
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the extent of agricultural production in landed nations This is quite unlike the 
deductive method of the neoclassical representation of Smith’s theory of absolute 
advantage Given the mductive nature of several of the predictions of Smith’s theory, 
it is impossible to apply the term ‘novel prediction’ m the sense in which it was meant 
by Lakatos In the Lakatosian framework, as in the Poppenan, novelty can only be 
used in the context of predictions derived from deductive systems
Where then are the (Lakatosian) novel predictions of Smith’s theory of international 
trade9 Implicit in Smith is the argument that there are mutual gams from trading 
according to the principle of absolute advantage In order, however, to establish this 
novel prediction, it would have been necessary to show that complete specialisation is 
the outcome of international trade While m his vent-for-surplus theory, Smith did not 
argue that complete specialisation is a result of trade according to international 
absolute advantage, in his discussion of the productivity gams from trade Smith did 
suggest that a reallocation of resources might take place Moreover, he argued that 
such a reallocation would be more easily facilitated by a removal of the restrictions on 
the domestic movement of labour Thus, the prediction that there will be mutual gams 
from international trade can be said to be a novel prediction of Smith’s theory 
However, the observation Smith made that complete specialisation was not the 
outcome of international trade did not shake Smith’s theory For Smith, the 
reallocation is incomplete, because only an incomplete specialisation is necessary to 
generate division of labour to the extent that a surplus is created and capital
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accumulated Thus, under international trade, landed nations remain specialised m 
both agriculture and manufactures, while underdeveloped countries will develop a 
manufacturing industry out of the surplus resources they generate from their exports 
of agricultural produce
The notion that international trade will result m both an increase m the resources of a 
country, and m the fuller utilisation of previously unused resources of that country, 
are the two mam novel predictions from Smith’s dynamic theory of international 
trade In arguing that Smith’s dynamic theory of international trade persisted, it 
should be pointed out that it was the productivity aspect of this theory which persisted 
Trade theorists of the 19th century and early 20th century focused on the extent to 
which international trade, through specialisation, would encourage the development of 
increasing returns to scale m manufacturing This, and the assumption of diminishing 
returns to agricultural production, form the mam propositions of the classical theory 
of international trade This classical theory would therefore predict an imbalance m 
economic growth between developed and underdeveloped countries This would not 
have been a result of Smith’s dynamic theory alone, given that in Smith’s theory 
diminishing returns to agriculture do not outweigh the positive effects of specialisation 
m agriculture
A neoclassical rational reconstruction ignores the dynamic theorising of these early 
trade theorists, and focuses instead on the further development of a static theory of
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international trade The next significant development m the static theory of 
international trade was m 1848, when Mill proposed his principle of reciprocal 
demand Between 1869 and 1873, Marshall put forward a geometric representation of 
Mill’s principle, and introduced the method of comparative statics to international 
trade theory These developments are the subject of the following section
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5 3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE - MILL AND MARSHALL
Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage provided only one half of a static theory 
of international trade What was missing from Ricardo’s discussion was some way of 
determining the international terms of trade This missing half was supplied by 
J S Mill m chapters 17 and 18 of his Principles o f Political Economy, published in 
1848
Mill was much more explicit than either Ricardo or Smith on the method he believed 
appropriate to political economy Mill’s contribution to the development of 
international trade theory should therefore be considered in the light of his 
methodological discussions
Mill argued that political economy should adopt the deductive method of the natural 
sciences "the method a prion  in Political Economy, and m all the other branches of 
moral science, is the only certain or scientific mode of investigation" (Mill 1874 331) 
Mill was a positivist, though he saw the role for induction "not as a means of 
discovering truth, but of verifying it" (Mill 1874 331) Like Ricardo, Mill derived 
abstract models based on the notion that wealth maximisation is the sole motive behmd
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individuals’ behaviour It was m this domain of a priori, abstract science that Mill 
held the laws of political economy to be exact (de Marchi 1986 91) However, in the 
application of these laws to the real world, "disturbing causes" to the laws are 
revealed (Mill 1874 330) Mill stressed the importance of empirical testing m order to 
elucidate disturbing causes to the laws of political economy "the discrepancy between 
our anticipations and the actual fact is often the only circumstance which would have 
drawn our attention to some disturbing cause which we have overlooked" (Mill 
1874 330) The laws of political economy can be made more exact in their 
application if the disturbing causes, too, are subject to definable laws In this case, 
Mill argued, "the nature and amount of the disturbance may be predicted a p n o n , like 
the operation of the more general laws which they are said to modify or disturb" (Mill 
1874 330)
Only the disturbing causes which "operate upon human conduct through the same 
principle of human nature with which Political Economy is conversant, namely, the 
desire of wealth" can "be brought within the pale of the abstract science if it were 
thought worth while" (Mill 1874 330-331) Where the disturbing cause is due to 
"some other law of human nature it can never fall within the provmce of Political 
Economy, it belongs to some other science" (Mill 1874 331) Because there will 
always be disturbing causes which are non-economic in nature, the predictions of 
applied economics will never be wholly accurate
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mankind can never predict with absolute certainty, but only with a less or 
greater degree of probability, according as they are better or worse apprised 
what the causes are, - have learnt with more or less accuracy from experience 
the law to which each of those caues, when acting separately conforms, - and 
have summed up the aggregate effect more or less carefully (Mill 1874 336)
Like Popper, Mill argued that a critical attitude was necessary
All we can do more, is to endeavour to be impartial critics of our own 
theories, and to free ourselves, as far as we are able, from that reluctance 
from which few inquirers are altogether exempt, to admit the reality or 
relevancy of any facts which they have not previously either taken into, or 
left a place open for m, their systems (Mill 1874 336)
But Mill, in contrast to Popper, argued that the method of induction is viable as a 
method of analysing the trath-status of hypotheses Mill’s methodology also holds that 
the basic laws of political economy are mtrospectively derived by the theorists, and 
are therefore psychological in nature Popper made a strong attack on psychologism as 
a method for the social sciences (Popper 1966 90-99, see also section 1 4)
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Mill did not advocate the rejection of economic theories where these theories are 
falsified Blaug implied that this is an irrationality on Mill’s part "Mill cannot bring 
himself to equate a failure to verify a prediction with a refutation of the underlymg 
theory" (Blaug 1992 59) However, de Marchi argued that "it is not correct to regard 
the tendencies of Mill’s economic science as inexact laws Rather, they are 
encompassing and wholly accurate as far as they go, but their domain is artificial and 
limited" (de Marchi 1986 92) De Marchi’s interpretation suggests that Mill, while 
conceding that disturbing causes exist for all theories in their application to the real 
world, would argue that these theories are nonetheless accurate within the context of 
the axiomatic system within which they were constructed
In Lakatosian terms, Mill laid down the following heuristics for political economy
PHI use the deductive method to develop the theories of political economy, 
using introspection to establish the basic laws 
PH2 compare the predictions of theories with observed data
PH3 any divergence between these predictions and the observed data should
be analysed in order to elucidate the disturbing causes
PH4 theories may have to be modified in order to take account of disturbing
causes, if the disturbing causes are economic m nature
The extent to which Mill adhered to his own methodology in respect of international 
trade theory is now examined
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In chapter 17, Mill repeated Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage, with its 
allied assumption that factors of production are internationally immobile Mill 
presented international trade as a substitute for factor mobility, where both would 
result in "a more efficient employment of the productive forces of the world" (Mill 
1892 392) In addition, Mill reiterated Smith’s dynamic argument that international 
trade would expand the market for domestic production and allow for economies of 
scale However, Mill demed Smith’s argument that surplus production on the basis of 
these economies of scale would be generated in the absense of international trade (Mill 
1892 394) For Mill, economies of scale would not be realised prior to the generation 
of excess demand through international trade
In chapter 18, Mill was concerned with the determination of international values He 
argued that the international price of a traded good would be determined by "the cost 
of its acquisition", or, "the cost of production of the thing which is exported to pay 
for it" (Mill 1892 395) Mill was, therefore, discussing a barter, or pure theory of 
international trade
The value, then, in any country, of a foreign commodity, depends on the 
quantity of home produce which must be given to the foreign country in 
exchange for it In other words, the values of foreign commodities depend on
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the terms of international exchange (Mill 1892 395)
Mill argued that international prices were determined, not by the cost of production as 
was the case with domestic prices, but rather they were determined by "an antecedent 
law, that of supply and demand" (Mill 1892 396) Since "the supply brought by the 
one constitutes his demand for what is brought by the other, supply and demand are 
but another expression for reciprocal demand" (Mill 1892 402)
Mill outlined the process by which the international price ratio is established "when 
two countries trade together m two commodities, the exchange value of these 
commodities relatively to each other will adjust itself to the inclinations and 
circumstances of the consumers on both sides, m such a manner that the quantities 
required by each country, of the articles which it imports from its neighbour, shall be 
exactly sufficient to pay for one another" (Mill 1892 398) Exactly where this 
exchange value settles would depend on the "inclinations and circumstances" of the 
consumers of each country These inclinations and circumstances are in modem terms 
denoted by elasticity of demand Mill argued that there would be limits to the extent 
of variation of the ratio of exchange "the limits within which the variation is 
confined, are the ratio between their costs of production m the one country, and the 
ratio between their costs of production in the other they may exchange for any 
intermediate number" (Mill 1892 398)
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Mill argued that the country most likely to benefit from a favourable ratio of exchange 
is "the country for whose productions there is in other countries the greatest demand, 
and a demand the most susceptible of increase from additional cheapness" (Mill 
1892 400) In other words, the country with the greater elasticity of demand for 
imports, gams most
It gets its imports cheaper, the greater the intensity of the demand in foreign 
countries for its exports It also gets its imports cheaper, the less the extent 
and intensity of its own demand for them The market is cheapest to those 
whose demand is small (Mill 1892 401)
With the elucidation of the principle of reciprocal demand, the notion that there would 
be mutual gams from international trade with incomplete specialisation could now be 
fully derived from the pmciple of comparative advantage It is not surprising that 
from a neoclassical point of view, Mill’s theory of international trade is considered as 
"one of the greatest achievements of the human intellect" (Chipman 1965 486) With 
the elucidation of the equilibrium international price ratio, the static theory of 
international trade became wholly dependent upon an assumption of constant costs 
The extent to which this assumption was a necessary precondition of establishing a 
trading equilibrium is revealed in Marshall’s geometric representation of Mill’s
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principle of reciprocal demand
Mill reiterated Smith’s dynamic (productivity) theory of mtemational trade, and 
examined the impact of changes m technology on the international terms of trade He 
first considered a technological change which creates a new product for export In this 
case, Mill argued that the country’s terms of trade would improve He then considered 
the effect of a change in technology which reduces the cost of production In this case, 
Mill argues that the terms of trade would deteriorate Specifically, the terms of trade 
would fall to a greater degree than the fall in costs if foreign demand for the good is 
less than one (Mill 1892 402-403)
Mill went much further than other trade theorists of the classical period in developing 
the static theory of international trade While other classical writers focused on the 
dynamic aspects of international trade, paying only lip-service to the principle of 
comparative advantage, Mill’s discussion of international trade was almost exclusively 
m static terms With the elucidation of the principle of reciprocal demand, he 
developed the following hard core propositions of the static theory of international 
trade
HC1 trade patterns are determined by the comparative cost of production between 
countries
HC2 the international price ratio is determined by the interaction of mtemational 
demand and supply
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HC3 there are mutual benefits from free trade between two countries
In conjunction with these hard core propositions, Mill also proposed some auxiliary 
hypotheses
AH1 the extent to which a country gams from mtemational trade depends on the 
elasticity of foreign demand for its exports, relative to its own demand for 
imported goods
AH2 rich countries gam least from trade, because their elasticity of demand for 
imports is greater
Mill, like Smith and Ricardo before him, argued that free trade would bring mutual 
benefits to trading partners He showed this, not m an inductive way as Smith had 
done, but rather as a prediction deduced from his basic premises Mill did, however, 
concede that while mutual gams from trade were the outcome of his abstract model, m 
terms of applied political economy a policy of protection might be justified in a 
particular circumstance "The only case m which, on mere principles of political 
economy, protecting duties can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily 
(especially in a young and rising nation) in hopes of naturalising a foreign industry, m 
itself perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country" (Mill 1892 593) This 
admission was, for Mill, a disturbing cause to his abstract model of international 
trade, but it did not cause him to abandon his abstract model
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Blaug has argued that Mill’s methodology resulted in nothing more than the addition 
of ad  hoc adjustments m the face of refutations to elements in the Ricardian theory of 
economic growth (Blaug 1992 65) According to Blaug, Mill ‘saved’ Ricardian theory 
"by adopting various ‘immunizing stratagems,’ of which the chief one was to empty 
the appropriate cetens panbus clauses of whatever specific content they may once 
have had" (Blaug 1992 65) Blaug listed the anomalies to the Ricardian theory of 
economic growth which were well-known at the time at which Mill was writing 
Pnnciples (Blaug 1986) The decline m the birth rate from the 1820s onward, falsified 
Malthus’ hypothesis that higher money wages would result m a higher rate of 
population growth (Blaug 1986 95) It was also apparent at the time, that in spite of 
the persistence of the com laws, the price of com was declining (Blaug 1986 105) 
Despite these recorded refutations of the Ricardian theory of economic growth, Mill’s 
Pnnciples "retained the Ricardian system without qualifications" (Blaug 1992 65) For 
Blaug, as a falsificatiomst, this failure to reject the Ricardian system can only be 
interpreted as a degenerative move
Blaug argued that Mill, "having defended the Malthusian theory of population as 
analytically ‘correct, ’ was forced to concede that the census reports did not uphold 
the theory" (Blaug 1986 99) In terms of Mill’s methodology, however, such an 
acknowledgement would not involve the rejection of the theory The divergence of the 
abstract laws from empirical observation do not indicate that the abstract laws are
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false, but rather that they may require modification m the light of hitherto unsuspected 
economic disturbing causes, or that there are non-economic disturbing causes which 
prevent the abstract laws explaining fully the observed phenomenon De Marchi 
conceded that Mill was not always concerned with the elucidation of the disturbing 
causes "It cannot be said that Mill always attempted to test his theory against the 
facts Mill was sometimes willing to live with a gap between his deductive theory and 
the facts" (de Marchi 1970 272) With respect to international trade theory, Mill 
considered the impact on the two country/two commodity model of removing the 
initial assumptions "Those who are accustomed to any kind of scientific investigation 
will probably see, without formal proof, that the introduction of these circumstances 
cannot alter the theory of the subject" (Mill 1892 399)
Mill argued that transportation costs may change the international price ratio between 
two countries for two goods, but it will not prevent an international price ratio bemg 
established (Mill 1892 400) He also argued that the principle of reciprocal demand 
would still hold in a multi-good model "the exports of each country must exactly pay 
for the imports, meamng now the aggregate exports and imports the thmgs supplied 
by England to Germany will be completely paid for, and no more, by those supplied 
by Germany to England This accordingly will be the ratio in which the produce of 
English and the produce of German labour will exchange for one another" (Mill 
1892 400) Nor, Mill argued, would the extention of the model to a multi-country 
model have any impact on the principle (Mill 1892 401) Thus, in the case of the
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conclusions of international trade theory, Mill held there to be no disturbing causes 
One must conclude from this, that Mill believed the static theory of international trade 
which he developed, to explain fully the empirical facts
Implicit in Mill’s static theory and its extensions, is the assumption of a labour theory 
of value This was how Mill was able to show a mutual gam from mtemational trade 
Without some assumption of proportionality between price and cost, it becomes 
impossible to argue as a logical consequence of the model that there are mutual gams 
from trade, or that the patterns of international trade is determined by differences in 
the relative cost of production across countries (Steedman and Metcalfe 1979 99)
In a methodology like instrumentalism, which is wholly concerned with prediction, 
the (Veracity of initial assumptions like the labour theory of value is irrelevant This is 
the point argued by Friedman, in the Methodology o f Positive Economics (Friedman
1984) Mill, however, purported to be concerned, in his applied  political economy, 
with explanation It was to this end that he advocated the elucidation of the disturbing 
causes to the principles of abstract political economy Despite this methodological 
instruction, Mill himself made no attempt to analyse the impact on the static theory of 
mtemational trade, of removmg the assumption of a labour theory of value In the 
case of international trade, it seems that Mill was indeed "willing to live with a gap 
between his deductive theory and the facts" (de Marchi 1970 272) Thus, the static 
theory of international trade as developed by Ricardo and Mill, is unprogressive
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according, not only to falsificatiomsm, but also to Mill’s own methodology
Most of the classical political economists continued to make an exception of 
international trade theory "Economists who in general would deny that prices are 
necessarily proportional to labor costs may have fallen back on the labor cost formula 
when expounding the theory of international trade because of the aid this formula 
provides m avoiding - or evadmg - serious logical difficulties m appraismg from a 
welfare point of view the consequences of trade" (Viner 1955 491) Eventually, a real 
cost alternative to the labour theory of value was established, which was in essence, 
nothing more than "a strong presumption of rough proportionality between market 
prices and real costs" (Viner 1955 491) According to Viner, the following 
methodological rule was adopted "propositions which depend for their validity on the 
existence of such rough proportionality are not for that reason to be regarded as 
invalid unless and until evidence is produced tending to show that in the particular 
situation under examination no such approach to proportionality between prices and 
real costs exists" (Vmer 1955 491) Since classical theorists were not predisposed to 
searching for instances in which proportionality fails to hold, this methodological rule 
amounts to little more than a warrant to ignore gaps between deduced theory and the 
facts
This is not meant to suggest that classical international trade theorists ignored 
empirical facts, but rather to point out that little attempt was made to analyse the
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relationship between the static theory and the facts For example, Ohlin was later to 
express his surprise at finding "a chapter in Bastable [1887] dealing with the 
international movements of capital, without a smgle word bemg said to explam how 
far these movements affect the fundamental arguments of the foregomg chapters," 
which dealt with the static theory of international trade (Ohlin 1933 589) The static 
theory continued to be developed in the late nineteenth century, but the empirical facts 
of international trade were analysed in a looser framework which was closer to 
Smith’s dynamic theory of international trade This juxtaposition of two distinct 
methodologies without any attempt at integration, is obvious m Marshall’s analysis of 
international trade
In a neoclassical reconstruction, it is Marshall’s geometric interpretation of Mill’s 
principle of reciprocal demand which would be given prominence m a discussion of 
the importance of Marshall m the development of international trade theory 
Marshall’s offer curve analysis of the principle of reciprocal demand was developed 
between 1869 and 1873, and was published privately m 1879, m a paper, The Pure 
Theory o f  International Trade Marshall later published a revised version of this 
paper, as an appendix in his Money, Credit and Commerce (1923) Marshall placed 
most of his geometric and algebraic analyses in the appendices of his major texts, lest 
these techniques "lead us astray in pursuit of intellectual toys, imaginary problems not 
conforming to the conditions of real life" (Marshall 1925 84)
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Along with most of the latter classical political economists, Marshall replaced the 
Ricardian labour theory of value with a real cost theory Marshall abandoned Semor’s 
notion of capital as abstinence from consumption with the notion of ‘waiting’ or 
delayed consumption (Roll 1962 397) His real cost theory was therefore just as 
subjective as that adopted by Semor (Roll 1962 402) The Marshallian synthesis 
preserved the Ricardian notion of a tendency for the price of factors to equal their 
marginal productivity in the long run "interest would tend to be identical with the 
marginal sacrifice involved in saving, wages with the marginal disutility of effort" 
(Roll 1962 401) This, Marshall coupled with a neoclassical analysis of demand
The debt which Marshall owed to Mill, in his analysis of demand and supply, is 
exemplified by Marshall’s geometrical development of the principle of reciprocal 
demand In Marshall’s model, the terms of trade are determined by the rates at which 
the umts of productive power, or "bales," of one country exchange for those of the 
other (Marshall 1923 330) Taking two countries, England and Germany, Marshall 
outlined a table of the number of bales England would sacrifice m order to obtain a 
specific number of "G bales," and vice versa (Marshall 1923 330) The rate of 
increase of England’s offer of its bales m respect of a constant increase of German 
bales offered, initially mcreases and then falls The same is true in respect of 
Germany’s offer of bales to England
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Marshall transformed this table into a graphic representation of the two countries’ 
offer of bales, namely, the offer curves of each (Marshall 1923 331) G bales are 
represented on the y-axis, and E bales on the x-axis The decline m the rate of 
increase of bales offered for exchange produces an mtersection of the two offer 
curves This is the geometric representation of Mill’s equilibrium international price 
ratio
Marshall measured the gam from trade in terms of the surplus amount of bales 
embodied in the exports a country would have been willing to exchange, for the 
amount that country actually imports at its equilibrium terms of trade This is an 
application of Marshall’s notion of consumer surplus to trading countries "the surplus 
is the greater, the more urgent is G’s demand for a small amount of E ’s goods and the 
more of them she can receive without any great movement of the rate of interchange 
in her favour" (Marshall 1923 339-340) The gams from trade are measured, 
therefore, by the relative slopes of the offer curves of the trading partners In fact, 
Marshall overestimated the extent of the gam, since he assumed the trading partner’s 
offer curve to remain unchanged whether the country exchanges exports determined 
by the equilibrium terms of trade, or exchanges the maximum amount of exports it is 
willing to exchange (Vmer 1955 541-546)
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The slope of each offer curve is a reflection of the elasticity of demand of one 
country for the products of the other "if E has some important exports which are 
nearly mdispensible to G, while G has none which are nearly dispensible to E, then 
OG  will be nearly vertical m the neighbourhood of O  [the ongm], but OE will not be 
nearly horizontal in the neighbourhood of O" (Marshall 1923 332) Marshall held that 
under the "ordinary (or ‘normal’) conditions of international trade neither country is 
m urgent need of the greater part of her imports from the other, and the demand of 
each is very elastic m the neighbourhood of the equilibrium point" (Marshall 
1923 332) In normal cases, each point on one country’s offer curve (each offer of 
bales) will correspond to a single point on the trading partner’s offer curve, in spite of 
any difference m the slopes of the two offer curves (Marshall 1923 332) Abnormal 
cases, where there are two possible corresponding points on the trading partner’s offer 
curve, occur where the trading goods are subject to "exceptional demand" or to 
"exceptional supply" (Marshall 1923 332) Exceptional demand, Marshall defined as 
the case where "the markets of a country for foreign wares may be so inelastic as to 
be completely glutted by moderate supplies, in so much that any further increase of 
the supplies, forced on the market, will compel them to be sold for a diminished 
aggregate return" (Marshall 1923 333) The case of exceptional supply is that where 
the produce of one of the tradmg partners is subject to mcreasmg returns to scale
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Marshall’s attempt at incorporating the case of ‘exceptional supply’ mto his static, 
geometric representation, was essentially an attempt to integrate his static and dynamic 
discussions of international trade Marshall’s dynamic theory of mtemational trade did 
away with Smith’s notion of a vent-for-surplus Marshall argued instead that absolute 
advantage would depend on the size of the home market
No country has ever attained leadership m manufacture for export, without 
previously developmg manufacture on a rather large scale for domestic 
consumption but the export trade affords exceptional opportunities for 
dealmg on a large scale, and this, in turn, tends to promote manufacture on a 
large scale (Marshall 1923 351)
In Marshall’s theory, therefore, a country will have realised increasing returns to a 
particular good p n o r  to the introduction of international trade This will give an 
indicator of that country’s absolute advantage, before mtemational trade is established 
This differs from Smith’s dynamic theory, where mtemational trade generates the 
division of labour, which in turn creates an absolute advantage
In Marshall’s theory, the realisation of increasing returns to scale would increase the 
"content of the bales" of the country (Marshall 1923 354) This would have no impact 
on the offer curve of the country, but rather would affect the slope of the offer curve
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of the trading partner (Marshall 1923 354) The result of the realisation of increasing 
returns by one country would be that "the other country may be willing to take an 
increased number of them [bales] at a rate of interchange which is nominally (though 
not really) less favourable to her" (Marshall 1923 354) As the extent of increasing 
returns realised by one country increases, the offer curve of the trading partner will 
change slope There may be a decrease m the number of bales which the trading 
partner is willing to trade, for any given number of bales offered This decrease 
causes the offer curve to become negatively sloped, and m turn, generates more than 
one point of intersection with the offer curve of the first country Marshall’s inability 
to show which of these intersections would be a stable equilibrium led him to conclude 
that "[djiagrams representing the case o f  Exceptional Supply, in which the exports o f a 
country show strong general tendencies to Increasing Return, are deprived o f  practical 
interest by the inapplicability o f  the Statical method to such tendencies" (Marshall 
1923 354)
Marshall’s attempt to integrate some dynamic aspects into the static theory of trade, 
although it failed, marks a departure from other classical political economists who 
simply ignored the gaps between the two theories Marshall’s analysis of the case of 
exceptional supply could be interpreted in terms of Mill’s methodology as as an 
attempt to modify the static, abstract theory of international trade, in the face of an 
important disturbing cause
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Although unable to handle increasing returns within the confines of the two 
country/two commodity model, this did not prevent Marshall from dealmg with 
increasing returns withm the dynamic theory of international trade Marshall 
recognised the effect of specialisation m the export of agricultural produce on 
economic growth - "the more America exported her raw produce in return for 
manufactures, the less the benefit she got from the Law of Increasing Return (îe that 
manufacture on a large scale is more economical than on a small)" (Marshall 
1925 261) This is the first hint of a recogmtion that, where there are decreasing 
returns to scale, it may, contrary to the conclusion implicit m the static theory, matter 
where a country’s comparative advantage lies "It was to England’s sagacity and good 
fortune m seizing hold of those industries in which the Law of Increasing Return 
applies most strongly, that she owed in a great measure her leading position m 
commerce and industry" (Marshall 1925 266) Marshall did not, however, attempt to 
reconcile this conclusion to the static theory
Rather than use this argument in support of protection, Marshall used it to show that 
free trade was in fact still preferable to protection in the case of America He argued 
that if America had not used protectiomst policies to build up a specialism m 
agriculture, its absolute advantage in certain artisan skills could have been developed, 
allowing America to benefit from increasing returns to scale (Marshall 1925 261) 
Marshall showed that the existence of increasing returns m manufacture reinforced
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List’s arguments m favour of a temporary policy of protection m certain circumstances 
(Marshall 1925 258) However, he argued that protection should not be relied upon 
indefinitely He pomted to the mismanagement and corruption which, for him, are 
inevitable consequences of a protectiomst regime Marshall’s conclusion that free 
trade is not universally beneficial but is better than corrupt protectiomsm, is similar to 
Krugman’s (1987) argument that free trade, while it cannot be universally defended as 
optimal, is a second-best policy m the light of such outcomes as retaliation
Marshall’s method was strongly influenced by Mill It was Marshall who mtroduced 
the ceteris panbus clause as a method of abstractmg from disturbing causes (Marshall 
1920 366) He was aware of the implications of such abstraction "The more the issue 
is thus narrowed, the more exactly can it be handled but also the less closely does it 
correspond to real life" (Marshall 1920 366) Marshall stressed the importance of 
making exact statements m the abstract, but at the same tune, loosemng these 
arguments in order that they reflect reality "With each step exact discussions can be 
made less abstract, realistic discussions can be made less exact than was possible at an 
earlier stage" (Marshall 1920 366) The importance which Marshall placed upon this 
loosemng of the abstract models of political economy is reflected in his tendency to 
place all mathematical formulations into appendices
In respect of the static theory of international trade, Marshall was more involved in 
the development of techniques of analysis rather than in the generation of novel facts
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The facts derived from his offer curve analysis - a country’s terms of trade varies 
directly with its elasticity of demand for imports, the more elastic the demand for 
imports, the greater the volume of international trade, tariff retaliation eliminates the 
gams from trade - are all to be found in Mill, although in a less technical form While 
Marshall was engaged in normal science m the static theory of international trade, he 
did produce novel facts in respect of the dynamic theory of international trade, 
principally, in his implication that where there are mcreasing returns to scale it does 
matter m which goods a country’s absolute advantage lies This argument, m turn, 
provided a justification for temporary protection, provided this protection serves to 
build up the industry m which a country has an absolute advantage
Marshall’s failure to incorporate increasing returns into his static model of 
mtemational trade brought a warning on the limitations of the static method of 
analysis This is not a limitation of which other classical political economists remamed 
unaware "This assertion [comparative cost] is only true if all retarding elements - all 
those hindrances which arise from cost of carriage and customs duties - are neglected, 
and then only if the inquiry is confined to two countries" (Bastable 1897 16) Bastable 
argued that, while the principle of comparative advantage proposed some unexpected 
predictions, these are in fact "exceptional cases "(Bastable 1897 19) The more usual 
basis for international trade, Bastable argued as the case where a country "is able to 
procure commodities which it is absolutely unable to produce itself - tropical spices
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furnish a good example" (Bastable 1897 19)
Classical political economists recogmsed the predictive strength of the static theory of 
international trade, but they were also aware of the disturbing causes to the theory 
Few held Mill’s view that the propositons of the static theory remain unaffected by the 
removal of its limiting assumptions They elucidated the disturbing causes to the static 
theory, and then proceeded to analyse international trade and to address the policy 
debate over free trade versus protection in terms of absolute advantage, as Ricardo 
had done (A good example of the failure to make use of the static theory of 
international trade in respect of policy issues is Cannes’ essay, Fragments on Ireland, 
1873)
The limitations to the static theory allowed for the persistence of two theories of 
international trade, the static theory developed by Ricardo and Mill, and the dynamic 
theory begun by Smith These two theories contmued to be developed in tandem, until 
the 1930s when the static theory began to dominate analysis of international trade The 
next chapter considers the development of the static theory of international trade, 
focusing specifically on the attempts to incorporate into this static theory, the 
phenomena of increasing returns and product differentiation
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CHAPTER SIX
THE TREATMENT OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUB-DISCIPLINE
6 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
SUB-DISCIPLINE AND THE GREATER NEOCLASSICAL RESEARCH 
PROGRAMME
By the turn of the century, two dominant theories of trade existed - the dynamic 
Smithian theory of absolute advantage, and the static Ricardian theory of comparative 
advantage The Smithian theory was an attempt to analyse the role of international 
trade in the context of economic growth and development The Ricardian theory 
focused on the effects of international trade on economic welfare Within the static 
theory, there was a period of heuristic refinement which began with Marshall’s offer 
curves, and was continued by Edgeworth, Lemer and Leontief among others, in the 
early part of this century However, few empirically corroborated novel facts were 
produced out of this new mathematical analysis of international trade
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Despite this, the static theory of international trade came to dominate analyses of 
international trade, culminating in the ‘Samuelson shift’ in the 1940s, where static 
analysis took over completely The extent to which static theory came to dommate the 
analysis of international trade theory, in spite of the lack of empirically corroborated 
novel facts, is an mdicator of the importance trade theorists have placed on heuristic 
as opposed to empirical progress One could argue that their choice is essentially a 
Lakatosian one that, out of heuristic strength should come predictive power This 
chapter examines the attempts of international trade theorists to derive the predictions 
of the dynamic theory of international trade from their static framework Specifically, 
it deals with the attempt to incorporate increasing returns and product differentiation 
into the static theory
Different fields of economic inquiry can be linked in a fundamental way Remenyi 
(1979) explored the nature of these links by modifying MSRP, mto what he called, 
"the theory of core demi-core interaction" (Remenyi 1979 33) Remenyi argued that 
there is a single research programme m economics - the neoclassical research 
programme All branches of applied economics he referred to as "sub-disciplines", 
each of which has its own "demi-core" (Remenyi 1979 33) These sub-disciplmes are 
m essence mim-programmes - "[t]he demi-core is to the sub-disciplme what the hard 
core is to the SRP [in this case, the neoclassical research programme]" (Remenyi 
1979 33) These sub-disciplmes sit m the protective belt of the neoclassical
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programme where they are classified as either progressive or degenerative to the 
neoclassical programme Thus, the demi-core of a sub-disciplme is not fixed, and can 
"drift into open conflict with the hard core" (Remenyi 1979 34) In the case of 
conflict, Remenyi cited the defence mechamsms of the negative heuristic of the 
research programme The "oversight principle" alerts theorists to anomalies arising in 
the sub-disciplines, a kind of early warning system (Remenyi 1979 35) On the 
discovery of anomaly, two mechamsms are put into action The "Errant Hypothesis" 
(the academic response) attempts to disprove the anomaly (Remenyi 1979 35) The 
EH mvolves "critical research to evaluate the attack and if possible demonstrate the 
source of ’error’" (Remenyi 1979 35) The "Institutional Response will operate to 
isolate the heretics from the mainstream of the discipline" (Remenyi 1979 35)
According to Remenyi, the positive heuristics of the neoclassical programme permeate 
every part of the entire system of sub-disciplines "In almost messiamc fashion they 
direct economists to go out and preach the dictates of the hard core in every 
conceivable field of political economy” (Remenyi 1979 47) The positive heuristics 
produce a "Bravado Impulse", in that economists are "blind to the prospect that 
anomalies might be encountered" (Remenyi 1979 36) Allied to this is an "Absorptive 
Reaction" which is "the natural tendency to absorb into an SRP all core-supporting 
facts and knowledge, plus the equally natural propensity to learn" (Remenyi 1979 36)
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Perhaps not surprisingly, Remenyi’s methodology bears the hallmarks of Mill’s 
methodology The neoclassical research programme constitutes the abstract laws 
outlined by Mill The protective belt is the application of these laws The disturbing 
causes do not allow the abstract laws to be rejected m  Remenyi’s methodology, it is 
the negative heuristic which prevents rejection of the propositions of the neoclassical 
hard core The m a m  difference is that in Mill’s methodology there is scope for the 
modification of the abstract laws in the face of disturbing causes, although in respect 
of international trade theory, Mill seemed reluctant to make such modifications (see 
chapter 5 3) In Remenyi’s methodology, on the other hand, the negative heuristic 
appears to protect the neoclassical hard core indefinitely
Remenyi’s modification makes it easier to elucidate the links between the international 
trade sub-discipline and other fields of economic research The static and dynamic 
theories of international trade can be redefmed as elements within the international 
trade sub-discipline And this sub-discipline can be analysed m  terms of its 
dependence on the neoclassical hard core and heuristics This analysis sheds much 
light on the rise to dominance within the sub-discipline, of the static theory of 
international trade
In Remenyi’s methodology, no sub-disciplme can be independent of neoclassical 
heuristics without being classified as a degenerative element in the protective belt of
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the neoclassical programme This raises the question, was the international trade 
sub-disciplme ever independent of these neoclassical heuristics Did the international 
trade sub-disciplme ever constitute a degenerative element m  the neoclassical research 
programme9 To answer this, it is necessary to delineate the hard core and the 
heuristics of the neoclassical programme, and to assess their impact on the 
development of international trade theory
There have been several outlines of the neoclassical programme (eg Backhouse 1988, 
Weintraub 1985,1988, and Remenyi 1979) The following is not intended as an 
exhaustive list of neoclassical characteristics, but it provides the most important 
features given the context of this analysis
H C 1  Consumers have rational preferences
H C 2  Producers seek to maximise profits
HC 3  "Choices are made in interrelated markets" (Weintraub 1988 214)
H C 4  Perfect competition is allocationally optimal
H C 5  "Stable Pareto-efficient equilibrium solutions can be defined for any and all
markets relevant to economic research and analysis" (Remenyi 1979 59)
The neoclassical programme contains the following heuristics
\
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PHI Construct models in which an equilibrium exists
PH2 "Test equilibrium for stability, if it is unstable search for the stable solution"
(Remenyi 1979 60)
PH3 Investigate how economic systems shift from one equilibrium position to 
another
PH4 "Always act on the premise that economic welfare is a direct function of
economic efficieny and that social welfare is a direct function of economic 
welfare" (Remenyi 1979 60)
N H 1  Do not test the propositions of the neoclassical hard core
In addition to the above, a number of auxiliary assumptions are required to uphold the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium solution (Latsis 1972)
A A 1  Both producers and consumers have perfect knowledge 
A A 2  There is freedom of entry and exit onto all markets 
A A 3  Products in industries are homogeneous
The link between the Ricardian model of trade and neoclassical methodology is 
obvious The Ricardian model led, for example, to the hunt by Mill and Marshall, in 
the last century, for the conditions of a stable competitive trading equilibrium The 
Ricardian model was expanded into a general equilibrium model with the inclusion of
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the factor proportions theorem by Ohlin The search for the stability conditions 
persisted, through the work of Samuelson, until the late 1960s As Wemtraub has 
pointed out, however, the neoclassical hard core and heuristics outlmed above only 
’hardened’m  the 1950s, with the elucidation of the proof for stable, Pareto-efficient 
equilibria (Wemtraub 1985 112) One would expect therefore that each step m  the 
hardemng process of the neoclassical hard core would send shock-waves through the 
sub-disciplmes of its protective belt In the case of the international trade 
sub-disciplme, however, the demi-core remained virtually unchanged from the end of 
the classical period until the late 1970s
DC1 Patterns of international trade are explamed by pre-trade comparative cost 
differences between countries 
D C 2  Free trade maximises the overall welfare for tradmg partners 
DC 3  The equilibrium level of international trade is determined by the interaction of 
international demand and supply for traded goods
The development of the general equilibrium methodology durmg the marginalist 
revolution, posed no methodological problem for the static theory of international 
trade which had always been presented in terms of a (mcomplete) general equilibrium 
model The static theory adopted the new methodology with little problem, 
substituting the problematic real cost assumption with the concept of opportunity cost 
(Haberler 1930) The search for stable equilibria had been a focus of international
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trade since Mill’s determination of the international terms of trade Marshall showed 
the conditions for stable equilibrium m  his offer curve analysis The dynamic theory 
of mtemational trade could not, by definition, be subsumed into this static framework, 
although there were a few attempts to incorporate dynamic aspects of international 
trade into the static, general equilibrium theory
This chapter is concerned with the attempts to explain international trade under 
increasing returns to scale and/or product differentiation within the neoclassical 
tradition, and specifically with the constraints imposed upon the sub-discipline by the 
heuristics of the neoclassical programme m  this respect Section 6 2 is concerned with 
the treatment of increasing returns and product differentiation by trade theorists prior 
to the publication of Robinson’s and Chamberlin’s theories of competition Section 
6 3 assesses the impact of Robinson’s and Chamberlin’s theories on the neoclassical 
tradition Section 6 4 examines the impact of these theories on the International trade 
sub-discipline during its ’Samuelson shift’
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6 2 T H E  E A R L Y  T R E A T M E N T  O F  I M P E R F E C T  C O M P E T I T I O N  WI T H I N  
T H E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  T R A D E  SUB-DISCIPLINE
As was shown in chapter 5 3, Marshall attempted to incorporate mcreasmg returns to 
scale mto his static offer curve analysis of international trade, but found it impossible 
to establish a stable equilibrium where two countries’ offer curves mtersected more 
than once
Marshall attempted to derive a method of dealmg with mcreasmg returns to scale m  a 
way that would be compatible with perfect competition The problem was to show that 
a cost advantage realised by individual firms within an industry would not lead, 
ultimately, to monopoly Marshall argued the existence of mcreasmg returns to scale 
which are external to individual firms, but which are internal to the industry as a 
whole
The economic use of expensive machinery can sometimes be attained in very 
high degree in a district m  which there is a large aggregate production of the 
same kind, even though no individual capital employed m  the trade be very 
large (Marshall 1920 271)
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In the case, then, of external economies, a single firm cannot realise increasing 
returns to scale, and the perfectly competitive equilibrium is preserved Marshall’s 
definition of external economies has been widely used by international trade theorists 
as a way of incorporating increasing returns into the static theory, although Marshall 
himself did not incorporate external economies into his offer curve analysis
The difficulties inherent m  the incorporation of mcreasing returns into the static theory 
of international trade were elucidated in the debate between Graham (1923,1925) and 
Knight (1924,1925)
In Graham’s model there are two countries, A  and B  A  has a comparative advantage 
m  the manufacture of watches, produced under mcreasmg returns B has a 
comparative advantage in wheat, produced under decreasing returns Using this 
model, Graham attempted to show that, where there are non-constant returns to scale, 
it may, contrary to the implication in Ricardo’s theory, matter a great deal where a 
country’s comparative advantage lies Marshall had hinted at this novel fact in his 
analysis of the pattern of international trade between America and England (see 
chapter 5 3) This problem with the prediction of mutual gams from trade, in the face 
of decreasing returns to scale, was largely ignored by subsequent trade theorists until 
the mid 1980s, when it became the focus of attention m  work on strategic trade 
policy
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Graham argued that the opening up of trade would, according to comparative 
advantage, force B to specialise m  wheat production, and this specialisation in a 
decreasing returns industry could result in welfare losses for B
It may well be disadvantageous for a nation to concentrate m  production of 
commodities of increasing cost despite a comparative advantage m  those 
lines, it will the more probably be disadvantageous to do so if the world 
demand for goods produced at decreasing cost is growing m  volume more 
rapidly than that for goods produced at mcreasmg cost, while at the same 
tune competition m  the supply of the former grows relatively less intense as 
compared with competition m  the supply of the latter (Graham 1923 213)
Knight argued that Graham failed to specify the nature of the mcreasmg returns in the 
watch industry He pomted out that if the mcreasmg returns are mtemal to specific 
firms, then the pre-trade production of watches m  B  would be monopolistic prior to 
the opening up of trade And m  this case, Knight argued, there would be no reason to 
suppose that, after trade, B ’s watch-maker should lose the economies of scale he 
realised before trade was established He pomted out that in the event of 
non-reversible mcreasmg returns to scale, there would be no incentive for this 
watch-maker to switch into the production of wheat after trade Knight concluded as 
Marshall had done that where the watch industry is subject to internal mcreasmg
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returns to scale, the pattern of international trade is indeterminate The argument for 
protection cannot be justified
Knight conceded that, under an assumption of external economies, Graham’s 
conclusion holds (Knight 1924 331) The argument for protection would seem to be 
validated However, Knight questioned the empirical validity of this assumption He 
insisted that, m  order to validate his conclusion about protection, Graham had to first 
establish "that in a significant proportion of cases industry really operates under 
decreasing cost, without tending towards monopoly, the case of monopoly being 
expressly excepted" (Knight 1924 331) Knight also considered the theoretical validity 
of the external economies assumption He argued that although one industry might
y
display external economies, this must be as a result of internal economies elsewhere m  
the system The implication of Knight’s argument is that only a partial analysis of 
trade under increasing returns is possible
Marshall identified what could be interpreted as an anomaly to the principle of 
comparative costs, namely the mutual exchange between countries of goods 
categorised withm the same mdustnal classification
Belgian steel on its way to England, often crosses English steel on its way to 
Belgium, but the consignments are likely to be of different qualities, and to
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be used for different purposes (Marshall 1923 104)
Several years later, Taussig investigated the extent of "cross trade" in the U S  trade of 
iron and steel (Taussig 1931 191) Taussig found cross trade to exist between 
developed countries across many industries "[W]e fmd the perplexing phenomenon 
that commodities apparently of the same sort are both brought mto the country and 
sent out from it Cotton goods, woolens, silks, iron manufactures are among both the 
exports and the imports of the Umted Kingdom (Taussig 1931 191) The puzzle for 
Marshall and for Taussig was in finding an explanation for this pattern of trade which 
did not contradict the comparative cost proposition of the demi-core Accordmg to the 
Ricardian principle of comparative advantage, countries would specialise m  industries 
in which they had a pre-trade comparative cost advantage Where two countries had 
pre-trade comparative cost advantages in the same industry, then the principle predicts 
that there would be no trade between them Cross trade appears to be an empirical 
refutation of the Ricardian demi-core proposition
Both Marshall and Taussig related this type of trade to product differentiation The 
implication was that where industries are composed of differentiated products, then 
each of these differentiated products involves a different production function If one 
adhered to the traditional, classical method of identifying industries as composed of 
firms which are close substitutes m  production rather than in consumption, then a 
smgle industry composed of differentiated goods could be redefined as a number of
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separate industries Under this definition, the pattern of international trade could still 
be determined by pre-trade comparative cost differences For example, Taussig 
considered the case of cross trade between America and Germany m  sewmg machines 
He argued that while America had an advantage in the production of mass-produced 
standardised sewmg machines, Germany had an advantage in the production of 
specialised machines (Taussig 1931 199) These advantages stemmed from the 
different factors and technology necessary to both types of machme, so that this cross 
trade can be reinterpreted as mter-industry trade
Ohlin raised the possibility that international trade might be determined by consumer 
preferences "English and Czek boots for ordinary wear cannot be called identical, nor 
can one say that the former are ’worth’, for example, 10 percent more than the latter 
If their price is 10 percent higher, a certain number of people will prefer one kmd and 
the rest the other If the price increases to 20 percent some people will contmue to buy 
English boots, if it disappears others will still contmue to buy English boots" (Ohlin 
1933 95) Even if England has no comparative advantage in the production of boots, 
international demand will ensure that this industry survives Ohlin clearly recogmsed 
the impact this hypothesis has on the underlymg assumptions of the static theory "It 
has hitherto been assumed that a country will export things it can make cheaper than 
other countries and import the rest That statement clearly assumes that the goods are 
identical in quality, as soon as this condition changes the relationship between prices
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There is, however, no suggestion by Ohlin that trade determined by consumer 
preferences could conflict with the comparative advantage proposition, nor, indeed, 
any suggestion that it could conflict with Ohlin’s factor proportions explanation for 
comparative advantage In this regard, Ohlin was guilty of the same neglect of which 
he accused Bastable, namely, a disregard for the impact of empirical facts on the 
theory of international trade (Ohlin 1933 589)
Ohlm was more explicit in defimng the relationship between increasing returns to 
scale, comparative advantage and the factor proportions theorem He argued that 
mcreasing returns provided an explanation for pre-trade comparative cost differences 
between countries, that was an alternative to his own factor proportions theory (Ohlm 
1933 106) Thus, where two countries have identical factor proportions there may still 
be trade between them, if one country has a pre-trade comparative cost advantage 
arising out of the realisation of increasing returns Inter-mdustry specialisation will in 
this case depend on the relative extent to which increasing returns have been realised 
across countries (There is a clear link between Ohlin’s conclusions on mcreasmg 
returns and comparative advantage, and those of Lmder (1961), see chapter 7 2)
In respect of his analysis on trade within regions, Ohlm took this argument a stage 
further, and concluded that even in the case where there are no pre-trade comparative
and international trade becomes more complicated" (Ohlin 1933 95)
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cost differences between regions, international trade may still be an outcome if 
increasing returns exist (Ohlin 1933 54) This international trade would be prompted, 
not by the existence of mcreasmg returns m  one part of a region, but by recogmtion of 
the potential of mcreasmg returns for whichever part of the region is most successful 
in extending its market through trade (Ohlin 1933 54)
Ohlin noted that, in this case, an equilibrium pattern of trade is indeterminate "The 
character of this trade will be entirely a matter of chance, if factor equipment is 
everywhere the same, for it is of no consequence whether a certain region specialises 
in one commodity or another" (Ohlin 1933 55) This novel prediction clearly conflicts 
with the prediction of comparative advantage The novelty of Ohlm’s prediction was 
overlooked by subsequent trade theorists who stressed the importance of Ohlm’s 
incorporation of Heckscher’s factor proportions theorem into a Casselian-type general 
equilibrium model of international trade Yet, like Marshall, Ohlin had placed his 
static analysis of international trade m  an appendix to his text
The failure to derive a model of international trade based on the potential for 
mcreasmg returns, is indicative of the growing links between welfare theory and the 
static theory of mtemational trade during the 1930s
Developments in the static theory during this period were mamly to do with 
developments of the techniques of analysis These techniques allowed the movement
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towards a competitive trading equilibrium to be geometrically shown Haberler 
mtroduced the concept of opportunity cost mto the static model (Haberler 1930) This 
allowed for the techniques of welfare theory to be fully incorporated mto the static 
model of international trade Haberler derived the production possibilities frontier, 
and in 1933, Leontief provided a proof of the derivation of a community indifference 
curve from individual indifference curves In addition, Leontief derived Marshallian 
offer curves from community indifference curves, thus providing a link between the 
standard tools of analysis in both sub-disciplines During this period, the static theory 
began to dominate in explanations of patterns of international trade
Lemer considered the existence and stability of a trading equilibrium under mcreasmg 
returns (Lemer 1932,1934) He constructed a composite "production indifference 
curve", which gave the production potential m  a two-country/two-good model (Lemer 
1932 331) Lemer did extend his analysis to the case where both goods are subject to 
mcreasmg returns He concluded that the only stable trading equilibrium under 
increasing returns would be where each country would become an international 
monopolist m  the production of a smgle good (Lemer 1932 332) In the case where 
only one good was subject to mcreasmg returns, the country with the comparative 
advantage in the production of this good would specialise completely, since there 
would be no incentive for domestic producers to specialise in the non-increasmg 
returns good The other country would, Lemer argued, remain diversified (Lemer 
1932 331) Lemer’s predictions as to the outcome of international trade in the static
239
model under increasing returns were generally upheld until the ’new theories of 
international trade’ of the late 1970s and early 1980s It was not until this time that the 
models of imperfect competition outlined by Robinson (1932) and Chamberlin (1933) 
had any significant impact on the static theory of international trade
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6 3 T H E  N E O C L A S S I C A L  THEORIES O F  I M P E R F E C T  A N D
M O N O P O L I S T I C  COMP E T I T I O N
Marshall had sought to reconcile the notion of increasing returns and the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium by establishing the phenomenon of external economies The 
introduction of external economies had two benefits It provided a "safeguard against 
the common error of assummg that wherever increasing returns operate there is 
necessarily an effective tendency towards monopoly" (Young 1928 527) It also 
simplified "the analysis of the manner m  which the prices of commodities produced 
under conditions of mcreasing returns are determined" (Young 1928 528) However, 
Marshall failed to show how external economies might arise in actuality
In England, there was a much greater attachment to the neoclassical, static method 
initiated by Ricardo and developed by Marshall, than m  Germany or m  America Yet, 
it was from Cambridge, England, that the most dramatic critique of the neoclassical 
theory of competition was to come Sraffa argued that increasing returns, no matter 
how defined, could not be made compatible with competitive equilibrium (Sraffa 
1926 196) However, he also held that mcreasing returns introduced into a 
competitive structure need not necessarily lead to the establishment of a monopoly
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Sraffa held that each firm could influence the price it charged through product 
differentiation and m  this way would prevent a firm with competitive advantages in 
the form of increasing returns from establishing an equilibrium Sraffa called these 
industries which displayed both product differentiation and (internal) increasing 
returns "multiple monopolies" (Sraffa 1926 195) He held that product differentiation 
would produce an equilibrium, but that the relationship between price and cost would 
vary across firms in the industry "The conclusion that the equilibrium is m  general 
determinate does not mean that generalising statements can be made regarding the 
price corresponding to that equilibrium, it may be different in the case of each 
undertaking, and is dependent to a great extent upon the special conditions affecting 
it" (Sraffa 1926 195) Sraffa presented an obvious challenge to competition theorists, 
namely to establish the conditions for equilibrium in mdustries that were multiple 
monopolies
Robinson’s The Economics o f  Imperfect Competition (1933), was a work which was 
firmly in the neoclassical welfare theory tradition Robmson was concerned, not with 
firm behaviour, but with the allocation of resources under non-competitive equilibria 
She was concerned to protect the demi-core proposition of the welfare sub-disciplme 
which states that perfect competition is an optimal, albeit mythical, system of resource 
allocation Imperfect competition was so-called because it is sub-optimal In order to 
show how imperfect competition failed to produce optimal allocation, Robmson
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devised a model whose assumptions differed from perfect competition m  only one 
respect In Robinson’s model of imperfect competition, consumers perceive some 
difference in the goods produced by firms m  the same industry Removing the 
assumption of perfect elasticity of substitution between products produced a downward 
slopmg demand curve In order to preserve the concept of industry, Robinson had to 
assume that all firms in her industry have identical production functions In 
Robinson’s model, there is therefore no actual product differentiation
Yet, if there is no product differentiation, are consumers m  fact making irrational 
choices between products which were m  fact homogeneous9 Such an outcome would 
clearly conflict with the hard core proposition that consumers display rational 
preferences between goods Robmson was undoubtedly aware of the impact of such a 
conclusion She argued that "[t]his problem can be evaded if we assume that the 
imperfection of the market arises solely from differences in transport costs or from 
such differences between consumers in their preferences for particular firms as cannot 
be altered by the action of the firms themselves" (Robmson 1932 545) This is not a 
very satisfactory solution, but it had the vital effect of allowing the concept of 
industry, as it had been classically defined, to persist Moreover, she was able to 
assume that no individual firm had control over the demand curve of the industry 
Thus, the marginal revenue curves facing each firm in the industry are identical
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Robinson’s next task was to establish the conditions for equilibrium in this industry 
"The equilibrium of the industry thus requires a double condition Margmal revenue 
must be equal to margmal cost, and price must be equal to average cost" (Robinson 
1932 547) Where price is equal to average cost, there is no incentive to leave or to 
enter the industry. A n  outcome of this double condition is that the industry would be 
in equilibrium where each firm has excess capacity It was exactly this conclusion 
which Robinson required, in order to show that this form of competition was an 
imperfect allocator of resources, despite being a stable equilibrium
Robinson’s theory can be described as an Errant Hypothesis, as outlmed by Remenyi 
(1979 35) The theory of imperfect competition was an attempt to deflect the 
anomalies raised by Sraffa (1926) Robinson protected the hard core proposition of the 
neoclassical research programme, and the demi-core of the welfare sub-disciplme, by 
showmg that a deviation from perfect competition would lead to a misallocation of 
resources through the creation of excess capacity This interpretation of the 
methodological significance of Robinson’s theory explains its popularity among her 
Cambridge colleagues, despite the obvious inadequacies of her model
Robinson managed to "preserve by sleight of hand the concept of the industry" 
(Shackle 1967 51) Her reasons for the display of consumer preferences in a 
homogeneous market were inadequate
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Joan Robinson’s demand functions have no analytical roots Her demand 
curves fall simply because she tells them to do so By this device she virtually 
assumed that the major theoretical problem had been solved, without actually 
solving it (Andrews 1966 22)
These inadequate assumptions were nevertheless necessary for the preservation of the 
predictions of the welfare sub-disciplme
Chamberlin’s ami, in The Theory o f  Monopolistic Competition (1933), was not to 
support the neoclassical welfare propositions but to find an alternative to them
The theory of competition, by its very nature, eliminates the monopoly 
elements completely, thus erasing a part of the picture and giving an account 
of the economic system which is so false that in most cases it could not even 
be called an approximation to it (Chamberlm 1962 206)
Chamberlin, m  contrast to Robmson, emphasised anomalies to the neoclassical theory 
of competition "He was offering a full theory of competition, not of imperfections 
from a perfect ideal" (O’Brien 1983b 35) Chamberlin’s theory was, therefore, part of 
a different sub-discipline to that of Robinson’s Where Robmson was concerned with 
the preservation of welfare theory, Chamberlm was anxious to develop a theory of
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firm behaviour The irony is that m  the process, Chamberlin came up with the same 
tangency solution to describe the outcome of competition in an industry with many 
small firms (the large group case) as Robmson did
Chamberlin mtroduced the notion of product differentiation mto a model of 
competition among a large number of competmg firms He acknowledged that this 
inclusion blurrs the concept of the industry, so he discussed competition m  terms of 
groups rather than industries (Chamberlin 1962 69) He considered competition in the 
large group (monopolistic competition) and m  the small group (oligopoly) case 
Chamberlin’s large group case was made up of firms with varying degrees of 
monopoly power, reflected by the slope of the demand curve for their individual 
product Thus, Chamberlin did not attempt to preserve the neoclassical notion of an 
industry made up of identical firms, each with no influence over market price, in the 
way that Robmson had done He willingly deviated from the neoclassical heuristic m  
his attempt to provide a more realistic model of firm behaviour
The Institutional Response mechamsm from the neoclassical programme which 
Chamberlin’s model prompted is well-documented (for example, Shackle 1967 62, 
Loasby 1971 878) Chamberlin spent the remainder of his academic life trying to 
establish the difference between his theory of monopolistic competition and 
Robinson’s theory of imperfect competition He argued that Robinson’s imperfect
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\competition is not an alternative theory of competition, in the way that monopolistic 
competition is (Chamberlm 1962 206)
The Errant Hypothesis mechanism, the academic response, was to criticise 
Chamberlin’s model not on the grounds that it gave a less realistic account of 
competitive forces, but rather because it was too nebulous to produce any empirically 
testable hypotheses (See chapter 1 3 for an outline of the debate between Archibald 
and the Chicago school on the theory of monopolistic competition ) Lip service is paid 
to the theory of monopolistic competition "the theory of monopolistic competition is 
tucked away in every text, but its relevance and its implications are ignored" (Solo 
1976 47)
Both Loasby (1971), usmg a Kuhnian analysis, and O ’Brien (1983b), using a 
Lakatosian analysis, concluded that Chamberlm’s theory marked a substantial 
departure from the neoclassical theory of the firm, and that there is a significant 
difference between the work of Robinson and Chamberlm "the function of the 
analysis, m  relation to both theoretical issues and their views of the world, is very 
different for the two authors" (Loasby 1971 876)
In contrast, Latsis (1972) who examined monopolistic competition usmg a Popperian 
situational logic analysis interspersed with Lakatosian and Kuhnian terminology, 
placed Chamberlin’s theory firmly within the neoclassical tradition Latsis described
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both perfect competition and monopolistic competition as coming from the same 
programme "the neoclassical programme of situational determinism" (Latsis 
1972 208) This programme has the following hard core "(1) Profit Maximisation (11) 
Perfect Knowledge (111) Independence of Decisions ( iv )  Perfect Market" (Latsis 
1972 209) The positive heuristic of this programme is comparative statics (Latsis 
1972 212) In his argument that both perfect and monopolistic competition fit into this 
framework, Latsis appeared to have confused monopolistic competition with imperfect 
competition - "[t]he firms under monopolistic competition produce goods which are 
different m  the eyes of the consumers but which do not demand any special knowledge 
or advantage, on the part of the producer who is responsible for their differentiation" 
(Latsis 1972 214) Yet, it is precisely the ability of individual firms to influence 
demand for their product which distinguishes monopolistic competition from imperfect 
competition
Latsis argued that perfect competition and monopolistic competition have the same 
situational analysis - "that optimizing behaviour (yielding merely subsistence profits in 
equilibrium) is the only way of avoidmg elimination from the industry" (Latsis 
1972 214) As was pointed out in chapter 1 4, Latsis held that the rationality principle 
must be empirical if it is to serve any purpose (Latsis 1972 228) In neoclassical 
economics, the profit maximisation hypothesis exerts cast-iron control on the 
behaviour of firms Given that both imperfect competition and monopolistic 
competition are based on an assumption of profit maximisation, they are simply
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showing the different reactions of firms, according to whether their situational analysis 
is that outlmed by Chamberlm or that outlined by Robinson The rationality principle 
is the same m  both cases Latsis held that the Chamberlin/Chicago controversy was 
one of number of "mere family quarrels between slightly different variants within the 
same programme" (Latsis 1972 222)
In Lakatosian terms, neither Robinson’s or Chamberlin’s models can be considered 
progressive Robinson’s model was specified in such a way that it was anomalous to 
the hard core proposition that consumers make rational choices Chamberlm’s model 
questioned the hard core proposition that pure competition optimises social benefit, he 
argued that the increased social welfare from increased variety under monopolistic 
competition might be greater than any loss in terms of excess capacity Since both 
models conflict with a neoclassical hard core proposition, they are ad  hoc 
Chamberlin’s and Robinson’s simultaneous elucidation of conditions for equilibrium 
m  imperfect competition/monopolistic competition are the novel facts m  both models 
Therefore, each is classified as ad hoc3 to the neoclassical theory of the firm
This conclusion with regard to the models of imperfect competition suggests that, 
from a Lakatosian perspective at least, these models should not have been 
incorporated into the static theory of international trade, since they would have been 
ad hoc3 to it And, indeed, except in a few instances, they were not However, in the 
late 1970s, several models of mtemational trade were proposed, which were based on
the models of Robinson and Chamberlin Far from being rejected as ad  hoc to the 
international trade sub-disciplme, they were hailed as its rejuvenator The following 
section examines the analysis of increasing returns and product differentiation within 
mtemational trade theory, m  the period following the publication of Robinson’s and 
Chamberlin's models, up to these ‘new theories of mtemational trade’ of the 1970s 
and early 1980s
\
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6 4 A T T E M P T S  T O  M O D E L  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  T R A D E  IN A  STATIC 
I M P E R F E C T L Y  COMPETITIVE M O D E L
Very few theorists considered the impact of Robinson’s or Chamberlin’s models on 
the analysis of international trade This is strange when one considers the lengthy 
discussions of Ohlm and Marshall, among others, on the impact of mcreasing returns 
and product differentiation on the pattern of international trade This lack of response 
is indicative of the extent to which the static theory of international trade, with its 
neoclassical foundations, had come to dominate the international trade sub-disciplme 
The dynamic theory, while still used as a basis for policy prescription, was not the 
standard model of trade to be found in the textbooks of the 1940s Another, perhaps 
more fundamental, reason for the lack of response by trade theorists, is that these 
models of imperfect competition were partial analyses, whereas the static theory of 
international trade from the time of Ricardo presented a general analysis
Up to 1941, there was no attempt to analyse international trade within an imperfectly 
competitive model, although several trade theorists discussed m  a less formal way the 
implications of Robinson’s and Chamberlin’s conclusions for the predictions of the 
static theory (eg Beach 1936, Anderson 1937, McDiarmid 1938) Beach highlighted
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the extent to which the link between prices and costs of production are broken when 
the assumption of homogeneous products is removed (Beach 1936 108) Implicit m  
Beach is the conclusion that the acknowledgement of monopolistic competition would 
warrant an entirely new proposition upon which to base the determinantion of patterns 
of international trade, although he himself made no attempt to establish such a 
proposition Anderson (1937) considered the impact of monopolistic competition on 
the free trade proposition He argued that free trade would still be the optimal trade 
policy m  the face of product differentiation Protection would only serve to limit the 
market of domestic producers of differentiated products The only producers who may 
lose from free trade would be those who produced varieties closely resemblmg 
imported varieties (Anderson 1937 163) McDiarmid (1938) was more explicit than 
Beach had been about the problem which product differentiation caused for the 
comparative advantage proposition In a three-country/two-good model, McDiarmid 
reiterated Ohlin’s argument that patterns of international trade could be determined by 
the potential for increasing returns to scale (McDiarmid 1938 126)
In 1941, a trade theorist presented a model of international trade under monopolistic 
competition Implicit m  this model was the belief that cross trade necessitated a new 
theory of international trade, that it was more than simply the statistical phenomenon 
observed by Marshall and Taussig Lovasy (1941) derived a two country/one good 
model, where the good is differentiated into a number of varieties Lovasy used a 
modified version of Hoteling’s (1929) location theory model, placing the varieties of
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the product along a scale according to the elasticity of substitution of consumers for 
each variety Lovasy did not go any further in the specification of utility functions of 
consumers She did note, however, that the introduction of more varieties through 
international trade would change the elasticity of substitution between varieties m  each 
country Lovasy considered the possibility of international trade m  a number of 
different cases
1 where country A  has a cost advantage m  all varieties, although A  does not 
produce all varieties
2 where there are no cost differences between country A  and country B, but 
consumers in A  and B  have different tastes
3 where all the varieties produced in country A  are of a superior quality to those 
produced m  country B, and there is no cost difference between the two countries
4 where all the varieties produced m  country A  are of a superior quality to those 
produced in country B, and A  varieties are more expensive than B  varieties
None of these patterns of trade between A  and B are incompatible with comparative 
advantage, as Marshall and Taussig had shown m  their analysis of cross trade 
However, Lovasy took the analysis of cross trade a step further She argued that 
"foreign trade is caused by the mere fact of product difference with standardization 
of the products and no cost or price difference international trade would not take place 
at all" (Lovasy 1941 582) The demi-core proposition of comparative advantage 
predicted that where production functions are identical across countries and where 
there are no pre-trade comparative cost differences between countries, there will be no 
international trade Lovasy, on the other hand, argued that trade could occur between
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countries that are identical in every respect including factor endowment, on the 
grounds of product differentiation This international trade is patently not of the same 
nature as the cross trade described by Marshall and Taussig The pattern of 
international trade which Lovasy predicted was not cross trade, but intra-industry 
trade Intra-mdustry trade is not compatible with the demi-core proposition of 
comparative advantage, because it assumes that the same costs are faced within the 
industry in both of the trading partners The distinction between mtra-industry trade 
and cross trade did not come to the attention of trade theorists for another 34 years, in 
Finger (1975) The significance of this distinction between cross trade and 
mtra-industry trade is highlighted m  the debate on the validity of the ’new theories of 
international trade’ proposed in the late 1970s
Lovasy does not appear to have been aware of the the significance of her conclusions 
for the static theory of mtemational trade Nevertheless, her work did contain several 
novel facts which could, had they been given any serious consideration by trade 
theorists at the time, have changed the direction of International trade theory 
markedly The following analysis shows how similar Lovasy’s conclusions are to the 
conclusions of the ’new theories’ which led to a radical change in the International 
trade sub-disciplme
To a sub-discipline whose m a m  preoccupation was to find the conditions for 
competitive trading equilibria, Lovasy’s model was too indeterminate to be anything
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other than ad hoc3 It conflicted with the neoclassical heuristics in that it was a two 
country/one good model, with no additional assumptions about the factors of 
production The incorporation of Lovasy’s model mto the international trade 
sub-disciplme would therefore have rendered the international trade sub-discipline and 
by association the neoclassical programme, degenerative
The concept of intra-industry trade did not reappear in the international trade 
sub-discipline until the 1970s Trade theorists contmued to try to mtegrate the 
phenomenon of increasing returns mto the static model of international trade In 
particular, static theory focused on the impact increasing returns would have on the 
factor price equalisation theorem (Samuelson 1948,1949,1951,1953)
Both Matthews (1949) and Meade (1952) used Lemer’s analysis of international trade 
under external economies Lemer had argued that complete specialisation by both 
countries was the only stable outcome where both traded goods were produced under 
conditions of increasing returns (Lemer 1934) Smce Samuelson had argued that 
incomplete specialisation was a necessary condition for factor price equalisation 
(Samuelson 1949), it was necessary to refute Lemer’s prediction m  order to show that 
factor price equalisation would occur in a competitive trading equilibrium under 
increasing returns
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Matthews however argued that "complete specialisation is inevitable only if the 
production frontier is more sharply convex than the country’s indifference curves" 
(Matthews 1949 153) He held that there could be a stable equilibrium with 
incomplete specialisation under mcreasmg returns, if one trading partner was 
substantially larger than the other (Matthews 1949 153)
Meade concluded that, excepting Matthews’ case of comparative size differences 
between the trading partners, there could be no stable equilibrium with incomplete 
specialisation in the presense of mcreasmg returns (Meade 1952 40) Meade reiterated 
Lemer’s geometric representation of international trade under mcreasmg returns, and 
added to it Matthew’s exceptional case This became the standard treatment of 
mcreasmg returns within the static theory of international trade
It was generally accepted that, due to complete specialisation, international trade 
under mcreasmg returns would not result in factor price equalisation Lamg proved 
this to be the case m  1961 In 1964, Kemp concluded that the only case in which there 
would be factor price equalisation would be where both countries had identical factor 
endowments and produced each product to the same scale Of course, under these 
conditions there would not be any trade, according to comparative advantage (Kemp 
1964 122) Kemp did, however, argue the possibility of relative factor price 
equalisation under mcreasmg returns He held that the outcome of relative factor price
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equalisation would depend on whether the production frontiers of both countries 
intersected after trade (Kemp 1964 125-7) However, he argued that, while there 
might be a number of price ratios at which relative factor price equalisation is 
observed, "[t]he probability that consumer preferences will dictate the establishment 
of one of those commodity price ratios is slight indeed" (Kemp 1964 126)
The post-Lemer analysis of international trade under increasing returns yielded little m  
the way of novel facts, either theoretical or empirical The limitations imposed by the 
neoclassical methodology were apparent to all working in the area "while there will 
be trade, there is very little else we can conclude about the pattern of trade in the 
increasing returns situation W e  have no way of knowing, for example, which country 
will export which good W e  know that one country will specialise m  X  and one m  Y, 
but except for that, the production function is indeterminate Of even more 
importance, we cannot even be sure that both countries will gam from trade" (Melvin 
1969 393) Negishi was more succmct "[w]hen these assumptions [constant returns] 
are relaxed, we must confess that the subject is in a mess" (Negishi 1972 73)
The problem with analysing trade under increasing returns was not in establishing the 
compatibility of the phenomenon with the demi core of the static theory of 
international trade As Ohlin had shown in 1933, there was no intrinsic conflict 
between the comparative advantage proposition and the existence of increasing 
returns The problem was one that had been noted much earlier by Marshall, namely
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that static models imposed severe limitations on the analysis of dynamic phenomena 
such as mcreasing returns (Marshall 1923 356)
The phenomenon of mtra-industry trade was raised again during the 1960s, with the 
publication of empirical studies which showed the extent to which countries with the 
same factor endowments were trading m  goods belonging to the same industries (eg 
Dreze 1961, Verdoom 1963, Kojima 1964, Balassa 1966, 1967) It should be noted 
that trade theorists did not always distinguish between cross trade and mtra-mdustry 
trade In many cases, the empirical data related to cross trade as distinct from 
mtra-mdustry trade To reiterate, cross trade is trade m  varieties which have different 
production functions Intra-mdustry trade, on the other hand, assumes that there are 
no production differences in traded varieties
The lack of distinction between mtra-mdustry trade and cross trade is obvious in the 
outline given by Grubel m  1970 to show the eclectic approach which trade theorists 
took to trade withm the same industrial grouping Grubel outlined three different 
approaches
1 The Heckscher/Ohlin theorem which explained "mtra-mdustry trade" according 
to pre-trade comparative cost advantages across countries in respect of specific 
sub-industries
2 Linder’s theory which explained mtra-mdustry trade in the context of national 
income differentials (see chapter 7 2)
3 Technology gap theories, which explained mtra-mdustry trade in the context of
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the product life cycle and the international transfer of technology (see chapter 
7 2) (Grubel 1970 38-43)
The Heckscher/Ohlin theorem cannot explain intra-industry trade, but it can explain 
Marshall and Taussig’s cross trade Further evidence that Grubel mistook cross trade 
for intra-industry trade is to be found m  his model of international trade where the 
traded good is differentiated
Grubel analysed international trade m  the context of a two country/one good model, 
where there were three varieties of the single good (Grubel 1970 45) Grubel 
concluded, as Lovasy had done, that the pattern of international trade would depend 
on the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of a smgle good produced 
m  both countries The difference between Grubel’s analysis and that of Lovasy, is that 
Lovasy considered the possibility of trade on the basis of product differentiation alone 
Grubel, on the other hand, assumed that factor mputs would vary across varieties 
Given this assumption, Grubel was able to predict which countries would specialise in 
which varieties, using the Heckscher/Ohlin theorem But Grubel was able to make this 
prediction only because he assumed pre-trade comparative cost differences m  respect 
of different varieties across countries The international trade Grubel identified was 
therefore cross trade, not intra-industry trade Grubel’s model was m  essence a more 
formalised version of Marshall and Taussig’s arguments While his analysis has a 
different perspective to Grubel’s, Gray’s (1973) model of international trade under
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monopolistic competition does not preclude a comparative advantage explanation of 
international trade either
Despite some not insignificant problems with empirical evidence on cross 
trade/mtra-industry trade, by the late 1970s there appeared to be a fairly substantial 
consensus of opimon that the H O S  theories were madequate to explam intra-industry 
trade Corden’s view was a widely-held one "It is desirable that there be developed a 
rigorous general equilibrium model with economies of scale, possibly embody m g  
some dynamic elements and allowing for more than two products - and yet (ideally) 
remaining as simple as the popular geometric expositions of the H-O-S model" 
(Corden 1978 10) What Corden was asking was that further work be carried out 
within the static theory of international trade, m  order that the phenomenon of 
increasing returns be adequately dealt with The inclusion of mcreasmg returns into 
the static theory would have necessitated a change m  the neoclassical heuristics of that 
theory
In his response to Corden’s paper, Krugman took a much stronger anti- factor 
proportions lme "the evidence on intra-industry trade does more than downgrade 
conventional factor proportions theory it provides considerable positive support to 
one particular alternative theory, which combmes factor proportions with economies 
of scale and differentiated products" (Krugman 1978 13) Krugman argued that it 
would be possible to construct a model of trade under monopolistic competition, and
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cited Gray (1973) in this respect (Krugman 1978 14) Moreover, Krugman held that 
"a model which combines scale economies and factor proportions makes some 
substantive predictions which seem to be borne out in practice" (Krugman 1978 14) 
Krugman based this conclusion on a model he had already derived and which was 
published the following year (Krugman 1979)
In his 1979 paper, Krugman derived a two country/one good model where the single 
good was made up of several varieties the production of which were subject to 
increasing returns Krugman showed that trade could be stimulated by the potential 
that exists for increasing returns through the extension of the market "Trade need not 
be as a result of international differences in technology or factor endowments Instead, 
trade may simply be a way of extendmg the market and allowing exploitation of scale 
economies, with the effects bemg similar to those of labour force growth and regional 
agglomeration" (Krugman 1979 479) This prediction first appeared m  Ohlin (1933) 
and later in in Lovasy (1941) Negishi (1969) also produced a model which 
incorporated economies of scale, on the grounds that "it is preferable to develop an 
endogenous theory of trade since there is a possibility that international trade and 
specialization as such creates the comparative advantage" (Negishi 1969 132) Negishi 
went on to show that gams from trade between countries which are identical are 
upheld where Marshallian external economies are held to be irreversible
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In Krugman’s model, all varieties of the traded product enter the utility function of 
each consumer symmetrically Under this condition, the opening up of trade mcreases 
the scale of production for each firm as well as the range of varieties available m  each 
country Krugman held that international trade could be stimulated by the demand for 
additional varieties by consumers, irrespective of whether pre-trade comparative cost 
differences exist Krugman was, however, unable to predict which countries would 
produce which varieties after the opening up of trade Again, this argument is not 
new. Exactly the same pomt was made by Lovasy (1941) What is important here is 
that Krugman was dealmg with mtra-mdustry trade, not with cross trade or two-way 
trade as his immediate predecessors had done This was the first mention of the 
possibility of international trade m  the good of a smgle industry where there were no 
cost differences across trading partners m  respect of the good, smce Lovasy (1941) 
Krugman, like Lovasy, was unable to make any predictions about what country would 
produce what varieties after trade links were established
Lancaster (1980) specified an alternative model to that of Krugman, but arrived at the 
same conclusions. Lancaster’s model was a two country/ftvo good model, where one 
good was a differentiated manufactured good, and the other a standardised agricultural 
product Thus, it was an attempt at a more general version of international trade under 
monopolistic competition In Lancaster’s model, only one variety of the manufactured 
good enters the utility functions of consumers, along with the agricultural product
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Where the consumer’s most preferred variety is not available, he might be persuaded 
to accept another variety on the basis of a price differential between this variety and 
his most preferred variety In Lancaster’s model, thetrading partners are identical m  
every respect Every consumer m  one country is matched in the other country by a 
consumer with identical preferences Lancaster concluded that "mtra-mdustry trade 
will certainly occur when the economies are absolutely identical m  all respects and can 
persist under conditions of comparative advantage" (Lancaster 1980 174, m y  italics) 
The pattern of trade would, according to Lancaster, depend on the elasticity of 
substitution among all the product varieties The agricultural product was assumed to 
be a non-traded good Lancaster also predicted that international trade could occur 
where there was the potential for economies of scale but no pre-trade comparative cost 
differences between two countries
Lovasy, Krugman and Lancaster arrived at the same prediction, namely that 
mtemational trade could occur without any pre-trade comparative cost differences 
between countries (Lovasy is not acknowledged in either Krugman 1979 or Lancaster 
1980) However, while Lovasy’s prediction was ignored, the Krugman and Lancaster 
models were seen as the rejuvenators of international trade theory A  Lakatosian 
analysis can shed some light on this rather paradoxical treatment of what was 
essentially the same set of novel facts
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Lovasy, by predicting the possibility of intra-industry trade where no pre-trade 
comparative cost advantages are present, introduced an anomaly to the static and the 
dynamic theories of international trade, both of which were based on the principle of 
comparative advantage In a Lakatosian framework, such anomalies are tolerable, 
provided that the research programme (or in this case, sub-disciplme) continues to 
generate empirical novel facts that are derived m  a way that is consistent with the 
heuristics of the programme (sub-discipline) Under these conditions, Lakatos argued 
"it may be rational to put the inconsistency into some temporary, ad  hoc quarantme, 
and carry on with the positive heuristic of the programme" (Lakatos 1970 143)
During the Samuelson shift, the links between the static theory of trade and the hard 
core of the neoclassical programme strengthened, to the extent that the static theory 
domrnated the international trade sub-disciplme One could m  fact argue that durmg 
this period, the international trade sub-discipline went from being a quasi-mdependent 
sub-disciplme to bemg simply a set of hypotheses within the protective belt of the 
neoclassical programme, such was the preoccupation among trade theorists with 
proving the existence of a trading equilibrium (de Marchi 1976) Given the strength of 
the neoclassical heuristics at this time, the reaction or rather lack of reaction to 
Lovasy’s theory is explicable in Lakatosian terms Under MSRP, the incorporation of 
Lovasy’s ad  hoc3 theory would have rendered the static theory degenerative
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Yet, Krugman’s and Lancaster’s models, although they reiterate the novel facts found 
m  Lovasy (1941), were treated very differently H o w  can M S R P  explam this 
dichotomy9
During the 1970s, the international trade sub-disciplme began to display signs of a 
creative shift The emphasis on the existence and stability of competitive trading 
equilibria waned, and trade theorists turned to the problem of providing an 
explanation for actual international trade patterns The empirical work on 
mtra-mdustry trade is an example of this change in direction Such a change of 
direction in m m  necessitated the modification of the restnctmg neoclassical heuristics 
adopted by the international trade sub-discipline The new theories of international 
trade played a major role in this reorientation of trade theory With the loosening of 
the heuristic constraint, Krugman’s and Lancaster’s predictions could be introduced 
into the sub-disciplme, where Lovasy’s could not
The incorporation of the new theories of international trade into the sub-disciplme was 
not, however, an indication of independence from the neoclassical programme The 
incorporation of the new theories was facilitated by prior heuristic changes within the 
neoclassical programme m  respect of its treatment of imperfect competition The 
neoclassical programme has dealt with imperfect competition by devising a series of 
models, each of which derives equilibrium under different forms of imperfect
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competition Trade theorists adopted this method on the grounds that "it is better to 
have a collection of examples that seem to capture what is actually gomg on than to 
restrict oneself to a fully mtegrated theory that does not" (Helpman and Krugman 
1985 4) Thus, the impetus for a creative shift, a change m  the heuristics of the 
international trade sub-disciplme, came from the changes in the greater neoclassical 
economics research programme, as much as from any desire on the part of 
international trade theorists to provide a more realistic explanation of international 
trade patterns
Accordmg to Lakatos, a creative shift changes only the positive heuristics of a 
programme (Lakatos 1970 137) The Lovasy/Krugman/Lancaster predictions 
constituted more than a creative shift in the international trade sub-disciplme The 
principle of comparative advantage is accepted now as an explanation for only a 
certain number of world trade patterns It has been supplemented by two other 
demi-core propositions which provide an explanation for international trade which 
does not occur on the basis of pre-trade comparative cost differences between tradmg 
partners
H C 1  Inter-industry trade is explained by differences in the comparative costs of 
production between countries
H C 2  Intra-industry trade is explained by the differentiation of products across 
countries
H C 3  Where there are different relative prices across countries, there will be 
gams from trade from exchanging goods at intermediate prices
H C 4  Where there are no pre-trade comparative cost differences across
countnes, there may still be gams from trade m  terms of consumer choice 
where traded goods are differentiated, or where the expansion of the 
market allows for the realisation of economies of scale
H C 5  Free trade with compensation will mcrease global welfare
In MSRP, any incorporation of theories into a programme which involve a change in 
the hard core of that programme, amounts to the generation of a new hard core Using 
Remenyian terminology, the incorporation of the new theories mto the international 
trade sub-disciplme generated a change m  the demi-core of the sub-disciplme, and 
therefore resulted m  the creation of a new sub-discipline This new sub-discipline is 
still dependent on the heuristics of the neoclassical programme, m  the same way that 
the old sub-disciplme was There is considerable continuity between the old and new 
sub-discipline, m  terms of the issues addressed For example, there have been 
attempts to establish whether factor price equalisation is an outcome of international 
trade under various models of trade under imperfect competition (see Helpman 1981) 
The emphasis m  the new sub-discipline is still on the existence, nature and stability of 
trading equilibria Given this continuity, the shift from the old international trade 
sub-disciplme to the new one cannot be interpreted as a paradigm-shift
The Krugman and Lancaster papers did not generate novel facts This suggests that 
their incorporation mto any international trade sub-disciplme cannot be held as 
progressive m  the Lakatosian sense However, it is more accurate to regard these
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papers as only a part of the development of the new sub-discipline, a new 
sub-discipline which did go on to generate novel facts Since the early 1980s, the 
international trade sub-disciplme has become more empirically-oriented, and several 
of these novel facts have been empirically corroborated Thus, the international trade 
sub-discipline can now be described as progressive m  the Lakatosian sense
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6 5 CONCLUSIONS
In the early part of this century, the international trade sub-discipline is principally 
characterised by the technical refinements of the static theory of international trade 
While there were few novel facts to be gleaned from this exercise, it is an indication 
of the importance which trade theorists have attached to heuristic development, as 
opposed to the generation of empirically corroborated novel facts
The development of the techniques of comparative static analysis, along with Ohlin’s 
completion of the Ricardian two country/two good model, gave rise to the dommance 
of the static theory within the international trade sub-disciplme from the 1930s The 
problem this presented for trade theorists was m  reconciling the adoption of the static 
theory, with the knowledge that increasing returns had an important role to play in the 
determination of patterns of international trade Despite Marshall’s warning that his 
comparative static method does not lend itself to analysis under increasing returns, a 
few trade theorists persisted m  the attempt to derive a model of trade under increasing 
returns Very few novel facts were generated out of this analysis The most 
significant, in hindsight, is the novel prediction of Lovasy (1941), that international 
trade can occur without the initial assumption of pre-trade comparative cost 
differences across countries
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M S R P  explains the lack of response to Lovasy’s novel prediction Lovasy’s novel 
prediction was derived from a partial two country/one good model which conflicted 
with the general equilibrium heuristics of the static theory of international trade, 
making her prediction ad hoc3 to the static theory at that time In addition, Lovasy’s 
prediction questioned the adequacy of the principle underlying both the static and the 
dynamic theories of mtemational trade, the principle of comparative advantage
Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1980) reiterated Lovasy’s novel prediction m  more 
formalised models While they may have provided more precise explanations of 
intra-industry trade, they did not provide any novel facts m  addition to that of 
mtra-mdustry trade Hence their models cannot be considered progressive Yet, these 
papers marked the beginning of a whole new static theory of international trade
The adoption of the new theories of mtemational trade once again indicates the 
concern which trade theorists place on heuristic development The Krugman/Lancaster 
models were part of a heuristic shift in the International trade sub-disciplme which was 
to lead to a new sub-discipline They did not m  themselves generate novel facts, but 
these models marked the acceptance within international trade theory of the derivation 
of partial models of international trade This is a substantial change in perspective 
from the general equilibrium methodology which had characterised the static theory of 
International trade since the time of Ricardo The Krugman/Lancaster models were
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new, not m  the Lakatosian sense that they generated novel facts, but in a heuristic 
sense This change in heuristics allowed for the incorporation of Lovasy’s novel 
prediction into the demi-core (although this novel fact has not been recognised as 
originating from Lovasy) This change to the demi-core resulted m  the development of 
a new sub-discipline, but a new sub-disciplme which displays considerable continuity 
with its predecessor
It has been argued above that the heuristic change m  the international trade 
sub-discipline was facilitated by heuristic changes that had been previously made 
within the neoclassical programme There was, m  addition, some impetus for change 
from within the international trade sub-disciplme itself The dynamic theory of 
international trade continued to be developed during the ‘Samuelson shift’m  the 
international trade sub-discipline, and the novel facts it generated, placed further 
pressure on the static, neoclassical heuristics of the sub-discipline The following 
chapter exammes the development of the dynamic theory of trade, and compares this 
development to that of the static theory under the ‘Samuelson shift’
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SCIENTIFIC P R O G R E S S  IN T H E  
STATIC A N D  D Y N A M I C  THEORIES O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  T R A D E
Up to and including Ohlin (1933), the dynamic and static theories were depicted as
;
complementary, though separate theories of international trade There were few 
attempts to link the two approaches This chapter explores the post-Heckscher/Ohlin 
theorem development of the two theories, during the 1950s and 1960s Judging from 
the textbooks of the day, it would appear that the static theory, durmg this period, 
dominated in any explanation of international trade patterns This chapter considers 
whether this dominance of the static theory was warranted by progress m  the static 
theory of international trade, as opposed to that of the dynamic theory The first 
section of this chapter considers the development of the dynamic theory of 
international trade, concentrating on three theories, those of Lmder (1961), Posner 
(1961) and Vernon (1966) The second section examines the development of the static 
theory of international trade durmg its ‘Samuelson shift’ The final section uses the 
theories of scientific rationality explored in Part One of the dissertation, to analyse 
why the static theory of international trade was emphasised as the prmcipal 
explanation for international trade patterns durmg this period
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7 1 P R O G R E S S  IN T H E  D Y N A M I C  T H E O R Y  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  T R A D E
During the 1950s, the dynamic theory of international trade does mdeed appear to 
have become relatively isolated, as the sub-discipline became preoccupied with the 
question of factor price equalisation in the Heckscher/Ohlm model It was not until the 
early 1960s, that a reconsideration of the dynamic aspects of mtemational trade 
occurred This reconsideration came from two angles Lmder (1961) considered the 
impact of increasing returns on international trade, while Posner (1961) analysed the 
impact of technological change on international trade
Lmder questioned the relevance of the factor proportions theorem m  explaining 
international trade patterns Lmder held that the other reasons which Ohlin gave for 
international comparative cost differences, like economies of scale and transportation 
costs, are much more significant in explaining comparative advantage (Lmder 
1961 17) Linder’s theory did not, therefore, conflict with the demi-core proposition 
of the static theory that international trade patterns are determined by comparative 
advantage But his model of mtemational trade was not m  the static, comparative 
static tradition It was not consistent with the heuristics of the static theory
)
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Linder’s was an attempt to amalgamate theories of growth and international trade, in a 
way remimscient of Smith His primary focus was on the extent to which countries are 
able to reallocate resources when the opening up of trade forces them to specialise m  
particular lmes of production Smith had argued that the reallocation of resources mto 
the specialist industry would depend on the homogeneity of factors of production 
(Smith 1776 Vol I 493) Lmder argued that m  certain countries, the scope for this 
reallocation of resources would be slight and the gams from trade limited (Lmder 
1961 12-13) He derived two models, one which considered the effect of international 
trade on underdeveloped countries, and one on developed countries He argued that 
economic growth would depend on the relative ability of countries to reallocate 
resources "Countries with an ability to reallocate factors of production are likely to 
be able to accumulate material resources at a rate faster than that at which population 
increases, and they are thus probably passing through a process of economic growth 
reflected in per capita incomes" (Lmder 1961 49) Moreover, he argued that countries 
with a faster growth rate are likely to be able to reallocate resources at a permanently 
faster rate, thus ensuring the persistence of a growth differential between high-growth 
and underdeveloped countries "Since trade will stimulate growth in growth countries 
- but not in U-countnes [underdeveloped countries] - our theory leads to the important 
conclusion that the per-capita income gap as between U-countnes and growth 
countnes will grow faster under trade than under autarky" (Lmder 1961 134)
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Linder considered increasing returns to be an alternative to the factor proportions 
explanation for pre-trade comparative cost differences, but derived no formal model 
In respect of the impact of increasing returns on the development of comparative cost 
advantage, he made the following prediction "We shall claim that a country cannot 
achieve a comparative advantage in the production of a good which is not demanded 
on the home market" (Lmder 1961 17) This argument is hinted at in Mill (1892) and 
is explicitly made m  Marshall (1925) The argument is that the size of the home 
market determines the extent of mcreasmg returns which in turn determines the 
country’s comparative cost advantage Lmder, however, went on to argue that, 
high-mcome countries will, prior to trade, specialise in the production of goods the 
demand for which comes from high-mcome earners The level of economies of scale 
earned through this autarkic specialisation will determine the high-mcome countries’ 
comparative advantage Lmder argued that given the preference of high-mcome 
countries for the same types of goods, the extent of international trade would be 
greater between countries with the same per-capita income levels (Lmder 1961 17) 
Due to the existence of increasing returns, each high-mcome country would specialise 
in only a limited range of these high-mcome goods
Lmder noted that the introduction of mcreasmg returns would bring with it the 
possibility of differing production functions at different output levels withm the same 
industry "if production functions differ it may be impossible to distinguish
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between labor- and capital-intensive industries at all relative prices" (Linder 
1961 129) In this case, it becomes more difficult to identify industries as labour or 
capital intensive, and the H O S  theorem is inapplicable, unless industries are divided 
into labour and capital intensive sub-industries
Linder considered the impact of the increasing returns explanation for comparative 
advantage on the factor price equalisation hypothesis Under the H O S  theories, 
Samuelson had shown that relative and absolute factor price equalisation would be the 
outcome of free trade (Samuelson 1948b) Linder predicted that there would not 
necessarily be any movement to factor price equalisation where international trade was 
determined by mcreasing returns rather than by factor proportion differentials across 
countries Where mcreasing returns are present m  labour-mtensive goods, Lmder 
argued, there is no reason why the cost of labour should rise as production is 
increased "Only to those who are indoctrinated with the factor cost equalization 
theorem could it seem provocative to conclude that a labor-abundant country, although 
it takes part in international trade, will have relatively low wages" (Lmder 1961 132)
The Stolper/Samuelson (1941) theorem of the static theory, predicts that inter-industry 
specialisation according to comparative advantage would reduce the returns to the 
scarce factor of production, as the country would demand relatively greater amounts 
of the abundant factor in order to facilitate export demand Lmder argued that just as 
there is no reason to suppose that the abundant factor gams where trade is determined
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by increasing returns, likewise there is no reason to suppose that the scarce factor 
loses out Linder argues that for developed countries, "as total income increases m  
consequence of reallocation, the absolute renumerations will increase" (Linder 
1961 132)
Linder pointed out that in the H O S  theories, international trade is a substitute for 
international factor movements Where international factor movements cause factor 
price equalisation then there is no incentive to trade, since comparative cost 
advantages, under the H O S  theories, can only be explained by factor price 
differentials across countries In Linder’s theory, however, "labor and capital 
movements will tend to increase trade by making factor endowments and per capita 
incomes more equal" (Lmder 1961 139) In other words, the international movement 
of labour and capital, by equalising factor prices across countries, would also equalise 
per capita incomes across countries This would, according to Lmder, expand the 
volumes of international trade between these countries, as the mcreased international 
demand for goods, whose production is subject to economies of scale, would allow for 
the further development of comparative cost differentials between countries
Lmder found it curious that relatively little empirical testing of the predictions of the 
static theory had been undertaken (Linder 1961 142-143) Lmder conducted some 
rudimentary testing of the predictions of his own theory In particular, he studied the 
propensity of high per capita income countries to trade with each other (Lmder
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1961 110) While his results broadly supported his hypothesis that volumes of 
international trade will be greater between countries with similar per capita incomes, 
Linder did point to technical problems m  his statistical analysis - the incompatibility of 
international trade statistics, the use of per capita mcome as a proxy for demand, etc ,
- and he called for more rigorous empirical specification and testing of this 
hypothesis He also suggested areas for further empirical research, such as the extent 
to which trade m  certain product categories is expanding or declining as a function of 
per capita mcome growth, and the reaction of individual countries to these changmg 
patterns
Lmder had a different agenda of problems to that of the static theory of international 
trade, and this necessitated an alternative methodology The difference between the 
static theory and Linder’s dynamic theory become more obvious, when Linder’s 
theory is represented in Lakatosian/Remenyian terms Lmder’s theory contains the 
following demi-core propositions
DC1 Economic growth under trade follows a different pattern to that under autarky
D C 2  The dynamic gams from trade for a country are determined by that country’s 
ability to reallocate factors of production
D C 3  The level of demand in a country determines the extent of economies of scale 
derivable, and m  turn the comparative advantage of that country 
Along with these demi-core propositions, Linder’s theory incorporates the following
heuristics
PHI Construct models which outline the links between growth and trade
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PH2 Assess the welfare effects of international trade for countries with differing 
productive capabilities
PH3 Statistically analysis the predictions derived from auxiliary hypotheses 
The following auxiliary hypotheses form the protective belt of Linder’s theory
A H 1  Underdeveloped countries are less likely to be able to reallocate factors as 
efficiently as growth countries
A H 2  The level of trade is likely to be higher among countries with similar per 
capita incomes, than between countries with different per capita incomes
A H 3  The per capita income gap between developed and undeveloped countries will 
grow faster under trade than under autarky
Linder’s theory is more compatible with the dynamic, Smithian theory of international 
trade It can be interpreted as a progressive development in the dynamic theory, 
producing as it did a variety of novel facts The novel predictions generated by 
Linder’s theory include the following that the extent of a country’s comparative 
advantage depends on the level of domestic demand for exported goods, that countries 
with similar per capita income levels will trade relatively more intensively with each 
other, that international mobility of the factors of production will stimulate, rather 
than depress trade volumes Some of these novel predictions were empirically 
corroborated Linder’s theory can therefore be considered a progressive shift in the 
dynamic theory of international trade More evidence of Lakatosian progress in the 
dynamic theory of international trade at this time can be found in the analysis of
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international trade patterns and technological development by Posner (1961)
In 1961, Posner argued that the static theory might only be an explanation of short run 
international trade flows "‘comparative cost differences’ may induce trade in 
particular goods during the lapse of time taken for the rest of the world to mutate one 
country’s innovation" (Posner 1961 323) As with Linder, Posner’s aim was not to 
replace comparative advantage, but rather to explain why, when the mtemational 
transfer of technology is taken m  account, the factor proportions theorem "may not 
provide the whole answer to the questions at issue" (Posner 1961 323) His aim was 
rather to provide an "explanation of the process of generation of comparative 
advantage through time" (Posner 1961 328)
Posner argued that the gap in the development of technology across countries means 
that "a cause of trade exists which is mdependent of any of the previously existing 
comparative cost differences" (Posner 1961 323) The introduction of an assumption 
of variable technological development across countries conflicts with the H O S  
assumption that production functions are identical across countries "trade, then, may 
be caused by the existence of some technical know-how m  one country not available 
elsewhere, even though there may be no international differences m  relative 
endowments of factors of production stnctu sensu" (Posner 1961 324) Moreover, 
Posner went on to argue that differences in factor endowment across countries might 
well be a result rather than a cause of international trade (Posner 1961 331) The
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generation of extra capacity in the country which developed the new technology may 
involve the flow of foreign capital into this country, making it more capital intensive 
and its trading partner more labour intensive
Posner identified a number of different lags which determine the length of time for 
which the country with the new technology retains its comparative advantage in this 
new technology The imitation lag is the length of time it takes for the firms of the 
trading partner to adopt the new technology (Posner 1961 331) The foreign reaction 
lag is "that time which elapses between the successful utilization of an innovation by 
one firm in the foreign country and the new good’s becoming regarded, by producers 
in the domestic market, as a likely competitor on the same footing as a domestic 
product" (Posner 1961 333) A  demand lag represents the substitutability between the 
imported new good and the domestic older variety (Posner 1961 333)
Posner put forward two alternative hypotheses on the relationship between the demand 
lag and the foreign reaction lag The first hypothesis is that the lags would be very 
similar m  size "the more slowly the sales of a new foreign product could be promoted 
in the domestic market, the less the mcentive to imitation, and vice versa" (Posner 
1961 333) The second hypothesis argues that the two lags are positively, although not 
strongly correlated "the foreign reaction lag could be much smaller than the demand 
lag if domestic producers were more alert to foreign developments than were
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foreigners to the possibilities of their export market" (Posner 1961 333) Posner 
favoured the second hypothesis
Posner outlined a model of international trade, where the length of time a country 
holds on to its technological comparative advantage depends on the size of the net lag, 
(L - _) L is equal to the foreign reaction lag +  the imitation lag +  the learning 
period, and _ is equal to the demand lag Posner depicted the following no-trade 
scenario
If the imitating country’s entrepreneurs in the relevant industry are 
particularly quick at imitation, the reaction lags may be very small, and if the 
learning period is also small, it may be that the mutation lag is smaller than 
the demand lag, in this case, there will be no trade (Posner 1961 335)
Posner’s model of international trade does not explicitly incorporate cross trade, 
although it could be easily modified to include the phenomenon Posner did comment 
on the possibility of cross trade in his discussion of inter-regional trade
Innovations affecting only single products, m  an industry where 
multi-product firms predominate, present an interesting special case The 
switch of one firm’s capacity to the standardized production (by a new 
technique) of one commodity will automatically leave unsatisfied those
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customers which had previously purchased other products from the 
innovating firm and this market (often a relatively unprofitable one) will fall 
to the backward firms (Posner 1961 331)
Like Linder, Posner’s theory generated a number of novel predictions, the principal 
one bemg that the pattern of international trade changes with the mtemational transfer 
of technology Like Linder’s, it retained the principle of comparative advantage as the 
underlying explanation for mtemational trade patterns Its principal dispute was, again 
like Linder’s theory, with the factor proportions explanation for comparative 
advantage Yet, neither of these theories were simply static replacements for the factor 
proportions theorem They involved the use of a very different set of heunstics to 
those of the static theory, the most obvious bemg then* emphasis on empirical 
investigation
In his product life cycle theory, Vemon (1966) went further than Linder and Posner, 
m  that he attacked, not only the factor proportions theorem, but also the principle of 
comparative advantage He argued that neoclassical analysis had outlived its 
usefulness "It is doubtful that we shall find many propositions that can match the 
simplicity, power, and universality of application of the theory of comparative 
advantage and the international equilibrating mechamsm, but unless the search for 
better tools goes on, the usefulness of economic theory for the solution of problems in
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international trade and capital movements will probably decline" (Vernon 1966 190)
Like Linder, Vernon too had a different agenda to that of the static theory of 
international trade He retained nothing of the static and dynamic theories of 
international trade Vernon’s was a whole new theory of international trade, which 
drew on theories of innovation, industrial growth, marketing and the behavioural 
theories of the firm Vernon approached mtemational trade from the perspective of the 
individual firm and its strategy vis-a-vis export markets The m a m  strategy options for 
the firm, as Vernon saw it, are to export or to engage in foreign direct investment In 
Vernon’s life cycle theory, the pattern of mtemational trade is dependent on the 
decision to export m  preference to direct investment by individual firms This 
decision, in m m ,  depends on the stage of development of the market for the product 
of the firm
Vemon outlined the stages of production of a good Each of these stages has specific 
characteristics which influence the decision about how to service the export market for 
the good In the first stage of production, Vemon argued that the product is likely to 
be differentiated due both to the adoption of a number of different production 
functions and a high degree of marketing (Vemon 1966 195) At this stage of 
production, the firm is faced with a number of strategy options, but due to the 
precariousness of its position m  the market these decisions are likely to mvolve 
regional as distinct from international locational or export strategies In contrast, in
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the mature stage of production, Vemon argued that the market for the product is more 
firmly established and the need for flexibility m  production functions declmes Vemon 
held that at this stage, firms become less concerned with the differentiation of their 
product and more with the accumulation of economies of scale It is at this stage of 
production that the firm turns to the question of how to expand its market The 
decision facmg the firm is whether to service this expanded market through exporting 
or through foreign direct investment (Vemon 1966 200)
Vemon held that the m a m  influence on this decision is the cost of foreign labour 
relative to transportation costs He suggested the possibility of an extreme case where 
domestic firms might switch all their production abroad and service the domestic 
market through exports "If labor cost differences are large enough to offset transport 
costs, then exports back to the Umted States may become a possibility as well" 
(Vemon 1966 200) Vemon predicted that foreign direct investment would be more 
likely to be chosen by a firm involved m  labour-intensive industries with standardised 
production methods He also used his theory of the mtemational product life cycle to 
provide an explanation of the Leontief Paradox What Leontief s empirical results 
showed, according to Vemon, was that "the Umted States [was] exporting 
high-income and labour-saving products in the early stages of their existence, and 
importing them later on" (Vemon 1966 201)
)
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Vernon predicted that "at an advanced stage in the standardisation of some products, 
the less-developed countries may offer comparative advantages as a production 
location" (Vernon 1966 202) Vernon based this prediction on an assumption that 
"highly standardized products tend to have a well-articulated, easily accessible 
international market and to sell largely on the basis of price" (Vernon 1966 203) 
Vernon went on to describe the likely characteristics of goods exported from lesser 
developed countries - "[t]heir production function is such as to require significant 
inputs of labor they are products with a high price elasticity of demand for the 
output of individual firms products whose production process did not rely heavily 
upon external economies products which could be precisely described by 
standardised specifications and which could be produced for inventory without fear of 
obsolescence" (Vernon 1966 204)
Vernon’s demi-core proposition that the pattern of international trade will be 
determined by developments in the production process would appear to conflict with 
the demi-core comparative advantage principle of the static theory For Vernon, 
national comparative advantage in the production of a good is temporary, if it is 
viewed in terms of national comparative costs of production Where the production 
function of a good changes over time, the country m  which the original production 
began may lose its comparative cost advantage as the necessity for certain factors 
decline and the demand for others increase Production then shifts to another country
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But is this a source of conflict with the comparative advantage principle9 Vernon’s 
argument could be restated m comparative advantage terms a country which is capital 
intensive will initiate production of a capital intensive good, as the production of that 
good matures and less new capital and technology are required, production of the 
good becomes relatively more labour intensive and the country loses its comparative 
advantage, production of the by now labour intensive good switches to labour 
intensive countries From this perspective, Vernon’s theory is not necessarily 
incompatible with the principle of comparative advantage or with the factor 
proportions theorem (This is contrary to the view expressed by Deardorff 1984)
Vernon’s approach to international trade is very different from the static theory, and 
from the theories of Lmder and Posner His theory can be incorporated with Linder 
and Posner into the dynamic theory of international trade, if one accepts the argument 
presented above that Vernon’s theory does not conflict with the principle of 
comparative advantage Grouping the three theories together m this way suggests that 
the dynamic theory of international trade, during this period, was characterised by 
methodological pluralism What ties the three theories together, however, is their 
support of the comparative advantage proposition and an emphasis on empirical 
investigation A Lakatosian analysis would suggest, however, that this commonality is 
not enough to prevent Vernon’s theory from being ad hoc to the dynamic theory 
Despite its novel facts, it is not consistent with the macroeconomic view of 
international trade taken by the dynamic theory
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7 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATIC THEORIES THE SAMUELSON 
SHIFT
The Heckscher/Ohlin theorem resolved the classical problem of how to link 
international prices to the production function, and allowed for the development of a 
complete general equilibrium formulation of the static theory of international trade 
From a neoclassical perspective, the elucidation of the Heckscher/Ohlin theorem and 
the development of techniques of analysis were the mam events in the international 
trade sub-disciplme during the 1930s Both events allowed for the development of a 
strong neoclassical heuristic within the sub-discipline From this time until the 1970s, 
those working within the static theory developed an intense preoccupation with the 
axiomatic deduction of hypotheses based on the general equilibrium framework 
provided by the Heckscher/Ohlin theorem This set of hypotheses is commonly 
referred to as the Heckscher/Ohlin/Samuelson (HOS) theories, m order to 
acknowledge the work done m this regard by Samuelson
From the mid-1940s, the static theory underwent quite dramatic formalisation This 
development was directly tied to developments in mathematical economics, general 
equilibrium theory, and welfare economics This section considers the mam aspects of 
that development
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In Stolper and Samuelson’s 1941 paper, they were concerned with Haberler’s (1936) 
prediction that where factors are immobile across industries there could be substantial 
welfare losses from specialisation according to comparative advantage (This was a 
possibility later considered by Lmder, although he does not refer to Haberler’s 
prediction)
Stolper and Samuelson agreed that in the two-factor/two-good model, "international 
trade necessarily lowers the real wage o f the scarce factor expressed in terms o f any 
good" (Stolper and Samuelson 1969 257) This admission raised a serious question for 
the demi-core proposition that free trade optimises welfare While it was a relatively 
simple affair to show that the scarce factor would lose from international trade, it was 
more difficult to analyse the effect on the scarce factor m a multi-factor/multi-good 
model Stolper and Samuelson concluded that in a multi-factor model, the factor 
proportions explanation for comparative advantage is unlikely to hold due to the 
existence of factor intensity reversals The existence of more than two factors 
increases the possibility that a number of different production functions could be used 
to produce the same identical good Thus, the definition of industry employed by the 
HO theorem is no longer appropriate in a multi-factor model of international trade 
However, Stolper and Samuelson pointed out that irrespective of the causes of 
pre-trade comparative cost advantages, international trade could still render losses to a 
particular groups of factors, although the possibility of "diverse patterns of
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complementarity and competitiveness" means that this loss is not inevitable (Stolper 
and Samuelson 1969 267) They do concede that these factors could only be identified 
after the process of specialisation has begun In a multi-commodity model, Stolper and 
Samuelson argued that the scarce factor (in their case, labour) will lose from trade, 
since "there will inevitably be a relative substitution of labour for capital in each line 
of production" (Stolper and Samuelson 1969 263)
This admission of welfare loss would seem to conflict with the demi-core of the 
international trade sub-discipline, were it not for the fact that Stolper and Samuelson 
make the following assertion "We are anxious to point out that even in the two factor 
case our argument provides no political ammunition for the protectiomst For if 
effects on the terms of trade can be disregarded, it has been shown that the harm 
which free trade inflicts upon one factor of production is necessarily less than the gam 
to the other" (Stolper and Samuelson 1969 267) To protect the free trade policy m 
the face of the Stolper/Samuelson prediction, it was necessary to introduce a proviso 
in the free trade proposition
DC4 Free trade (with compensation) increases the welfare of all participants
Stolper and Samuelson provided the justification for the compensation principle by 
showing that the welfare loss to the scarce factor will always be less than the overall 
gam from trade in the static two-factor/two-good model Even though this
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modification of the free trade proposition conflicts with the negative heuristic 
instruction not to interfere with the demi-core propositions, the modification was made 
in a way that was compatible with the neoclassical heuristics of the static theory This 
is a reversal of the Lakatosian conditions for a creative shift In MSRP, a creative 
shift occurs when there is a modification of the heuristics, but not of the hard core 
Stolper and Samuelson modified the demi-core, but m a way that was consistent with 
the heuristics This cannot be considered as a shift which results m the creation of a 
whole new theory, m the way that Krugman and Lancaster’s models were interpreted 
m chapter 5 4 The Stolper/Samuelson modification did not result m the generation of 
a whole new theory, but it allowed for further progress in the old theory One could 
argue, m the light of this, that creative shifts may also occur in a programme, where 
the hard core is changed m a way that allows for the incorporation of more novel 
facts, and in a way that is consistent with the existing heuristics of the programme
Stolper and Samuelson’s paper noted the tendency identified by Ohlin (1933) towards 
factor price equalisation, where international trade causes mter-industry specialisation 
across countries according to relative factor abundance The proof for complete factor 
price equalisation was to dominate much of the static theories during the ’Samuelson 
shift’ In 1933, Lemer showed that under a competitive tradmg equilibrium there 
would be relative and absolute factor price equalisation, although this proof was not 
published until 1952 Lemer’s proof was in the form of a geometric analysis Under 
the assumption of identical production functions within industries, factor price
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equalisation will, by definition, occur where the production frontiers of the trading 
partners are tangential to the international price line
Samuelson (1948,1949) gave a mathematical proof for relative and absolute factor 
price equalisation m the two-factor/two-good model Specialisation according to factor 
abundance causes demand for the abundant factor to increase relatively more than 
demand for the scarce factor The price of the abundant factor rises, while the price of 
the scarce factor falls In the trading partner, the same factor price changes are 
observed These factor price movements continue until factor prices are equalised m 
both countries At this point, the pre-trade comparative cost advantages have 
disappeared for each country and the volume of international trade stops expanding 
Underlying this proof are a substantial number of assumptions Factor markets must 
be perfectly competitive, and factors fully mobile within each country Allied to this is 
the assumption that both labour and capital earn the same in both industries A 
globally umvalent production function is assumed, that is, an assumption that there is 
a umque relationship between the price of factors and the price of goods Specifically, 
the factor price must be equal to the marginal productivity of the factor times the price 
of the good produced There is, in addition, the assumption of homogeneous and 
identical production functions across countries in respect of each industry Each of 
these assumptions made it difficult to render the factor price equalisation hypothesis 
empirically testable
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The main issue in this respect was the proof of whether the umvalent relationship 
between the price of factors and the price of goods held irrespective of factor prices, 
and in a multi-factor/multi-good model Pearce questioned Samuelson’s (1949) proof 
that production functions are invertible irrespective of factor prices (Pearce 1951-2) 
While Pearce accepted Samuelson’s proof of the umvalent relationship between goods 
prices and factor prices m the two-factor/two-good model, he argued that the same 
relationship could not be said to hold m a multi-factor/multi-good model (Pearce 
1951-52 114) In a mathematical appendix to Pearce’s paper, James and Pearce 
showed that m a three-factor/three-good model, factor prices could not be held as 
umquely determinable from traded goods prices (James and Pearce 1951-52 119-120) 
Pearce went on to show that where this umvalent relationship did not hold, then it 
would be possible for the common international price to be a result of different factor 
prices in tradmg countries Samuelson m his comment on Pearce (1951-52), conceded 
the problem with the assumption of identical production functions which Pearce 
highlighted (Samuelson 1951-52) In his 1953 paper, Samuelson further considered 
the proof provided by James and Pearce In James and Pearce’s proof, they argued 
that if the relationship between the factor price and the goods price, p = f(w), was 
umvalent, then the Jacobian, df/dw,  would have to remain invertible (le must not 
change sign) (James and Pearce 1951-52 120) In 1953, Samuelson put forward what 
he believed was an extension of the umvalence conditions to the 
multi-factor/multi-good case (Samuelson 1953 16) Both Laursen (1952) and
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McKenzie (1955) avoided this issue in their analysis of factor price equalisation, by 
choosing specific forms of analysis Laursen analysed factor price equalisation via 
log-lmear Cobb-Douglas production functions, while McKenzie used activity analysis 
or lmear programming Both of these analyses assume umvalence in the first instance 
Given this, McKenzie’s ’proof’ of umvalence (McKenzie 1955 243), essentially puts 
forward as a novel fact, that which it uses as an initial assumption
The notion of umvalence seems to have pre-occupied mathematicians as much as trade 
theorists (Chipman 1966 30) Nikaido showed Samuelson’s proof of umvalence in the 
multi-model to be false (Chipman 1966 30) Some considerable developments in 
mathematics were necessary to show the conditions under which the Jacobian could be 
held invertible m the multi-factor/multi-good model Without the specification of these 
conditions for umqueness, the factor price equalisation theorem remamed unproven in 
the multi-factor/multi-good case Moreover, the Heckscher/Ohlm theorem could not 
be extended to the general case either. Thus, it was not until Gale and Nikaido (1965), 
when the conditions for the mvertibihty of the Jacobian were isolated, that the HOS 
predictions could be extended to the multi-factor/multi-good model Where the 
function p = f(w) is globally umvalent, there are no factor intensity reversals and the 
definition of industry underlying the HOS theories can be upheld (It should be noted 
that Chipman did raise a doubt as to the validity of the Gale/Nikaido proof (Chipman 
1966 3 9 )) As can be seen by this discussion, the debate over the proofs for factor
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price equalisation was a complex one Yet, it failed to raise any novel predictions
The mam novel predictions of the static theory at this time were the 
Stolper/Samuelson theorem 1941, factor price equalisation in the two-factor/two-good 
model (Samuelson 1948, 1949), factor price equalisation m the 
multi-factor/multi-good model (Samuelson 1953), Rybczynski’s theorem 1955 The 
empirical testing of these predictions was not an issue, and indeed, they were 
formalised in such a way as to render them untestable "the whole discussion is, for 
better or worse, a supreme example of nonoperational theorizing" (Caves 1960 92) 
Blaug pointed out the paradox in Samuelson’s role m the development of a nontestable 
theory of international trade, given his methodological suggestion that economists 
focus on the generation of operationally meaningful statements (Blaug 1992 188)
International trade theorists did consider the disturbing causes to the predictions of the 
static theory They considered, for example, the effect of unequal numbers of 
factors/goods, variable factor supplies, specialisation and mcreasmg returns to scale 
Indeed, Johnson argued that the whole purpose of the factor price equalisation analysis 
was to elucidate disturbing causes
The Samuelson factor price equalisation theorem is indeed a splendid 
proposition, but its chief practical relevance is to direct attention -by the 
indirect process of theoretical abstraction- to the many reasons why factor
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prices, and more still, mcomes per head, are unlikely to be equalised m the 
real world as we know it (Johnson 1970 19)
Mill stressed the importance of elucidating disturbing causes to the predictions of 
abstract economic theory (Mill 1874 330, see section 4 3) However, m Mill’s 
methodology, disturbing causes are revealed by comparmg abstract predictions with 
real world pheonomena, not by the process of ‘theoretical abstraction’ outlined by 
Johnson
As Johnson argued, the static theory of international trade was not, at this time,
"much concerned with the empirical problems of predictmg or prescribing which 
goods will or should be traded by particular countries, or of specifying the 
characteristics of such goods" (Johnson 1970 10) The agenda of the static theory as it 
developed durmg the ‘Samuelson shift’ of the 1950s and 1960s, was a very different 
one to that of the dynamic theory of international trade Most textbooks implicitly 
suggest that a choice was made between the two theories, with the static theory being 
chosen as the appropriate method of analysing patterns of international trade The next 
section poses the following question- on what criteria could this choice between the 
static and the dynamic theories have been based7
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7 3 THEORY-CHOICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUB-DISCIPLINE
This section uses the theories of scientific rationality in order to elucidate possible 
criteria which would have facilitated a choice between the static and the dynamic 
theories of international trade, as they stood at the end of the 1960s
That falsificatiomsm was not on the methodological agenda of the international trade 
sub-disciplme is evident from the treatment of trade theorists to Leontief’s empirical 
findings on the pattern of U S trade De Marchi (1976) showed that, far from 
rejecting the factor proportions theorem, trade theorists defended the theorem m the 
face of Leontief’s findings with an ad hoc redefinition of ‘factor’ The Leontief 
paradox, that U S exports were predommantly labour intensive while the U S was 
abundant m capital, did not cause the upheaval for the static theory that would be 
suggested in a Poppenan rational reconstruction
De Marchi argued that "the Leontief test, though not perfectly controlled, is probably 
about as clear an example of a ‘crucial experiment’ as one is likely to encounter m 
economics" (de Marchi 1976 113) If it was deemed by the trade theorists of the 
1950s as a crucial experiment, then one is forced to conclude that these theorists made 
a conscious decision not to reject the factor proportions theorem despite the 
conclusions of the crucial experiment However, given that the reaction to the
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Leontief findings was to point to problems with the procedures employed by Leontief, 
it seems that theorists did not hold Leontief’s to be a crucial experiment There was, 
m fact, considerable agreement that the Leontief results could be overturned with the 
inclusion of skilled labour as a component of the U S capital endowment (as shown in 
the studies of Kravis 1956, Kenen 1965, Keesmg 1966) Leontief, himself, made 
several suggestions as to how his data might be made more compatible with the factor 
proportions prediction (Leontief 1969 126-139)
Crucial experiments are, for Popper, "experiments which could falsify and thus 
eliminate some of the competing theories" (Popper 1972 15) Falsificatiomsm 
presupposes some consensus on the part of the scientific community as to what 
constitutes a crucial experiment No such consensus existed in respect of Leontief’s 
test, and this is evidenced by the extent to which the empirical work following 
Leontief was largely concerned with reorgamsmg the data to fit the factor proportions 
theorem
Does a Lakatosian rational reconstruction fare any better at providmg an explanation 
for the apparent dominance of the static theory as the primary explanation for 
international trade patterns durmg the 1950s and 1960s7 MSRP argues that the choice 
between theories should be made on the criterion of empirically corroborated novel 
facts
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The static theory, while it may have generated theoretical novel predictions, made 
little attempt to empirically corroborate these predictions Indeed, the static theory 
immunised itself from empirical judgement by generating nonoperational hypotheses 
Its major novel fact was refuted by the Leontief paradox This refutation was 
overturned by later studies, and this afforded some support for a modified version of 
the factor proportions theorem There was also some support for the neoclassical, 
Ricardian model of international trade Empirical investigations by MacDougall 
(1951,1952), Stem (1962) and Balassa (1963), pointed to the positive relation between 
labour productively and comparative advantage There are two pomts to be made m 
respect of this evidence Firstly, the Ricardian model, while it assumed a link between 
labour productivity and comparative advantage, did not explain this link Thus, in 
Lakatosian terms, the model uses a novel fact twice, once m its construction and once 
in its prediction The labour productivity explanation for international trade cannot 
therefore be considered an empirically corroborated novel fact The second pomt is 
that this model does not conflict with the dynamic theory of international trade which 
is also based on the proposition of comparative advantage If it were to constitute an 
empirically corroborated novel fact, it would support both theories
The dynamic theory of international trade prompted a significant number of empirical 
investigations, particularly in respect of Posner’s prediction of a link between 
technological development and the pattern of international trade (for example,
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Bruno 1970, Hall and Johnson 1970, Hufbauer 1970) A number of the theory’s novel 
facts were corroborated A tally of empirical corroborated novel facts would suggest 
that the dynamic theory of international trade was the more (Lakatosian) progressive 
at this time A Lakatosian rational reconstruction could, therefore, not explain the 
persistence of the static theory of international trade, when a more progressive 
dynamic theory existed
There is, however, a problem with this conclusion The heuristics of the static theory 
of international trade did not stress the importance of empirical corroboration Static 
theorists were not instructed to test their predictions, in the way dynamic theorists 
were Thus, any methodological judgement between the two theories on empirical 
grounds is bound to favour the dynamic theory, and to argue therefore that the 
persistence of the static theory was an irrational move by trade theorists, one that is 
explained by factors external to any empirically-based rational reconstruction
Vernon proposed that the mam reason for the persistence of the static theory is that the 
"doctrine of comparative advantage and the theory of the international equilibrating 
process have a simplicity, a strength, and a clarity that are not matched by many 
branches of economic theory" (Vernon 1970 2) But strength in Vernon’s context is 
not equal to the Lakatosian concept of heuristic strength In Lakatosian terms, 
heuristic strength or power is the potential ability of a programme to generate
Bharadwaj and Bhagwati 1967, Gruber, Mehta and Vernon 1967, Keesing 1966,
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empirically corroborated novel predictions (Lakatos 1970 155) Economists, however, 
often mean something else when they talk about the strength of a theory or set of 
theories It is the strength of a theory in the abstract, the ability of a theory to explain 
in terms of an idealised model of reality This is the first stage m Mill’s dual 
methodology of political economy The second stage is to test these predictions against 
the real world m order to elucidate the disturbing causes to them It is this second 
stage that was overlooked within the static theory of international trade during the 
‘Samuelson shift’
Worrall argued that a choice between theories might be based on their relative internal 
consistency with their heuristics (Worrall 1978a 63, see section 3 2) There can be no 
doubt that the static theory was consistent with its neoclassical heuristics, which 
directed the theory to examine the stability and umqueness of general equilibrium 
models of international trade The dynamic theory too, however, was consistent with 
its heuristic, which directed the theory to empirically test predictions about the pattern 
of international trade However, the dynamic theory was a collection of 
methodologically diverse theories, with this single common heuristic It could 
therefore be argued that the static theory displayed more mtemal consistency, and was 
therefore the preferred theory Worrall argued that the heuristic criterion could be 
used m the case where two theories under consideration had predicted empirically 
corroborated novel facts to the same extent, that is, where the two theories are 
empirically equivalent (Worrall 1978a 63) Without this proviso, the heuristic
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criterion is nothing more than a conventionalist preference for precision, order, 
clarity, etc The persistence of the static theory can only be explamed m these 
non-empincal terms It is difficult not to agree with Corden’s conclusion that the 
preoccupations of the static theory during its ‘Samuelson shift’ were nothing more 
than an "intellectual game" (Corden 1965 31)
A Lakatosian rational reconstruction might explain dommance of the static theory, as 
adherence to a degenerative theory m the hope that it would eventually undergo a 
creative shift and begm to generate empirically corroborated novel facts once again 
As the previous chapter shows, the changes which did occur in the static theory at the 
end of the late 1970s resulted m the development of a whole new static theory of 
international trade Is it accurate, however, to argue that the static theory dominated 
the international trade sub-disciplme, in the period before this whole new static theory 
of international trade emerged9
While in the 1950s there may have been a period where mtemational trade became 
preoccupied with questions of existence and stability in the two country/two good/two 
factor model, this preoccupation had diminished greatly by the 1960s The 1960s saw 
the development of two progressive dynamic theories of international trade, critiques 
of the methodology of the static theory of international trade, and the development of 
a new heuristic instructing trade theorists to test their predictions The dommance of 
the static theory appears only in textbooks of the period The tendency to follow the
302
neoclassical history of economic thought has perhaps led critics to focus on the static 
theory, rather than on the development of the international trade sub-disciplme as a 
whole Blaug, for example, focused solely on the development of the static theory 
during the ‘Samuelson shift’, and not surprisingly, concluded that international trade 
theory was "prone to the disease of formalism" (Blaug 1992 190) This conclusion 
perpetuates the myth that the static theory of international trade was the dommant 
theory of international trade from the 1940s to the end of the 1970s (It is strange that 
Blaug, given his falsifications tendencies, did not examine the empirical work on 
patterns of international trade that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s)
It is only when focusmg on the development of the static theory, that the international 
trade sub-discipline appears esoteric and unrealistic In fact, the sub-disciplme only 
allowed neoclassical heuristics to dominate for a relatively short period of time, the 
1940s and 1950s By the 1960s, the sub-disciplme had reverted to its usual method of 
using the static theory to explain the basic principles of international trade, while 
dealing with real world trade patterns and allied policy issues within a dynamic 
framework The extent to which the empirical evidence on mtra-industry trade, 
gathered during the 1970s, influenced the development of the new theories is 
examined in the final chapter of this dissertation The conclusion of this final chapter 
should either corroborate or refute the methodological hypothesis that the new theories 
of international trade facilitated a convergence of the static and dynamic theories of 
international trade
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE INFLUENCE OF EMPIRICAL TESTING ON THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 
- THE CASE OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE
In the previous chapter, it was argued that a neoclassical rational reconstruction of the 
history of international trade theory would ignore the shift in methodology towards the 
empirical which occurred in the international trade sub-disciplme m the 1960s, and 
emphasise instead the development of the neoclassical, static theory of international 
trade This chapter examines a particular part of that empirical work, namely, 
empirical investigations mto the phenomenon of mtra-mdustry trade
Trade theorists tend to refer to both cross trade as identified by Marshall and Taussig, 
and the Lovasy/Krugman phenomenon of mtra-mdustry trade, as mtra-mdustry trade 
Cross trade is not incompatible with the principle of comparative advantage, as 
explamed by the Heckscher/Ohlin factor proportions theorem But it is compatible 
with the principle of comparative advantage Cross trade, as defined by Marshall and 
by Taussig, is international trade m respect of goods classified within the same
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industrial group Marshall and Taussig assumed that these goods, while m the same 
industrial classification, were produced under different production functions It is 
conceivable, therefore, that one good within an industry could be labour intensive, 
while another could be capital intensive Under such circumstances, cross trade is 
compatible with the factor proportions explanation for international trade
Intra-industry trade, as it was defined by Lovasy (1941) and by Krugman (1979), is 
not reconcilable with the factor proportions theorem Intra-mdustry trade is trade m 
varieties of a smgle product, where there are no differences in the factor requirements 
for each variety regardless of where they are produced Factor proportions, therefore, 
cannot explam intra-mdustry trade Intra-mdustry trade also runs counter to the 
principle of comparative advantage Both Lovasy’s (1941) and Krugman’s (1979) 
models assume that two countries are identical m every respect Under this condition, 
no international trade based on comparative advantage would occur However, Lovasy 
and Krugman both show that mtra-mdustry trade can occur under this assumption 
Thus, mtra-mdustry trade, as defined by Lovasy and by Krugman, contradicts both the 
factor proportions theorem and the principle of comparative advantage The failure of 
many trade theorists to make a clear distinction between these two types of 
international trade raised an important issue in the methodological debate over whether 
an alternative theory to the factor proportions explanation for comparative advantage 
was necessary
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In chapter 6 4, it was argued that the new theories of international trade, based on 
Krugman’s model of mtra-industry trade, created a shift m the static theory of 
\  international trade to the extent that a new static theory of international trade was 
generated A question was posed as to whether that shift m the static theory was borne 
out of changes which occurred in the heuristics of the dominating neoclassical 
programme, or whether the impetus for these new theories came from the empirical 
evidence on mtra-industry trade generated in the 1960s and 1970s This chapter
)
J considers whether the empirical investigations facilitated a convergence between the 
/< dynamic and the static theories of international trade, and whether the new theories of 
J international trade exemplify such a convergence
8 1 THE MEASUREMENT OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE
Empirical evidence which showed the existence of extensive mtra-industry trade was 
put forward m a number of papers m the 1960s and 1970s They include Dreze 
(1961), Balassa (1966,1978,1979) Kojima (1964), Grubel (1967,1970), Grubel and 
Lloyd (1971, 1975), Willmore (1972), Aqumo (1978), McAleese (1977, 1978)
Because of the distinction between cross trade and intra-industry drawn above, it is 
necessary to consider the way in which intra-industry trade has been measured in
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order to establish whether or not it is mtra-industry trade or cross trade which has 
been measured
The most common index used to measure mtra-mdustry trade has been (and remains) 
the measure used by Grubel (1967) and later modified by Grubel and Lloyd (1971)
GLj (X +  M ) - |X - MJ (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 496)
X = exports of industry i, M( = imports of industry i, (X( + Nl) = the value of total 
trade, where i = (1, ,n), n bemg the number of industries at a chosen level of
industrial aggregation, | X - Mj | = net exports from the industry Grubel and Lloyd 
derived this measurement from their definition of mtra-mdustry trade "the value of 
exports of an ‘industry’ which is exactly matched by the imports of the same industry" 
(Grubel and Lloyd 1971 496) Grubel and Lloyd took the 3-digit SITC classification as 
then- definition of industry
While this measure gives a value for mtra-mdustry trade m a given industry, an index 
is required for comparative industry and country studies
GL2 [(X, + M,) - |X - MJ] 100 / (X, + M,)
(Grubel and Lloyd 1971 496)
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This index ranges from 0 to 100 It equals 100 where there is complete intra-industry 
trade, that is, where X = It equals 0 where either X or equals 0, that is, 
where there is complete wier-industry trade
Underlymg the Grubel/Lloyd definition of intra-industry trade, is an assumption about 
the extent of mtra-industry specialisation across countries The closer that X moves to 
M , the greater a country is specialised m the production of goods within the same 
mdustrial classification as its trading partners If X[ exceeds Nl, then there is still 
some mter-mdustry specialisation between a country and ts trading partners Grubel 
considered the extent of mtra-mdustry specialisation within the EEC, for the years 
1955, 1958 and 1963 The proposition of comparative advantage would predict 
growing specialisation across countries m terms of their national comparative 
advantage as trade was liberalised On the basis of this prediction, the pattern of 
international trade should have shown greater export concentration as trade increased 
among member states (Grubel 1967 377) Grubel compiled variances for the 
mtra-EEC shares of total exports for each member-state, by calculating a trade ratio 
for each member in respect of each traded industry These ratios were classified 
according to whether exports were greater than, equal to or less than imports Grubel 
then calculated the mean and variance of these ratios, for each industry
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Grubel argued that if inter-mdustry specialisation, as predicted by the principle of 
comparative advantage, was occurring, one would expect to see an mcrease m the 
variance of export shares calculated for each member-state (Grubel 1967 377) In 
contrast, Grubel noted a "profound tendency towards an equalisation of three-digit 
industry exports and imports among the Common Market countries, evidenced by the 
decreases of both the means and the variances of the ratios" (Grubel 1967 378) This, 
Grubel argued, was .evidence that mira-industry specialisation was occurring The 
argument that mtra-industry specialisation can be inferred from increased 
mtra-industry trade is circular Grubel was, m essence, arguing that a country whose 
exports and imports are movmg closer together within a particular industrial group is 
engagmg in mtra-mdustry specialisation, because (he assumes) mtra-industry 
specialisation causes a country’s exports and imports within a particular industry to 
move closer together The argument is circular because Grubel failed to make any 
hypothesis about the link between his empirical definition of mtra-mdustry trade, and 
the notion of mtra-mdustry specialisation It is possible that mtra-mdustry trade is 
indicative, not of mtra-mdustry specialisation across countries, but rather as indicative 
of cross-country changes in comparative advantage due, say to changes m 
technological development across countries
The problem which this theoretical gap creates is considered below in respect of
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Aquino’s (1978) modification of the Grubel/Lloyd measures of mtra-industry trade
Grubel and Lloyd modified further their measure of intra-industry trade, in order to 
account for variance m the proportions of intra-industry trade across industries 
Without this modification, the index will overestimate the extent of mtra-mdustry 
trade as a proportion of total trade The GL2 mdex must be weighted to take account 
of the relative importance of industries to the total trade balance
GL3 [En(X + M )  - En | X - Mj | / En(X + Itf)] 100 
(Grubel and Lloyd 1971 497)
Grubel and Lloyd pointed to a problem with this modified version of GL3, if a 
country’s total trade is imbalanced (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 497) The mdex will 
underestimate the extent of mtra-mdustry trade when total exports and imports across 
n mdustnes is not matched Grubel and Lloyd attempted to remove this distortion "by 
expressing mtra-mdustry trade as a proportion of total commodity export plus import 
trade less the trade imbalance" (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 497) This has the effect of 
increasing the proportion of mtra-mdustry trade by a proportion of the size of a total 
trade deficit in the case of such a deficit, and decreasmg it m the case of a trade 
surplus This is akin to making an estimate of the proportion of mtra-mdustry trade 
there would be if total trade were balanced The adjusted mdex is the following
310
GL. [E(X  - M ) - E  IX - M I / E (X + M) -  I EX - E M  I] 1004 L n v 1 v  n 1 i l 1 n v l V 1 n 1 n 1 1J
(Grubel and Lloyd 1971 498)
Grubel and Lloyd next turned to the impact of the level of statistical aggregation on 
their indices They noted that GL3 will register more mtra-industry trade at the higher 
levels of aggregation, since the denominator, En(X +  M^, is unaffected by the level 
of aggregation (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 498) Aggregation has the foliowmg effect 
"aggregation mcreases the measure of intra-industry trade by a greater amount the 
greater the extent to which the terms (Xy - My) at the less aggregated level are of 
opposite sign" (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 498) The same effect applies, of course, to 
aggregation across countries, that is, the measure for bilateral mtra-mdustry trade will 
underestimate the extent of mtra-mdustry trade, compared to the measure for 
mtra-mdustry trade across a number of countries (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 499)
Grubel and Lloyd used these indices to calculate the extent of mtra-mdustry trade m 
Australia They found that the extent of mtra-mdustry trade as a proportion of 
Australia’s total trade, was less than proportions found m respect of industrialised 
countries m other studies (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 499) However, Grubel and Lloyd 
argued that certain of the mdustries m which Australia traded, revealed very high 
levels of mtra-mdustry trade and that this supported the hypothesis that "the
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phenomenon of mtra-mdustry trade is not restricted to trade among highly 
industrialised countries" (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 499)
Grubel and Lloyd noted that the level of mtra-mdustry trade declined rapidly as the 
degree of aggregation declined (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 500) This shows a serious 
downside to their measures of mtra-mdustry trade, since it may be the case that 
mtra-industry trade is merely a product of statistical aggregation "It is quite possible 
for a low level of mtra-commodity trade among several ’industries’, reflecting the fact 
the country exports and does not import the products of some of these industries while 
it imports and does not export the others, to become a high level of mtra-mdustry 
trade when these industries are aggregated" (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 500)
In order to show that mtra-mdustry persisted at the lower levels of aggregation,
Grubel and Lloyd undertook correlations between the 2-digit measure and the 3-digit 
measure, and between the 3-digit measure and the 5-digit measure, of mtra-mdustry 
trade in the industries they were investigating They found high correlations, which 
imply that the extent of mtra-mdustry trade persisted over the different levels of 
aggregation As they had expected in the light of the problems with the indices which 
they had noted, Grubel and Lloyd found that "the adjusted averages are generally 
higher than the unadjusted figures and more so for bilateral than total trade (Grubel 
and Lloyd 1971 501)
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Aquino noted that Grubel and Lloyd made no adjustment to GL2, for the bias they 
identified m GL3 (Aquino 1978 280) The assumption Grubel and Lloyd made, 
according to Aqumo, is that the downward bias in GL3, is due to the fact that it 
aggregates the means of GL2 (Aqumo 1978 280) Aqumo argued, however, that the 
bias is just as likely to appear at the level of a single commodity, as it is at the highest 
level of aggregation (Aqumo 1978 280) In other words, the trade unbalance of an 
individual industry is as likely to impact on the measure of mtra-mdustry trade within 
that industry, as the total trade imbalance would have on the calculation of 
mtra-mdustry trade across all industries
Aqumo introduced an alternative index, Qy, which estimates the proportion of 
mtra-mdustry trade, had there been no total trade imbalance
Q [E(X + M ) - E IX - M I]/ [E(X e+ M e)] 100
y y y 1 y y 1 y y
where X e = X [1/2 E(X +  M ) ] / EX
ij ij L i v ij i / J ij
and M e = M [1/2 E(X +  M )]/ EM
y  i j  L i v  i j  i j / J  ij
(Aqumo 1978 280)
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Aquino conceded that it is likely that all industries will be equi-proportionately 
affected by the total trade imbalance, but he argued that "in the absense of any 
information about mter-commodity differences in the strength of the unbalancing 
effect the best one can do is then to assume that it is equi-proportional m all industries 
and equal to the overall unbalance" (Aqumo 1978 280)
Despite the rather unrealistic assumption used in the construction of this index,
Aqumo argued that it has an important advantage over over GL3 and GL4 In order to 
show this advantage, Aqumo considered the case of two countries one with an equal 
ratio of exports to imports m its three industries, and one with complete intra-industry 
trade m two mdustnes (le exports = imports) and substantially more exports than 
imports in the third industry Both countries have the same absolute total trade figures, 
with both having an overall trade surplus
Case I Case II
X M X My o u y
Chemicals 20 10 10 10
Textiles 10 5 40 5
Machinery 40 20 20 20
(Aquino 1978 281)
With regard to case 1, it would appear that there is both intra-industry and 
mter-mdustry trade, in that exports exceed imports in each of the three industries The 
GL3 index is equal to 66 66, which confirms this view However, as Grubel and 
Lloyd pointed out, this mdex is likely to contain a downward bias where total trade is 
imbalanced The GL4 mdex is equal to 100, implying that there is m fact complete 
mtra-mdustry trade m case 1 when the impact of the total trade imbalance is taken into 
consideration
In case 1, the ratio of exports to imports is the same for all mdustnes In case 2, 
however, the ratios are not all the same If one accepts the Grubel and Lloyd 
argument that, where the value of exports is equal to the value of imports, there is 
complete mtra-mdustry specialisation, then there is greater mtra-mdustry specialisation 
m case 2 Note, however, that there is no more mtra-mdustry trade than m case 1 
Thus, it is not surprising that the GL indices are the same for both cases The fact that 
the mdices are equalised across the two cases shows the mistake in inferring, as 
Grubel (1967) did, the existence of mtra-mdustry trade specialisation from 
mtra-mdustry trade figures alone
Aquino made a different point about the equalisation of the mdices m respect of the 
two cases He argued that in case 2, there is "a clear tendency to specialize m textiles
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with respect to chemicals and machinery, m this case only a proportion of total trade 
is intra-industry trade" (Aquino 1978 281) In other words, the fact that the ratios of 
exports to imports is no longer equal indicates, for Aquino, the development of 
inter-industry specialisation He argues that GL4 over-estimates the level of 
intra-industry trade m the second case, because for Aqumo, this change m the relative 
trade ratios must mdicate more mter-industry trade than m case 1 The value of the 
index "would be in fact equal to 100 in case 1 (no mter-industry specialization hence 
all trade is mtra-mdustry trade) and to 57 1 in case 2 (42 9% of trade stems from 
mter-industry specialization and the remaining 57 1% is mtra-mdustry trade)" (Aqumo 
1978 282) Thus, Aqumo argued that while GL3 is a downward biased measure, GL4 
is an upward biased measure where total trade is unbalanced (Aqumo 1978 281n) He 
implied that an mdex should reflect the fact that export/import ratios can differ across 
industries, since, this, according to Aqumo, is an mdicator of mter-industry 
specialisation
However, according to the Grubel/Lloyd definition of mtra-mdustry specialisation, 
there is more mira-industry specialisation m case 2, in that there are more mdustnes 
in which the value of exports is exactly offset by the value of imports Thus, Grubel 
and Lloyd’s indices do not reflect the very thing they purport to be measurmg, namely 
the extent of mtra-mdustry specialisation
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This section has focused on the Grubel/Lloyd measure of mtra-mdustry trade because 
they were and continue to be extensively used (In respect of Irish mtra-mdustry trade, 
the Grubel/Lloyd measures were last used in NESC 1989) Yet, these measures are 
not unproblematic This section identifies a problem with the Grubel/Lloyd indices, m 
respect of the link drawn between mtra-mdustry trade and mtra-mdustry specialisation 
The following section considers these indices m respect of the distinction drawn 
between mtra-mdustry trade and cross trade The question to be answered is the 
following do the Grubel/Lloyd mdices provide a measure of a pattern of international 
trade which cannot be explamed by the factor proportions theorem, or even by the 
principle of comparative advantage9
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8 2 INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE - A STATISTICAL ABBERATION9
In 1975, Grubel and Lloyd published the first textbook on intra-industry trade As in 
then* earlier paper, they concluded that the factor proportions theorem could only 
explam certain types of mtra-mdustry trade for example, mtra-industry trade which 
arises out of different transportation costs across countries and within countries, 
mtra-mdustry trade due to seasonality of production m agricultural products, and 
mtra-mdustry trade which is essentially the re-export of slightly modified products 
(Grubel and Lloyd 1975 71-82) Specification of these different types of mtra-mdustry 
trade mdicates that mtra-mdustry trade, for Grubel and Lloyd, has a much wider 
definition than for Lovasy and for Krugman
Grubel and Lloyd identified three different types of mtra-mdustry trade, where the 
traded goods are close substitutes in either production or consumption The first was 
trade m goods which are close substitutes in consumption but not m production This
i
is the Marshall/Taussig cross trade Grubel and Lloyd pomted out that this type of 
mtra-mdustry trade is compatible with the principle of comparative advantage "Input 
requirements for the production of different types of furniture (wood and steel) are 
so different that the principle of comparative advantage can be found importing and 
exporting simultaneously two products within the same group" (Grubel and Lloyd 
1975 87) They stressed that in this case, "the intra-industry trade phenomenon is
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simply the result of statistical aggregation" (Grubel and Lloyd 1975 87) While Grubel 
and Lloyd did not expressly say so, it is clear that this type of intra-industry trade is 
compatible with a factor proportions explanation of mtra-industry trade if the 
mdustnal classification is narrowed Where the industrial classification is narrowed, 
this type of trade pattern becomes inter-industry trade
A second type of intra-industry trade highlighted by Grubel and Lloyd, is trade in 
goods which have "rather similar input requirements but low substitutability m use" 
(Grubel and Lloyd 1975 86) They argued that in this case, mtra-industry trade arises 
out of "technical peculiarities" such as the manufacture of jomt products (Grubel and 
Lloyd 1975 88) This type of mtra-mdustry trade, they argued, can be compatible 
with the principle of comparative advantage and with factor proportions (Grubel and 
Lloyd 1975 88)
Finally, Grubel and Lloyd identified mtra-mdustry trade in respect of goods with 
similar production functions and high substitutability in consumption This is the 
Lovasy/Krugman definition of mtra-mdustry trade, which is incompatible with both 
the principle of comparative advantage and the factor proportions theorem Grubel and 
Lloyd argued that this type of mtra-mdustry trade "can be explained by relaxing either 
the assumption that production functions are identical across countries or the 
assumption that there are no economies of scale" (Grubel and Lloyd 1975 89) 
However, the relaxation of the assumption of identical production functions dilutes
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this type of intra-industry trade into the first type of intra-industry trade identified by 
Grubel and Lloyd In other words, the Lovasy/Krugman intra-industry trade becomes 
the cross trade of Marshall and Taussig, and is compatible with both the principle of 
comparative advantage and the factor proportions theorem Removmg the assumption 
that there are no economies of scale m respect of the varieties of the good does, on the 
other hand, allow for international trade without the existence of pre-trade 
comparative cost differences, as both Lovasy (1941) and Krugman (1979) showed
From a methodological pomt of view, the type of mtra-industry trade which Grubel 
and Lloyd measured, matters considerably Some of their definitions were compatible 
with the principle of comparative advantage and, indeed, with a factor proportions 
explanation of that comparative advantage These types of intra-industry trade do not, 
therefore, warrant a new theory of mtra-mdustry trade They are fully compatible with 
the static theory of international trade as it stood before the publication of Krugman 
(1979) The third type of mtra-mdustry trade identified by Grubel and Lloyd, that 
which corresponds to the Lovasy/Krugman definition, is not compatible with the 
principle of comparative advantage and the factor proportions theorem This third type 
of mtra-mdustry does necessitate an alternative theory of trade
This distinction between different types of mtra-mdustry trade, and their 
methodological significance did not go unnoticed by those theorists engaged in 
empirical research into mtra-mdustry trade In the same year as Grubel and Lloyd’s
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textbook appeared, Finger published his critique of Grubel and Lloyd’s (1971) paper 
Finger argued forcefully that, "this paper does not attempt to contribute to the 
mtra-industry trade literature Rather it argues that this literature is valueless" (Finger 
1975 581)
Finger argued that what Grubel and Lloyd were measuring, m their indices, was not 
mtra-mdustry trade, but rather "trade overlap" (Finger 1975 581) ‘Trade overlap’ as 
defmed by Finger corresponds to the Marshall/Taussig phenomenon of cross trade It 
is mtra-mdustry trade which is compatible with the principle of comparative advantage 
and the factor proportions theorem, if the industry is reclassified at a lower level of 
aggregation It is trade which exists, merely as a result of statistical aggregation (For 
the sake of continuity, I shall contmue to use the term cross trade to refer to 
mtra-mdustry trade which is compatible with comparative advantage and factor 
proportions, and mtra-mdustry trade to refer to trade which is not compatible with 
these propositions)
Finger’s argument was that, while Grubel and Lloyd might have made the 
methodological distinction between cross trade and mtra-mdustry trade in their general 
discussion of the concept, this distinction did not carry through to their statistical 
investigation of the phenomenon The argument centred on Grubel and Lloyd’s (1971) 
contention that the 3-digit industrial classification corresponds most closely to the 
concept of industry as used in the static theory Fmger argued that in this industrial
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classification, factor proportions can vary as much within each industry as between 
them (Finger 1975 586) Finger held, therefore, that the mtemational trade which 
Grubel and Lloyd identified in their indices could be fully explamed by the factor 
proportions theorem
Finger argued that, in order to show that the international trade which they identified 
was incompatible with a factor proportions explanation, Grubel and Lloyd "must show 
not only that trade overlap exists at a given level of aggregation, but also that mput 
requirements do not vary substantially within commodity groups at that level of 
aggregation" (Finger 1975 584)
Fmger argued for the necessity of a clear definition of mtra-industry trade
if the formulation and testing of a ‘theory of international trade’ is to add to 
our knowledge of the international economy, it must focus on separating 
those elements of economic theory which are consistent with intra-industry 
trade from those which are not, so that the extent of trade overlap constitutes 
empirical evidence applicable to separating valid propositions from invalid 
ones (Fmger 1975 587)
The thrust of Finger’s argument is that intra-industry trade, m the Lovasy/Krugman 
sense, had to be proven to exist as an empirical phenomenon, before it could be taken
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as an anomaly to the factor proportions theorem, and a warrant for a new theory of 
international trade
Despite the methodological significance of his argument, Fmger’s critique did not 
produce much of a rethink on the Grubel/Lloyd indices and the phenomenon they 
measured Trade theorists contmued to use the Grubel/Lloyd mdices to measure 
mtra-mdustry trade Grubel and Lloyd, themselves, recogmsed the problem that 
aggregation poses, and investigated the extent to which the amount of mtra-mdustry 
trade they calculated at the 3-digit level was reduced at lower levels of mdustnal 
aggregation (Grubel and Lloyd 1971 500) This was obviously not conclusive 
evidence, for Finger, that mtra-mdustry trade exists The extent of aggregation, even 
at the 5-digit level, still did not, for Finger, preclude an explanation of mtra-mdustry 
trade based on different factor requirements among the products m the 5-digit 
classification
By the late 1970s, empirical investigation had turned to an assessment of the extent to 
which cross trade, as identified by Grubel/Lloyd mdices, was compatible with the 
predictions of the dynamic theory of international trade put forward by Linder, 
Posner, and Vernon Significant tests m this regard were presented at a conference on 
mtra-mdustry trade held at Kiel University m 1978 Some of the papers presented 
raised the issues which Finger had made m respect of the Grubel/Lloyd mdices
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Gray distinguished between intra-industry trade and trade which occurs as a result of 
"categorical aggregation" (Gray 1978 87) This latter was international trade m 
products categorised in the same industry, but with different production functions 
(Gray 1978 88) Gray surveyed the statistical studies of mtra-mdustry trade and his 
conclusions are similar to those of Finger none "can withstand the insistence of critics 
that the definition of an industry be limited to production umts producing completely 
identical goods m different nations" (Gray 1978 92) Gray attempted to re-focus trade 
theorists on what he saw as the central issue "to attempt to confirm or refute the 
existence of mtra-mdustry trade in quantities sufficient to warrant analytic concern 
with its causes" (Gray 1978 98)
The most interesting part of Gray’s paper, from a methodological pomt of view, is 
appendix B, m which Gray attempted "to set limits to an industry so that the concept 
becomes operational" (Gray 1978 107) The derivation of an ’operationally 
meaningful’ and hence measurable definition of industry is central to Finger’s 
argument Gray redefined industry m the following way "An industry comprises 
those goods which use generally applicable mputs in similar proportions in the absense 
of product-specific mputs" (Gray 1978 107)
Q = f s (K , H , L , PSI,, , P SI)
ij u v y y y 1’ ’ n7
(Gray 1978 107)
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In the above, j denotes subvarieties of the good 1 PSI are product specific inputs 
None of these product specific inputs are vital to the production of the j subvarieties 
The product could be made just using K, H and L Sy denotes scale properties
At given factor prices and at a certain scale of production, "there will be a distribution 
of umt variable costs of production of the j subcategories around some mean" (Gray 
1978 108) This gave Gray the following definition of an industry "an industry is 
defmed as compnsmg those j* sub-categories of the ith good which fall within some 
arbitrary range (say +  5 percent) around the mean of the distribution, when scale and 
the prices of generally applicable mputs are determined" (Gray 1978 108)
From this definition of industry, Gray defmed mtra-mdustry trade thus "when a 
nation simultaneously exports and imports some of the j* subcategories of the ith 
industry" (Gray 1978 108) Thus, in Gray’s definition, the production functions of 
these traded j subcategories are identical m respect of the general factors, K, H and L, 
where the product specific mputs do not have an ’overwhelming’ impact on the cost of 
the jth subvariety, nor on the extent of its differentiation (Gray 1978 108) Gray’s 
definition of mtra-mdustry trade, under his definition of industry, precludes not only a 
factor proportions explanation of mtra-mdustry trade, but also a comparative 
advantage explanation Within the j* subcategory, the production function is taken to 
be identical between firms Any international trade of varieties included in the j*
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subcategory is mtra-industry trade in the Lovasy/Krugman sense This trade occurs 
without the existence of any pre-trade comparative cost differences between countries
Gray’s analysis would appear to be a positive step m attempting to derive tests which 
would show mtra-industry trade rather than cross trade Yet his paper prompted the 
following comment from Hesse "I cannot understand in what way the question ’What 
is an industry’ can be at all meaningful Our task as economists is not to develop a 
generally valid definition of an industry, but to explam reality" (Hesse 1978 112) 
Hesse argued that the definition of an industry is moot, where what is being 
considered is the relative impact of price differentials and consumer preferences on the 
pattern of international trade
In this case, Hesse argued, industries should be determined by consumer demand 
functions, rather than by production functions (Hesse 1978 112) This implies that the 
appropriate classification of industries is accordmg to the elasticity of substitution in 
demand, not in production (In fact, a model of international trade based on elasticity 
of substitution in demand had already been postulated by Armington (1969) The 
Armington model was expanded on by Lloyd (1978), a paper presented at the same 
conference) This argument by Hesse sidestepped the mam point raised by Gray, and 
earlier by Finger (1975), which was that existence of intra-industry trade cannot be 
taken as an anomaly to the factor proportions theorem, if the industrial classification
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used in the empirical test does not correspond to the concept of industry employed in 
the factor proportions theorem
Finger and DeRosa attempted to reinstate the factor proportions theorem through a 
series of regressions (Finger and DeRosa 1978) They took labour, physical capital, 
skill ratio, and the rate of product turnover as independent variables set against US 
cross trade as the dependent variable The inclusion of the skill ratio in their analysis 
was on the basis of the argument put forward m Larson (1978), that large-scale 
production techniques can be operated by relatively unskilled labour, whereas 
small-scale production techniques involve frequent adjustment as product varieties 
change thereby involving more skilled labour which is classified as capital
The prediction from this analysis was that labour intensive countries are likely to 
export the more standardised versions of products, whereas (human) capital intensive 
countries are more likely to export specialised versions of products Finger and 
DeRosa found only insignificant correlations between the extent of cross trade and 
their independent variables (Fmger and DeRosa 1978 221) Because of this, they 
included cross trade as an independent variable, and used as a dependent variable "our 
measure of revealed comparative advantage the share of U S exports in the exports 
of fourteen major industrial countries to the world (less the U S )" (Fmger and 
DeRosa 1978 224)
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Their results were significantly different to their first set of correlations They found 
the following "human capital has a consistently positive effect on U S 
exports basic labor services are consistently negatively correlated with U S export 
performance the Leontief paradox continues to hold for U S trade U S export 
advantage appears stronger for those manufactures which are characterized by greater 
product turnover [w]here a large proportion of trade is overlapped, the revealed 
comparative advantage of U S manufactures m international trade is also above 
average" (Finger and DeRosa 1978 224-225)
Fmger and DeRosa considered some possible explanations for the high correlations 
between cross trade and the extent of U S revealed comparative advantage They 
considered Vernon’s theory in the light of the high correlation between the rate of 
product turnover and revealed comparative advantage They argued that while the 
product life cycle theory can explam why the U S would have a comparative 
advantage in varieties of products which are non-standardised, the product life cycle 
theory would also predict a high correlation between cross trade and the rate of 
product turnover This second prediction was not borne out by their empirical results 
(Fmger and DeRosa 1978 226-227)
For an alternative explanation, Fmger and DeRosa turned to Larson’s theory described 
above As in the product life cycle theory, this theory predicts that large, human
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capital intensive countries will tend to export specialised varieties, and import 
standardised varieties from basic labour intensive countries Fmger and DeRosa drew 
the following conclusion
A large mdustnal country (e g the Umted States) will, producing only for 
the home market, achieve economies of scale m more varieties than will a 
smaller mdustnal country This suggests that in those industries with a 
relatively large number of ’fringe’ product varieties, trade will be overlapped 
and production techniques will be skill intensive (Fmger and DeRosa 
1978 228)
This argument is supported by the significant correlation between cross trade and 
revealed comparative advantage, and also between cross trade and skill intensity which 
Fmger and DeRosa found for the U S (Fmger and DeRosa 1978 228) Fmger and 
DeRosa’s evidence showed that the factor proportions theorem was still a valid and 
important factor in the explanation of cross trade, and that the extent of product 
differentiation, while important m the explanation of U S comparative advantage, 
may not be that important as an explanation of why countries import and export within 
the same industrial classification Fmger and DeRosa’s findings in support of the 
factor proportions theorem did not deter trade theorists from attempting to derive an 
alternative theory of trade which would allow for the phenomenon of mtra-mdustry 
trade
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It was not Kingman’s mtention to abandon the HOS theories altogether, although he 
did argue that their significance had been seriously undermined "The evidence on 
mtra-mdustry trade does more than downgrade conventional factor proportions theory 
it provides considerable positive support to one particular alternative theory which 
combines factor proportions with economies of scale and differentiated products" 
(Krugman 1978 13) Krugman argued that "the emphasis on factor proportions in 
theoretical trade literature is, of course, not the result of an empirical judgement It is, 
instead, a matter of following the line of least mathematical resistence" (Krugman 
1978 14) "Following the line of least mathematical resistence" is exactly what trade 
theorists were directed to do by the neoclassical heuristics dominating the international 
trade sub-disciplme It is iromc that Krugman should have chosen to criticise the work 
done on the factor proportions theorm on these grounds, since, when Finger’s 
argument is taken into account, it becomes clear that the theory of mtra-mdustry trade 
as it was later defined by Krugman (1979) was not based on empirical considerations 
either
This section shows that the discussions on the phenomenon of mtra-mdustry trade 
were not cohesive There were fundamental disagreements over the definition of 
mtra-mdustry trade, and how to measure the phenomenon There was debate as to 
whether the empirical evidence for mtra-mdustry trade was anomalous to the factor 
proportions theorem There was debate as to whether the empirical evidence provided
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corroborations of the dynamic theories of international trade Yet by the early 1980s, 
a new international trade sub-disciplme had been established, which not only 
"downgraded" the HOS theories but also removed the Ricardian principle of 
comparative advantage as the sole explanation for patterns of international trade The 
question addressed in the final section of this chapter is the extent to which this new 
sub-disciplme was actually borne out of the empirical investigations which preceded 
it
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8 3 RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONS THE IMPACT OF EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORY OF 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE
The mtra-mdustry trade identified first by Lovasy (1941) and later by Krugman 
(1979), cannot be explained by the factor proportions theorem Nor, mdeed, can it be 
explained by the principle of comparative advantage, smce Lovasy and Krugman 
showed that this type of international trade would arise where there are no pre-trade 
comparative cost advantages across countries When faced with empirical evidence for 
mtra-mdustry trade, the appropriate falsificatiomst response would have been to reject 
the factor proportions theorem, and the demi-core principle of comparative advantage, 
and formulate an alternative conjecture to explam international trade patterns
Superficially at least, this is what trade theorists appear to have done During the 
1970s, empirical evidence identifying mtra-mdustry trade was accumulated, and m the 
late 1970s/early 1980s, an alternative model of international trade was proposed by 
Krugman (1979) The superficiality of this falsificatiomst rational reconstruction 
highlights a significant problem with the methodology of historiographic research 
programmes In usmg the history of a science m a quasi-empirical way m order to 
evaluate methodologies, MHRP presupposes that "a certain method M was used and 
was responsible for the success" that is identified by the scientific elite (Radmtzky
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1976 517, see chapter 3 2 for a review of the debate among philosophers as to the 
validity of MHRP as a meta-methodological framework) In other words, MHRP 
assumes that if the rational reconstruction accurately predicts actual historical events, 
then the theory of scientific rationality underlying that rational reconstruction gives 
methodological rules which are followed by scientists m practice However, the above 
argument m respect of a falsifications reconstruction of the development of 
international trade theory in the late 1970s, shows that a rational reconstruction may 
accurately predict actual historical events without explaining the development of those 
same historical events This outcome shows the danger m employmg MHRP as a way 
of choosing between methodologies This is the danger which Koertge discussed, the 
possibility that history would become distorted so that it would fit any theory of 
scientific rationality (Koertge 1978 361) A closer examination of the historical events 
highlights the extent to which a falsifications rational reconstruction fails to explain 
these developments m international trade theory
An investigation reveals that the factor proportions theorem was not m fact rejected by 
trade theorists, rather the theorem was relegated to an explanation of only some 
international trade patterns Moreover, the empirical evidence on mtra-mdustry trade 
was inconclusive The previous section shows that trade theorists were not measuring 
mtra-mdustry trade, as identified by Lovasy and Krugman, but rather cross trade 
Cross trade is compatible with the principle of comparative advantage and with the
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factor proportions theorem
How, then, can a falsifications methodology explam the development of an 
alternative theory of international trade9 One could argue that trade theorists believed 
that the tests they developed durmg the 1970s, did  provide empirical corroboration for 
mtra-industry trade Given this belief, the development of an alternative theory of 
international trade is warranted by the falsifications methodology However, the 
papers of Fmger (1975), Finger and DeRosa (1978), and Gray (1979) were 
prominently published, and serve as evidence that trade theorists were aware of the 
methodological problems with their data on mtra-mdustry trade Trade theorists knew 
their tests were inconclusive This suggests that it cannot be considered Poppenan 
rational for trade theorists to have developed an alternative theory of international 
trade on the basis of their empirical evidence on mtra-mdustry trade In terms of a 
falsifications theory of scientific rationality, it would not have been rational for trade 
theorists to base a theory of mtra-mdustry trade on this empirical evidence, because 
this empirical evidence did not falsify the propositions of the static theory of 
international trade based on factor proportions While a falsifications rational 
reconstruction can predict the development of the theory of mtra-mdustry trade, it 
cannot provide a causal explanation for this development It provides only a rather 
spurious correlation with the historical facts
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Does a Lakatosian rational reconstruction provide an adequate causal explanation for 
the development of an alternative theory of international trade9 Under MSRP, the new 
theories of international trade should have been bora out of a depletion of novel 
predictions from the older static theory of mtemational trade This depletion would 
warrant either a creative shift m the static theory, or the generation of a whole new 
theory which would entail the predictions of the older, static theory as a special case 
Chapter 6 3 argues that the incorporation of the new theories of mtemational trade 
into the sub-disciplme resulted m the generation of an alternative demi-core to that of 
the older, static theory of mtemational trade In Lakatosian terms, when a change 
occurs m the hard (demi-) core, a whole new programme (sub-disciplme) is created 
In order to constitute a progressive move m the development of the science, the new 
programme should generate, not only the empirically corroborated predictions of the 
older programme, but also a whole plethora of new empirically corroborated 
predictions
The problem here is that neither the novel predictions of the older static theory of 
mtemational trade based on factor proportions, nor the novel predictions of the new 
theories of international trade based on the Lovasy/Krugman definition of 
intra-industry trade, have been empirically corroborated The new theories appear to 
be more concerned with the prediction of actual trade patterns, but they are really an 
attempt to account in a theoretical way for disturbing causes to the predictions of the
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static theory of international trade There has been a certain amount of theoretical 
progress in the shift from the factor proportions research programme to the 
programme based upon the new theories of international trade, but in MSRP, 
theoretical progress (le the identification of theoretical, but not empirically 
corroborated novel facts) is not sufficient to explain why one programme should take 
precedence over another (Lakatos 1970 118)
De Marchi (1976) showed how the neoclassical heuristics of the older factor 
proportions theory of international trade did not direct trade theorists to empirical 
analysis The incorporation of the new theories of international trade does not break 
the link between the neoclassical economics programme and the static theory of 
international trade From a positivist pomt of view, the impetus for the generation of 
the new theories cannot rationally have come from the empirical work of the 1970s, 
since this empirical work did not highlight the existence of mtra-mdustry trade as 
defined by Krugman (1979) in the first of the new theories’ models The empirical 
work of the 1970s cannot be considered a crucial experiment, an experiment which 
allowed trade theorists to make an empirically based choice between the older static 
theory of international trade, and the new theories
Lakatos did argue that "there are no such things as crucial experiments, at least not if 
these are meant to be experiments which can instantly overthrow a research 
programme" (Lakatos 1970 173) However, he went on to say that "scientists, of
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course, do not always judge heuristic situations correctly" (Lakatos 1970 173) 
Lakatos cited several cases where what appeared at the time to be crucial experiments 
were later withdrawn For Lakatos, these examples serve as proof that "instant 
rationality" such as that suggested by Poppenan falsificatiomsm does not exist 
(Lakatos 1970 174)
One could argue that the apparent mterpretion by trade theorists of the empirical 
investigation into intra-industry trade as a crucial experiment which refuted the older, 
static theory and justified the development of an alternative, was simply a 
methodological mistake If so, it is a mistake which shows that "rationality works 
much slower than most people tend to think, and, even then, fallibly" (Lakatos 
1970 174) Lakatos suggested that incorrect judgements as to the nature of empirical 
investigations are made only by a few members of the scientific community "A rash 
scientist may claim that his experiment defeated a programme, and parts of the 
scientific community may even, rashly, accept his claim" (Lakatos 1970 173) Yet, 
surely, for an incorrect judgement to make a difference to the development of a 
programme or sub-disciplme, it must be accepted by the majority of the scientific 
community9 An incorrect judgement that is ignored cannot delay rational 
decision-making in the way suggested by Lakatos
As was argued above in respect of the Poppenan rational reconstruction of the 
development of the new theories of international trade, the methodological flaws m
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the empirical analysis of intra-industry trade were publicly exposed by Finger (1975) 
and were well-known Surely it would be permitting of too much irrationality for 
Lakatosian standards, to argue that trade theorists knew that they were making a 
methodological mistake and accepted it9 It appears, therefore, that, even with the 
acceptance that methodological mistakes can be made, MSRP cannot provide an 
adequate explanation for the development of the new theories of international trade 
Worrall extended Lakatos’ arguments on the criteria for choice between research 
programmes, and argued that, where two research programmes are empirically 
equivalent, a choice might be made between them on the grounds of their internal 
consistency (Worrall 1978a 63, see chapter 3 1) The research programme whose 
hypotheses are derived in a way that is consistent with the positive heuristics of that 
programme is the preferred programme (Worrall 1978a 63) In this case, however, 
both research programmes are equally internally consistent, and Worrall’s appraoch 
does not offer a "clear rationale" (Worrall 1978a 63) for the preference of one of the 
programmes over the other
Both falsificatiomsm and MSRP argue that it is empirical warrants which drive science 
forward The new theories of international trade are generally accepted as an example 
of progress m international trade theory by international trade theorists themselves 
However, this identification of the new theories as progressive cannot be explained by 
theories of scientific rationality which employ empirical warrants as the criteria for 
theory/research programme choice As is argued at the end of chapter 3 2, a failure of
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positivist rational reconstructions forces an examination of what it is that economists 
do m practice What, then, are the criteria that international trade theorists use, which 
prompted them to view the new theories of mtemational trade as progressive9
The incorporation of the new theories of mtemational trade into the static theory 
generated both a heuristic and a demi-core change m the static theory The principle 
of comparative advantage was relegated to the explanation of only some patterns of 
mtemational trade Economies of scale and product differentiation were incorporated 
into the demi-core, in order to explain the patterns of international trade which the 
principle of comparative advantage could not The change m the heuristics of the 
static theory was also significant It allowed for the generation of non-ad hoc novel 
predictions from partial equilibrium models of mtemational trade However, this 
heuristic change did not mean that the link between the static theory of international 
trade and the greater neoclassical programme was broken The new theories of 
international trade were not ad hoc to the neoclassical programme This is because the 
heuristic change m the static theory of mtemational trade was m response to previous 
changes m the heuristics of the neoclassical programme While the shift generated by 
the new theories of mtemational trade may m Lakatosian terms have resulted in a 
whole new theory, in purely heuristic terms the changes between the older, static 
theory of mtemational trade and the new theories were slight The new theories of 
international trade can be interpreted as a creative shift which allowed for the
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continuity of the neoclassical explanation for international trade by incorporating in a 
theoretical way, more disturbing causes
But what of the indications that an empirical warrant developed within the 
international trade sub-discipline durmg the 1970s9 It was argued m chapter 7 3 that 
the dynamic theory of international trade developed under an empirical heuristic 
Trade theorists, in the dynamic theory, were instructed to empirically test their 
hypotheses The empirical investigations of mtra-industry trade were not concerned 
with the theoretical concept of mtra-mdustry trade found m the new theories These 
studies tended to focus on the novel predictions of the dynamic theory as opposed to 
the novel predictions of the static theory of international trade It could be argued that 
this empirical work was in fulfilment of the heuristic requirement of the dynamic 
theory, but was not indicative of a shift within the international trade sub-disciplme as 
a whole to evaluate theories on empirical grounds
The conclusion of these arguments is that the new theories of international trade did 
not stem from the empirical investigations into mtra-mdustry trade which took place in 
the 1970s The new theories and the empirical investigations were essentially 
concerned with different phenomena The argument that trade theorists did not 
recogmse this difference is not accepted, given the well-documented evidence to the 
contrary If trade theorists recogmsed this difference between the theoretical and the 
empirical investigations, then it cannot be argued that the new theories of international
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trade were an empirically rational progression from the empirical investigations of the 
1970s Yet, both a falsificatiomst and a MSRP rational reconstruction arrive at this 
same conclusion It has been argued above, that the compatibility of these rational 
reconstructions with the actual historical events is merely a correlation, as opposed to 
a causal explanation for those events An explanation, it is argued, is to be found m 
the methodological hypothesis that trade theorists denote progress as inherent m those 
theories which allow more known facts to be incorporated into the neoclassical 
framework
Under a rational reconstruction which emphasizes the use of this theoretical criterion, 
it is argued that the new theories of international trade are simply a creative shift 
borne out of previous heuristic changes m the neoclassical programme Interpreted as 
such, the new theories of international trade allowed for the continuity of a 
neoclassical explanation of patterns of international trade The empirical 
investigations, on the other hand, were a response to the heuristics of the dynamic 
theory of international trade The division between the static, neoclassical theory of 
international trade and the dynamic theory, persisted mto the early 1980s This 
argument refutes the methodological hypothesis that the new theories of international 
trade facilitated a convergence between the static and the dynamic theories of 
international trade
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
Part one of this dissertation has been concerned with the influence of three twentieth 
century philosophies of science, Poppenan falsificatiomsm, Kuhnian scientific 
revolutions, and Lakatosian methodology of scientific research programmes, both on 
the actual practice of economics and on economic methodology
Poppenan falsificatiomsm appeared to provide a set of defined, obective criteria which 
would ensure progress m economics Economic methodologists examined the 
development of economics, and in particular econometrics, in order to see whether it 
progressed in the pattern of conjecture and refutation suggested by Popper This 
analysis has shown that falsificatiomsm is a difficult procedure for economists to 
adopt This difficulty is due m part to a lack of consensus among economists as to 
what constitute adequate tests of their theories There were also practical difficulties in 
empirical testing arising out of the fact that economic theories tend to be probabilistic 
hypotheses These problems show that falsificatiomsm has not been applied to 
economics in any general way, but they do not show that falsifications criteria, if 
applied, would fail to generate progress m economics However, there are certain
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flaws in Popper’s theory of scientific progress, principally with the concept of 
verisimilitude, which suggest that falsificatiomst criteria might not generate scientific 
progress
Despite these problems, Poppenan falsificatiomsm has continued to exert a 
considerable influence on economic methodologists, and to a lesser extent on 
economists in general This preoccupation with Popper has lasted much longer among 
economic methodologists, than among philosophers of science In the 1960s, 
philosophers of science began to question the whole notion that an objective set of 
criteria could be derived which would guarantee progress in science This backlash 
against orthodox philosophy of science culminated in the publication of Kuhn’s The 
Structure o f Scientific Revolutions m 1962 Kuhn’s theory of science provided a 
framework whereby the history of a science could be analysed in order to discover the 
grounds upon which scientists themselves chose between scientific theories Kuhn’s 
philosophy was not an alternative theory of scientific rationality to Popper’s Rather, 
Kuhn’s philosophy was based on the notion that "rationality ought to be defined by 
what is found m the history and practice of science rather than set out formally m 
advance and imposed upon history" (McMullin 1978 239) A Kuhnian philosophy, 
therefore, advocates a sociological examination of the history of science However, 
economic methodologists have tended to apply Kuhnian philosophy to the history of 
economics as though it were an alternative theory of scientific rationality In other 
words, they have been principally concerned with identifying paradigms, normal
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science and scientific revolutions in the history of economics, rather than with 
reconstructing this history as a sociological study
Because of their ‘objectivist’ application of Kuhn’s philosophy to economics, the 
failure to identify scientific revolutions m the history of economics has led to a 
conclusion that economics is not progressive in Kuhnian terms Not surprisingly, then, 
economic methodologists turned back to positivist philosophies of science, and in 
particular, Lakatos’ MSRP (1970) As with their use of Kuhnian and Poppenan 
philosophies, the concern of economic methodologists has been with the identification 
of Lakatosian concepts in the history of economics Thus, the present preoccupation in 
economic methodology is with identifying research programmes, heuristics and hard 
cores, and most importantly, Lakatosian novel facts, m the history of economics
Economic methodologists have had problems in identifying Lakatosian novel facts m 
the history of economics What Lakatos defined as novel does not appear to 
correspond to what economists themselves define as novel In other words, Lakatosian 
rational reconstructions do not tend to correspond with the reconstructions of 
economists, just as Poppenan rational reconstructions do not tend to correspond with 
the reconstructions of economists
The method of rational reconstruction has brought economic methodologyonto the 
meta-methodological level of analysis Both Popper and Lakatos suggested
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meta-methodological criteria whereby one methodology could be deemed preferable to 
another Lakatos’ methodology of historiographic research programmes (MHRP) 
involves the comparison of a rational reconstruction of the history of a science with 
the actual history of a science The assumption is that the ‘closer the fit’ between the 
rational reconstruction and the actual history, the greater the likelihood that scientists 
actually employed the criteria expounded by the particular theory of scientific 
rationality underlying the rational reconstruction MHRP has been much criticised by 
philosophers of science who argue that a closeness of fit cannot be assumed to reflect 
a causal explanation
Have economic methodologists been using this flawed meta-methodological 
framework to choose between theories of scientific rationality7 They have certainly 
devoted a substamtal amount of tune to searching for Poppenan, Kuhnian and 
Lakatosian concepts m economics Has their acceptance of MSRP been because it 
provides a better closeness of fit than the other two philosophies9 It appears not Both 
Blaug (1976) and Hands (1990) have argued that m several important cases, a 
Lakatosian rational reconstruction has failed to highlight the examples of progress 
which economists themselves give However, they do not conclude that the effort m 
trying to fit Lakatosian rational reconstructions has been a waste of time Rather, they 
argue that the analysis of the discrepancies between Lakatosian rational reconstructions 
and the actual history of economics has led to a greater understanding of what it is that 
economists do It is my contention that due to a failure of rational reconstructions
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based on positivist philosophies of science to identify what economists themselves 
hold to be examples of progress m economics, economic methodology has been forced 
into a Kuhnian type of analysis, an analysis of what economists actually do and of the 
criteria of progress economists themselves use m order to identify progressive 
theories
In order to show that this use of the method of rational reconstruction is fruitful, the 
development of international trade theory is considered in the light of the theories of 
scientific rationality discussed in part one of the dissertation
Part two begins with an identification of a rational reconstruction of the history of 
international trade theory by trade theorists themselves This fits in with the Kuhnian 
argument that the scientists of the present paradigm will present a history of their 
science which implies that the scientists of past paradigms had the same scientific 
concerns as those of the present paradigm (Kuhn 1970a 138) This rational 
reconstruction of the history of mtemational trade theory is found m all textbooks of 
international trade theory and is in fact the Pure Theory of International Trade In this 
dissertation, it is refered to as the neoclassical rational reconstruction This is not to 
suggest that neoclassicism is an alternative theory of scientific rationality akm to 
falsificatiomsm and MSRP Rather, it is to stress the close link between the Pure 
Theory and the general equilibrium programme m economics
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Part two is essentially an exercise in the comparison of three sets of rational 
reconstruction of the development of international trade theory those of the positivist 
philosophies of science, that of the historian, and the rational reconstruction put 
forward by trade theorists themselves Kuhn argued that each of these rational 
reconstructions will differ, because the philosopher, the historian and the scientists 
will identify a different set of "essentials" to form the basis of his rational 
reconstruction (Kuhn 1977 15) It is argued that a comparison of these distinct sets of 
rational reconstructions leads to a greater understanding of how progress is defmed in 
mtemational trade theory
Chapters 5 to 8 traced the parallel development of the static theory and the dynamic 
theory of international trade It is argued that both theories belong to the same 
sub-discipline because they share a demi-core That demi-core includes the principle 
of comparative advantage, the proposition that there are mutual gams from 
international trade, and that free trade mcreases those gams However, these theories 
have developed very different methodologies While the static theory of international 
trade has adhered to a neoclassical heuristic, the dynamic theory has been driven by 
empirical heuristics Not surprisingly, the neoclassical rational reconstruction 
commonly found m international trade textbooks focuses on the development of the 
static theory The neoclassical reconstruction depicts a history of international trade 
theory which mvolves only the development of the principle of comparative advantage
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in a 2x2x1 model of trade, by Ricardo, Mill and Marshall The implication from this 
reconstruction is that the overriding concerns of 19th century trade theorists m 
general, were neoclassical concerns A MSRP rational reconstruction, on the other 
hand, identifies the dominance of the dynamic theory of international trade as the 
principal mode of analysis during the 19th century, and indeed, until the 1930s There 
were very few attempts to amalgamate the two theories of trade, perhaps because they 
were not alternatives, but rather complementary explanations of the impact of 
international trade
From the 1930s, the static theory of international trade developed under the 
‘Samuelson shift’ to become the dommant mode of analysis This dominance lasted 
until the late 1950s, and it is durmg this period that the sub-disciplme exhibited signs 
of what Blaug diagnosed as the "disease of formalism" (Blaug 1992 190) Blaug 
implied, however, that international trade theory continued to be dominated by 
excessive formalism until more recently Such a conclusion would be suggested by a 
neoclassical rational reconstruction which ignores the extent of empirical 
investigations conducted within the dynamic theory of international trade from the 
early 1960s A MSRP reconstruction points out the empirically corroborated novel 
predictions of Linder (1961) and Posner (1961) A MSRP reconstruction would argue 
that the dynamic theory was progressing durmg the 1960s, while the static theory of 
international trade was bereft of empirically corroborated novel facts
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Why, then, was the static theory retained9 It is argued in chapter 7, that a rational 
reconstruction which focuses on the extent of internal consistency within the static and 
dynamic theories of international trade, shows that the static theory did not have the 
derivation of empirically corroborated novel facts as its heuristic goal It remamed 
consistent with the neoclassical aim of formalising the theory of international trade 
withm its general equilibrium framework Novelty, according to the neoclassical 
heuristics of the static theory, was not to be found in the derivation of empirically 
corroborated predictions, but rather in the ability to incorporate more extraneous 
phenomena into the general equilibrium framework
The final issue dealt with is the starns of the new theories of international trade and 
their relation to the empirical work on intra-industry trade conducted during the 
1970s The new theories of international trade are frequently cited as the rejuvenators 
of international trade theory, as facilitating a convergence of the static and dynamic 
theories of international trade (An exception would be Baldwin 1992) It is argued in 
chapter 8 3 that the new theories of international trade, while they focus on 
intra-industry trade, were not bom out of the empirical work carried out in the 1970s, 
but rather were bom out of developments in the neoclassical programme, the 
heuristics of which drive the static theory of international trade These new theories of 
international trade do constitute a positive development m the static theory of 
international trade In fact, they have resulted in the generation of a whole new static
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theory of international trade They have allowed for more extraneous phenomena to be 
incorporated into a general equilibrium model of international trade But they do not, 
m themselves, constitute a convergence of the static and dynamic theories of 
international trade
Has the international trade sub-disciplme been a progressive one9 The answer to this 
question depends on the definition of progress In terms of the Poppenan and 
Lakatosian theories of scientific rationality, the tune spent on the theoretical 
development of the static theory of international trade could have been more fruitfully 
employed m empirically-oriented investigation However, Koertge argued that, over 
the life of a research programme, a paradigm, or a sub-discipline, there will be 
occasions when theoretical considerations take precedence
Scientists are looking for theoretical systems which are both mterestmg ( 1  e 
deep, explanatory, informative, simple) and true But m the course of their 
search they are sometimes temporarily forced to trade off interest for truth 
and vice versa In a balanced research programme neither factor will be 
overriding m all situations (Koertge 1978 267)
Hausman has criticised economic methodologists for their failure to see that a large 
proportion of economic theorising is "a conceptual exploration" (Hausman 1989 115) 
It is pointless, therefore, to assess them "in terms of some philosophical model of
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confirmation or falsification" (Hausman 1989 115) It has been argued m this 
dissertation that the conceptual exploration which occurred within themtemational 
trade sub-discipline was progressive, within the terms of its own neoclassical 
heuristics A neoclassical rational reconstruction does suggest, however, that the 
international trade sub-disciplme has been unbalanced, that there has been a trade off 
of empirical considerations for theoretical considerations The comparison of this 
neoclassical rational reconstruction with a Lakatosian rational reconstruction shows the 
history of mtemational trade theory to be much more balanced as between empirical 
and theoretical considerations than the neoclassical reconstruction suggests Blaug’s 
argument that international trade theory has not paid due attention to empirical 
considerations is mistaken (Blaug 1992 190) International trade theory contains 
elements which are progressive from the neoclassical point of view, but also contains 
elements which can be defined as progressive from the objective, positivist 
perspective
Negishi has argued that "modem [trade] theory has failed to leam from classical 
theory" (Negishi 1992 229) This failure is not surprising if one considers the amount 
of the actual history of international trade that is omitted from its neoclassical rational 
reconstruction The neoclassical rational reconstruction of international trade theory 
identifies essentials which cause it to ignore or omit part of the history of international 
trade theory An historian’s rational reconstruction includes those elements of 
International trade theory omitted from the neoclassical rational reconstruction, but
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without making any judgments as to why international trade theory developed m a 
particular way A comparison of these rational reconstructions with the reconstructions 
of positivist philosophies focuses the analysis on definitions of progress used by trade 
theorists themselves If one accepts Hausman’s argument that economists are largely 
concerned with "conceptual exploration, " then it is not surprising that the definitions 
of progress inherent in the neoclassical reconstruction of international trade theory are 
very different from those inherent in positivist rational reconstructions of the same 
theory What is perhaps surprising is that a proportion of international trade theory is 
m fact progressive m terms of MSRP In other words, the definition of progress 
employed in certain theories of international trade is an empirical definition
The next stage in this analysis would be to reconstruct international trade theory from 
a sociological and a rhetorical pomt of view, in order to further explore the reasons 
behind the dominance of neoclassical considerations over empirical considerations m 
the development of international trade theory from the 1940s until the late 1970s The 
aim would be to provide a complete history of international trade theory formed from 
the combination of a number of reconstructions, each identifying a different set of 
‘essentials ’ This history would, it is argued, enable economists to learn much more 
from the development of international trade theory, than a rational reconstruction 
based on the current definition of progress in use m international trade theory would 
do This is because, as is evident from the post-1980 developments m international 
trade theory, the methodological objectives of economists change over tune These
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changes should have a greater and more fruitful impact on the history of economic 
thought, than simply another rewriting of the history of economic thought which 
portrays earlier trade theorists as "having worked upon the same set of fixed problems 
and m accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution m 
scientific theory and method has made seem scientific" (Kuhn 1970a 138) Similarly, 
a history which is solely a rational reconstruction based upon positivist philosophies of 
science is of limited use to the practical economist, given that so much of economics 
is, as Hausman pointed out, to do with ‘conceptual theorising ’
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